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t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. As a proponent of "full disclosure," Professor Folk notes that his
points of view have inevitably been shaped by his roles as Reporter and
Draftsman of the South Carolina Business Corporation Law of 1962 and
its 1963 amendments and presently as Reporter to the Delaware Corporation
Law Revision Committee.
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In 1955 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the Business Corporation Law, a radical revision and extension of existing
law. As the most advanced statute of its time,' it was the forerunner of significant developments in corporation laws elsewhere in
the United States. The North Carolina statute has now received a
comprehensive and, on the whole, a definitive exposition and interpretation by Russell M. Robinson, II, in his 1964 treatise North
Carolina Corporation Law and Practice. Apart from its other virtues-and they are many-this book lays before the reader, with
clarity and completeness, the whole sweep of the corporation statute
through its close dissection of individual sections, on the one hand,
and comparison and synthesis, on the other. In this tenth year after
enactment of the corporation law, the appearance of the Robinson
treatise makes it fitting to re-evaluate the North Carolina statute
which has been extravagantly praised and bitterly criticized.2 This
article, therefore, performs the dual function of reviewing the
Robinson treatise, and of reassessing the North Carolina statute.
Several considerations justify this approach. First, the Robinson treatise repeatedly (and rightly) gives advice on difficult practical problems of complying with the statute and raises warnings as
to the surprisingly large number of pitfalls besetting both the corporate practitioner, and perhaps more seriously, the unadvised
businessman not even aware of the need for legal counsel. Assaying
the adequacy of Mr. Robinson's advice and warnings involves judgment of the statute he expounds. Secondly, Mr. Robinson's treatise
lays the foundation for an informed critique of the North Carolina
'Even so, it would have been more "advanced" had not the legislature
excised certain provisions thought too radical for the time. Most notable
was deletion of the "pseudo-foreign corporation" sections which, if enacted,
would have given North Carolina courts broad statutory powers over the
internal affairs of enterprises incorporated outside North Carolina but
doing business chiefly within North Carolina. ROBINSON §§ 239, 245. New
York's new Business Coroporation Law, enacted in 1961, included various
pseudo-foreign corporation controls, but these have been progressively
watered down by amendments in the 1962 and 1963 legislatures so as to
exempt from most of these requirements all corporations listed on a national securities exchange or deriving less than half their business income
from New York sources. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-1320.
2E.g., Garrett, Capital and Surplus under the New CorporationStatutes,
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239 (1958). Mr. Robinson notes and makes
good use of these critical comments. See, e.g., ROBINSON § 141, at 388 n.3.
Much of the criticism has come from draftsmen and other proponents of the
Model Business Corporation Act from which the North Carolina law makes
major substantive deviations although borrowing its basic structure, many
of its ideas, and much of its language.
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statute. He does not himself take that step, but rather accepts the
statute as it is. Indeed, his essential neutrality with respect to the
statute and its policy is one of the book's strongest points. He highlights deficiencies and difficulties but only to aid the attorney who
consults his study. He has no axes to grind. Precisely because of
this unbiased and craftsmanlike approach, the attorney can rely
with confidence on his exposition and view his warnings as the
product of sober judgment, and no doubt, of experience. Although
enthusiastically endorsing his approach, I regard it as appropriate
and timely to take the step he denied to himself (if, indeed, he
wished to do so), and that is to reassess both the policy and some
technical aspects of the statute. Closely related to this is a third
consideration. The ten years since the statute's enactment in 1955
is a long time in the fast-moving corporate law field, particularly
since many of the most important statutes have been wholly rewritten or substantially revised.' These newer statutes have evoked
the most searching and critical studies of the whole of corporation
law at any time since the subject began to draw serious attention.
In the light of these new developments, the North Carolina statute,
essentially unaltered since its original enactment, shows signs of
aging. The same process whose consequences eventually forced
revision of the old law is already at work on the 1955 statute.
8 Among

the more significant post-1955 enactments are statutes in
Connecticut (1959), CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-282 to -412 (1962); New
York (1961), N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW; South Carolina (1962), S. C. CoDE
§§ 12-11.1 to -24.9 (1964 Supp.); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1
to -155 (1964). These statutes are singled out because each was the product
of unusually careful and extensive study preceding enactment and because
each may fairly be said to introduce novel provisions marking a significant
advance in the area. Pennsylvania has been carrying on a continuing
study and revision of its statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 (1958). The 1964
Delaware legislature authorized a committee, subsequently established by
the Secretary of State, to revise the Delaware General Corporation Law,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1953), but this committee will probably not report
until the 1966 legislative session. In 1963, Florida sharply departed from
precedent with a statute applicable solely to close corporations. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 608.0100 to 608.0107 (Supp. 1964); see Comment 77 HARV. L. REV.
1551 (1964). The Jenkins Committee in England recently recommended
sweeping changes in the present English statute, Companies Act, 1948, 11 &
12 Geo. 6, c. 38 COMPANY LAw COMMITTEE, REPORT, CMND. No. 1749
(1962). Important new statutes have either been enacted or officially
recommended in several commonwealth nations, most notably Ghana.
COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE WORKING AND ADMINISTRATION
THE COMPANY LAW

OF

GHANA, FINAL REPORT

(1961).

OF
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I. THE ROBINSON TREATISE
Robinson's North Carolina CorporationLaw and Practice is a
model of the law book expounding a local statutory enactment. It is

carefully organized for effective use; it is written with clarity and
precision; and, most important, it is accurate and comprehensive.

This in itself is an accomplishment. Most books of this genre are
so far a hodge-podge of statutory and decisional quotations and
paraphrases that the attorney pays twice-once for his state's code
and reports, and again for a scrapbook of quotes from the code
and reports he already owns. In contrast, Mr. Robinson's book is
a running narrative uninterrupted by copious quotations (the easy
alternative to analysis), and with a proper allocation of material between text and footnotes. This review criticizes some of the author's
choices and views, both as to coverage and as to detailed treatment
of certain matters. But these are minor defects and do not alter
the recommendation that the Robinson treatise should be owned by
every attorney in North Carolina and by other counsel having
significant contacts with North Carolina corporations.
A. Scope of the Book
The stated purpose of the Robinson treatise is to "furnish a
practical and comprehensive guide" to the North Carolina Business
Corporation Law.' The book achieves its goal. It explores virtually
every provision of that statute, in more or less detail, and it looks
to some subject matter outside the statute, e.g., aspects of suits by
and against corporations.5 Of special value are its chapters6 on
corporate accounting, dividends, and reacquisition of shares which
deal effectively with fundamentals, and give the general practitioner,
who is neither a corporate law specialist nor knowledgeable in
accounting, an adequate understanding of the most complex and
detailed financial provisions of any American corporation statute.
This material clearly does not put the attorney in the position of
an accountant, and even knowledgeable counsel should hesitate to
advise on the application of many North Carolina statutory provisions to specific fact situations without an accountant's opinion.
Besides laying the basis for a clear understanding of the statute,
'r ROBINSON
Id. § 15. § 3, at 8.
' Chapters 18, 19 & 20.
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these chapters hopefully will induce counsel to pressure corporate
clients into painstaking record-keeping--of itself an important accomplishment.
Although normally a reviewer recognizes and respects the
author's choice as to his book's coverage, in several instances the
self-imposed limitations of the Robinson treatise invite criticism in
the light of the book's purposes.
First, the treatise does not deal with any corporation questions
arising under securities statutes (federal or state) and under the
tax laws. In general, this limitation is needed to keep the treatise
within reasonable bounds and from invading specialized subject
matter. Apart from the tendency of this approach to ingrain the
all-too-common disposition to look only to the state corporation
law and to ignore or sidestep problems under cognate statutes, this
limitation leads the treatise into a serious omission: the failure to
discuss the SEC's rule 10b-5Oa under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. This is dismissed in a single sentence,1 although it is now
the matrix of much of the new law of fiduciary duties, and is being
applied almost to the limit of the commerce power, including stock
transactions in close corporations. In fact, precisely because of this
evolving federal corporation law,la derived from but increasingly
independent of the immediate purposes of the securities statutes,
the attorney must know something of this area which is likely to
escape his attention. Non-coverage of "insiders'" liabilities under
section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of

1 9 3 47b

is less

serious,' since at the time of writing the liability to repay "shortswing" profits on stock transactions within less than six months
applied only to Exchange-listed corporations, although now it will
govern many over-the-counter enterprises brought under SEC jurisdiction by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964.'
I would concur in the decision not to wade into the intricacies of
the ever-changing and constantly reinterpreted tax laws, but with
one exception. Certainly it is sufficiently important to the corporaoa 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
RoBINSOi § 95, at 257 n.40.
" For discussion, see Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal
Law of Corporationsby Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav.
185 (1964); 43 N.C.L. REv. 637 (1965).
48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958).
8RoBN~soNr § 95, at 257 n.41.
78 Stat. 565.
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tion practitioner to know about Subchapter S corporations"° to

criticize the exclusion of this subject from a study addressed to
attorneys who are not corporate specialists." Most close corporations will surely wish to consider taking advantage of the special
provisions for the Internal Revenue Code available to corporations
with less than ten individual shareholders and with but a single class
of stock-a situation often found in small businesses.' 2 Since
thousands of close corporations elect tax treatment under Subchapter
S," and since compliance with the federal requirements will dictate
many choices under a given state corporate law, it is appropriate
for a general treatise to deal with at least this single aspect of tax
law. This is not an impossible task, for O'Neal's Close Corporations'4 very successfully weaves tax matters into the corporate law
materials without upsetting the balance of the book, or unduly
lengthening it. Selective emphasis on some matters dehors the North
Carolina corporation law would surely have been helpful, and its
place is not adequately taken by Mr. Robinson's sound warning that
"few corporate problems can be handled" without reference to tax
and other statutes.' 5
On the other hand, the Robinson book does give detailed treatment to certain other matters not strictly within corporation law.
For instance, in discussing corporate officers and agents, he devotes
a number of pages to recapitulating some rather elementary agency
law,'" but here the treatment of the varying concepts of "authority"
is necessarily inadequate.
B. "General" versus "Local" Treatise
Mr. Robinson's choice of a study directed purely to North Carolina law is an appropriate one. It performs the indispensable task of
collecting together all the local decisions, keying them into the
statute, and showing interrelationships between case and statutory
law which otherwise would pass unnoticed. Moreover, it will serve
the attorney who will often not need to go much beyond local de1371-1377.
10 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§
" It is mentioned once in a footnote. ROBINSON § 9, at 33 n.38.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a).
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
(1958).
14 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
'5 ROBINSON § 3, at 8. A case in point is compensation of officers and
directors where, indeed, tax aspects are more important than the relatively
simple corporation law questions. Id. § 103, at 282-283.
'aId. § 99.
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cisions. It also permits a degree of detail and analysis not justifiable in a "general" treatise. However, the local study does have
important drawbacks, and no one should be misled into attributing
too much to even the best of local studies-and Mr. Robinson's is
surely among the best.' 7 This is especially true when, as in North
Carolina, the decisional law is not rich in relevant precedents or
illuminating dicta-in contrast to the vast corpus of case law in
states such as Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey.
To that extent, the attorney may unconsciously develop too narrow
an outlook or find it reinforced-especially dangerous in corporation
law which is, in many ways, more "national" in character than
many other private law areas. The local treatise, by its very nature,
is selective of those problems which the state's courts have thought
about or which interested the statute's draftsmen enough to induce
them to treat them in the statute. Thus, the local study rarely draws
attention to the new and evolving areas of the law, if only because
statutes usually lag behind the times and only come up to the frontiers when the frontiers have receded. The local treatise serves a
vital, but limited, role. In the usual case, its coverage is only as
complete as the body of statutory and decisional law in the state,
and this will often be inadequate for the attorney faced with novel
corporate law issues.
Mr. Robinson's book does, in large part, bridge this gap. From
time to time, he cites contrasting decisions from other states, typically Delaware, and cross-references various North Carolina statutory provisions to their archetypes in the California code. His test
for citing "outside" decisions is one of "special relevance to the
discussion," usually to "fill in a background on the general law of a
subject" or to "illustrat[e] a possible resolution of [an] uncertainty"
in North Carolina law.' He also fills some of the gaps in the local
statute and cases by citations to other treatises and to law review
articles, although this is helpful only so far as these materials are
readily at hand. In general, Mr. Robinson's self-imposed limitations
work satisfactorily, but not always. For instance, in discussing
shareholder derivative suits he notes, but does not comment upon,
a "number of other procedural problems in derivative litigation
"' ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE (1964), dealing on a comparative basis
with the New York and Delaware statutes is also a distinguished contribution 8to the literature on corporation law.
ROBINSON § 3, at 9.
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[that] have not yet received the attention of the North Carolina
Supreme Court."'" These, however, include such practical issues as
the scope of the corporation's right to interpose defenses to the
action, intervention rights of. shareholders, jurisdictional and procedural problems under federal law, and so on. The fact that these
issues have not arisen here does not justify their non-coverage in a
treatise designed for attorneys who will likely have no other source
of information on such matters and who are likely eventually to
encounter such problems as derivative litigation increases.
As a general rule, Mr. Robinson gives a full and adequate
exposition of any subject he turns to. A good example is his analysis
of the complexities in the less-than-perfectly worded statute permitting certain transactions between directors and their corporation.2"
On the other hand, for reasons not wholly clear, text discussion is
sometimes surprisingly thin,2 ' and frequently little more than a
paraphrase of the language of the statute. This is true, for instance,
in connection with indemnifying directors and officers for liabilities
and expenses incurred by them both in derivative and "third party"
suits-a practical, difficult, and important issue.22 The fact that
North Carolina has apparently never had a decision on idemnifying
corporate executives hardly is reason for not discussing the statute,
which contains problems well worth developing; indeed, it is a
good reason to develop it. In other instances, the text simply paraphrases more or less closely the language of the statute.2
C. Other Features of the Robinson Treatise
The Robinson book has many features of practical value and
utility to an attorney. First, the forms are as good as any currently
10 Id. § 109, at 302.
20 Id. § 92.
" For example, I find the treatment of voting trusts most unsatisfactory,
particularly because it does not deal with many difficult issues either raised
by or not covered by the statute or the case law. See id. § 55(a). See also
text acompanying notes 238-45 infra. This is a good example of the intrinsic
limits of a local treatise which can devote so little attention to problems
which out-of-state decisions either solve or illuminate. A like observation
applies to the discussion, if such it be, of the tough problem of the exclusiveness of the shareholder's appraisal remedy. RoBINsOx § 208.
2
Id. § 112.
Id. § 38 (proxies); id. § 39 (judicial review of elections). This is
true in many parts of the chapters dealing with "fundamental corporate
changes." Much of this is inevitable; after all, how much can one say about
the procedure to approve a merger or sale of assets?
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available.24

However, the attorney must be strongly and constantly
cautioned against the inevitable tendency to assume that any form
good enough to be printed is good enough for any corporation he
is asked to create. Many of the clauses in the forms for articles of
incorporation and especially the by-laws are inappropriate for a
close corporation, e.g., standard by-law provisions for quorum and
voting of shareholders and of directors, inclusion of an executive
committee article in the by-laws, as well as provision for assistant
officers. It would also have been helpful had the book given optional and alternative clauses for dealing with some of the very real
close corporation problems. Although O'Neal's Close Corporations,
as the prime source, contains a wealth of such optional matter, it
would have been useful to the general practitioner, whose only
corporation law treatise may be Robinson, to have these vitally important ideas before him. Adding a group of optional and alternative
clauses to the first supplement of the treatise would be invaluable.
Secondly, Mr. Robinson's book is replete with helpful advice and
warnings on a variety of technical matters.2 5 Contrary to those who
would always advise going to a "liberal" state, he correctly advises
local incorporation whenever possible, but he rightly notes that this
is not to be followed at all times.2 6 Usually, the advice is on more
specific points, such as clauses to include in the by-laws or in the
articles of incorporation, or good corporate practice, or advice as to
including all shareholders as parties to certain intra-corporate agreements. A very desirable feature, in this vein, is the constant stress
on the equitable limitations which can override any corporate action
specifically authorized by statute and thus negate decisions which
formally and procedurally are flawless. Mr. Robinson fully de"There are forty-three forms covering sixty-three pages of text with
footnotes. See id. at 635-697.
"Id. § 4, at 22 (warning about fleeing North Carolina to "liberal"
states) ; id. § 31(d), at 106 (electing directors by plurality); id. § 32(a),
at 108 (avoid fractional and multiple voter per share); id. § 44, at 131
(specific notice as to items on agenda of shareholder meetings); id. § 54,
at 148-149 (advising that high vote requirements go into charter rather
than by-laws); id. § 56(c), at 159 (advising that all shareholders be made
parties to agreement concerning corporate dissolution); id. § 97, at 261
(regarding procedure on removal of directors); id. § 103, at 284-285
(advance authorization of all compensation for executives); id. § 122, at
335 (advising specific refe rnce to dividend arrearages on fixing redemption price); id. § 130, at 358 (resolutions on consideration received for
shares); id. § 191, at 486 (statutory requirements in merging with an outof-state
corporation).
20
Id. § 4, at 11.
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velops this point as to sale of a corporation's own shares,27 purchases of a corporation's own shares,2" amendments of the charter,29
and dissolution.3 Of course, these "equitable limitations" are simply
applications, in particular circumstances, of the general standards of
fiduciary duty; but in these fundamental corporate changes they
undergo some special twists calling for the more detailed discussion
which Mr. Robinson gives them.
There are other helpful aids to the practitioner. These include
useful checklists and tabulations by which scattered material is
brought together."- North Carolina cases are copiously cited
throughout, since they offer some background to the statute. But
in so many respects, the statute departs so sharply from antecedent
law the older cases are apt to have little persuasive value, although
naturally they will continue to be cited and discussed by court and
counsel despite their marginal relevance. In some instances, the older
cases are essential because the statute does not cover the points they
involve, e.g., stock transfer restrictions, 2 or else because the statutory standards are broad and merely incorporate the prior law, e.g.,
the general standard of fiduciary duty."3 Counsel will always find
aid in the many cross-references in the footnotes-so copious, indeed, that sometimes one flits back and forth from page to page as
if he were vainly trying to follow an unfamiliar liturgy. The footnotes do have the great virtue of including a number of useful
treatise and law review citations for a fuller treatment of a particular subject. The book gives sufficient citations to and quotes
from the rather sketchy legislative history of the act, in the offchance that the supreme court may give serious weight to the
background of the statute, as it hinted it might in White v. Smith.3
The book has an excellent table of cases and statutes, and as compreId. at § 129.
Id. at § 174.
20Id. at § 180.
11Id. at § 218.
"1Id. § 8, at 31-32 (arrangements which must be stated in charter); id.
§ 9, at 33 (matters to be passed on at organization meeting); id. § 25, at
77 (special matters to be considered in by-laws); id. § 34 (shareholder
votes needed for various types of action); id. § 53 (devices to rearrange
intra-corporate control); id. § 57, at 162 (matters to be considered in a
first-refusal option); id. § 70, at 208 (matters committed by statute to
action by directors).
02 Id. at § 57.
asId. at § 87.
8'256 N.C. 218, 220, 123 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1962).
27

8
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hensive and accurate an index as is to be found in any legal treatise
of comparable scope and size.3 5 In general, the arrangement of parts,
chapters, and intra-chapter divisions is satisfactory.
Mr. Robinson also normally takes a realistic view of corporate
law and can recognize a fiction when he encounters one. For instance, in discussing dividends under the North Carolina statute
he does not fall into the error of supposing that "earned surplus"
or some other "sources" are funds, but, as he puts it, "simply
mathematical limitations on the extent to which shareholder withdrawals can legally reduce the net worth of the corporation."3 "
Similarly, he recognizes the "metaphorical" character of the old trustfund concepts supposedly protective of creditors but in reality more
likely to mislead them; for, as he points out, the substance of this
concept is again a mathematical limitation on the extent of distributions by corporations.3 7 So, too, in dealing with foreign corporations, he properly distinguishes the "doing business" concept
for purposes of qualification, local taxation, and amendability to
suit within North Carolina.38 This clear-sighted and pragmatic
approach is most desirable.
On the whole, then, Mr. Robinson has worked out his study
quite effectively. The attorney seeking information on a particular
point of North Carolina law should get material assistance from
Mr. Robinson's commentary and analysis. It is a first-rate contribution to the literature on North Carolina law and should be used, at
least in the first instance, by every attorney concerned with North
Carolina corporation law.3 9

II. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE-TEN YEARS LATER
A. Streamlining the Incorporation Process
The ten years since enactment of the North Carolina Corpora-

tion Law have witnessed the streamlining of incorporation procedure
" The tables of statutes and cases and index cover no less than eightysix pages. See ROBINsoN at 699-784.
So Id.§ 154, at 412.
37 Id. § 141, at 388 n.7.
8
3 Id. § 232, at 584-85.

" The publisher should be complimented. The Robinson treatise is

unusually well printed with almost no typographical errors; the type, both
for text and the numerous footnotes and for the indices, is sufficiently large
and clear to be easily readable; the binding is sturdy; and the book contains
back-cover pocket for updating supplements which, it is hoped, will be
frequently published.
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in almost all of the new statutes. The North Carolina statute, however, still contains excessive complexity and formalities characteristic of an earlier day's ritualism by which a corporation was brought
to birth. The 1955 statute went far towards eliminating unnecessary
requirements, but this salutary process of simplification should
today be carried much further, as it has been in so many other
states. 39a
1.-The present statute, for instance, calls for multiple incorporators: "three or more natural persons, whether or not residents of
this State, of the age of 21 years or more ...

"4o

Many of the

newest statutes have eliminated the archaic requirement of multiple
incorporators and authorize a single individual to act in that capacity.41 This is a sensible approach. The one-man corporation is
today universally recognized in American law,' and more particularly by a North Carolina statute43 occasioned by two fantastic decisions44 in the mid-50's which had, indeed, attributed some substantive significance to multiple incorporators and directors in holding that the corporate entity collapsed on acquisition of all the shares
by a single individual. It is surely undesirable to insist upon multiple
"a

Charters could be simplified if the statute would recognize the "all

purpose" clause rather than require, as does N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(3)

(1965), a detailed enumeration of specific corporate purposes. Everyone
knows that charters often recite every conceivable (and sometimes inconceivable) type of business, presumably to avoid both ultra vires difficulties
and the need to amend the charter if the corporation strikes out on a new
line of business. So long as charters recite any and all lawful business objectives, the "purpose" clause fails to serve the supposed function of disclosing the actual business of the enterprise. Since it would only revive the
old ultra vires problems to restrict corporations to one or more specific
purposes stated in the charter, it seems sensible to recognize the facts of
corporate life and adopt a statutory provision, such as Wyo. STAT. § 1736.46(c) (Cum. Supp. 1963) requiring the articles of incorporation to
state "either (1) the purpose or purposes for which the corporation is
organized; or (2) that the corporation shall have unlimited power to engage
in and to do any lawful act concerning any or all lawful businesses for which
corporations may be organized under this act." Similar provisions appear in
IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.49(3) (1962) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.45(1) (c)

(1957).
40 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-6 (1965).
" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 401; S.C.

CODE § 12-14.2 (Supp.

1964);

MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.3 (1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.44 (1957).
" See Fuller, The Incorporated Individual; A Study of the One Man
Company, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1373 (1938).
40 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (1965).
"Park Terrace Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d
877 (1955), on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956). For a
searching (and engaging) critique, see Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and
the One-or-Two Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 471 1(1956).
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incorporators to implement any fiction that a corporation is an
association of persons with the super-added statutory incident of
limited liability. Moreover, the law has never questioned the validity
of corporations formed by "dummy" incorporators-clerks or young
lawyers or what have you-who are merely straw-men for the real
parties in interest. If a dominant objective of corporation law is
simplicity-and surely it is in implementing the now undisputed
privilege of receiving limited liability through incorporation-multiple incorporators should be deleted as a ritualistic relic. This accords with the current version of the Model Act,45 the most influential
single corporate law pattern in use today and a significant source for
the provisions of most statutes, including North Carolina.
Some corporation statutes (including the Model Act) now take
the further step of removing any requirement, express or implied,
that the incorporator or incorporators be "natural" persons. 40 The
Iowa statute had long permitted "artificial" legal persons to function
as incorporators ;47 English law has recognized the capacity of
corporations to act as directors of other corporations.4" Since incorporation is a stereotyped process, at least so far as the role of
incorporators is involved, it is appropriate to permit a corporation to
function as incorporator. This is realistic since much incorporation
is now the work of professionals, i.e., the various corporation
service companies which attend to the mechanics of incorporation
as an aid to attorneys. Obviously any such corporate incorporator
can only act through its agents, but this merely means that the
authorization of a person or persons to act in the incorporator's name
is essentially an intramural matter. To take account of current practice, this approach is clearly preferable to a statutory requirement
that "dummy" individual incorporators be rounded up.
2.-Mr. Robinson cogently points out the uncertainty of the
current practice, both in North Carolina and elsewhere, of directors
taking the necessary action to organize the corporation through
unanimous written consents, instead of through a meeting which
section 55-11 says "shall be held" after filing the articles of incorporation. 49 Mr. Robinson's caution is appropriate since con-

"'ABA-ALI

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 47
CODE § 12-14.2 (Supp. 1964).
" IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 496A.2(1), 496A.48
ANN. § 21.2(c) (1963).

"'E.g., S.C.

(1962 Draft).
(1962). See also Micn.

" See Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 178, 204.
"'N.C.GEN. STAT. § 55-11 (1965) ; ROBINSON § 9, at 33-34.

STAT.
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ceivably a court might hold that the statutory provision for an
organizational meeting is mandatory and does not admit the substitute of formal written consent. I personally do not find such risk
under the statutory provisions: Section 55-29 declares, without
limitation as to subject matter or occasion or type of resolution,
that "action taken by a majority of the directors . . . without a
meeting is nevertheless board . . . action" if written consent is

given."0 The resolutions and decisions of the organization meeting
are action of the directors and can therefore be taken by consent.
Policy considerations support such a result. The traditional rationale
for compelling a directors' meeting is the conviction that a group of
directors assembled "in meeting" will bring out facts or perspectives
not known or apparent to any one of them singly, and that this
result is so probable and so much of a safeguard to the corporation
that nothing short of a meeting will suffice. Since this is certainly
true, statutory tolerance of action-without-a-meeting subordinates
those values to "convenience" and "flexibility." But if any directors'
meeting is likely to be cut and dried, demanding no exchange of
views but formally implementing previously agreed-upon action, it
is the organization meeting of directors. Hence, it seems only a
remote possibility that, in view of the statute's broad sanction of
action-without-a-meeting, courts would read section 55-11 so as to
single out corporate organizational activity as the sole type of
corporate action that directors may not take merely by written
consent. But courts do indeed sometimes stick to straight statutory
language unilluminated by any view of purpose or context. Hence,
since the incorporation procedure should, so far as possible, be unshadowed by doubts, and especially uncertainties as to the validity
of a common and harmless procedure, the North Carolina statute
should provide specifically that a corporation may complete its organization without a directors' meeting. New York has done so."
And North Carolina could do this simply by adding to section 55-11
a sentence stating that "any action permitted to be taken at the
organization meeting may be taken without a meeting of the board
of directors and shall be deemed board action if it complies with
the requirements of section 55-29 of this chapter."
10 N.C. GEN.
" N.Y. Bus.

STAT.
CORP.

§ 55-29(a)(1) (1965).
404, after stating that an organizational meet-

LAW §

ing "shall be held," provides that "any action permitted to be taken at the
organization meeting may be taken without a meeting if each incorporator
or his attorney-in-fact signs an instrument setting forth the action so taken."
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3.-An unfortunate, although probably a permanent and inescapable, feature of the incorporation process, and of many other
statutory schemes, is the conventional requirement of both central
filing and local recordation of particular documents.r Thus, all
corporate documents subject to the general requirements of section
55-4 must be filed with the Secretary of State and then recorded
with the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the
corporation locates its registered office. Failure to meet these dual
filing requirements were once the recurrent occasion for arguments
that a particular corporation had not completed its organization
and that, even if not a corporation de jure, it was a corporation
de facto. Happily, the North Carolina statute removes the worst
problems by making corporate existence collaterally unassailable upon
the single act of filing the articles of incorporation, or other instrument, with the Secretary of State.53 The only penalty for nonrecordation is monetary, but otherwise the validity of the transaction
stands unimpaired. This solution, although eminently desirable, is
really a compromise, and a compromise for practical political considerations, i.e., the refusal to forego local recordation fees even
when local recordation is no longer needed.
The insistence on local recordation boils down to the conviction
(1) that it is more convenient for local attorneys, i.e., attorneys in
or near the county of the corporation's registered office, and (2)
that it aids title searching. Local recordation does not necessarily
insure these asserted advantages. As to general convenience, the
document will be recorded only in one county, i.e., where the registered office is located, although the corporation may be doing a
multi-county business. Hence it may be as or more convenient to
call or write Raleigh than to go off to the one county where the
document is locally recorded. Again, since the only sanction to
compel local recording is a monetary penalty, there is no strong
incentive to remember local recording; and the attorney (or title
searcher) cannot be certain that the document will be locally recorded. To be certain, he must check in Raleigh, for absence of the
document in the local file does not establish the point-e.g., the
existence or non-existence of the corporation-one way or the other.
As for title searching, the local recordation requirement will be
§§ 26(c), 26(d) for examples of needless confusion
arising from a recordation, as well as a filing, requirement.
2 See ROBINSON

"N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 55-8, 55-4(b) (1965).
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really useful only if (1) the title being searched is for land located in
the county of the registered office and (2) it is certain that the document was locally filed. This cuts down on the asserted convenience,
for (1) many corporations will have land in more than one locale
(but no one has ever argued that convenience to title-searchers
means that the corporation must keep a file of all potentially relevant
corporate documents in every county where it has land) and (2),
since the document may not in fact be locally recorded, the title
searcher should draw no firm conclusions if he fails to turn up a
particular corporate document. Again, a call or letter to Raleigh
would seem more definite and certain.
The North Carolina solution, retaining local recordation but
drawing the sting of non-compliance, is, as we have said, a compromise, although one which properly gives precedence to the assurance that corporate existence begins on filing in Raleigh regardless of what happens subsequently. It would be much more sensible,
although probably politically impractical, to follow the lead of a
few states and either abolish local recordation entirely 4 or require
a single filing with the Secretary of State who must transmit a
copy of the filed instrument for local recordation. 5 If local attorneys and title searchers are to be protected-and not merely local
recording fees-then the latter procedure is much more satisfactory
for it insures local recordation through an administrative routine
(leaving aside some inevitable delay in transmission from the central to the local filing place).
B. De Facto Corporationsand Estoppel to Deny Corporateness
It is widely assumed that statutory provisions like North Carolina's,5 making articles of incorporation filed with the Secretary
of State conclusive of legal organization, eliminate any need for the
doctrines of "de facto corporation" and "corporation by estoppel." 57
Thus, Mr. Robinson notes that the de facto corporation concept
is now meaningless since it is improbable that "anything short of
filing articles of incorporation could create a de facto corporation," '
§ 33-285 (1962); S.C. CODE § 12-11.6 (Supp. 1964).
" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 104(g); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.53 (3)
(1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-51 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 301.06,
-07 (Supp. 1964).
" CONN. GEN. STAT.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8 (1965).
2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 179 (1960).

"ROBINSON

§ 11(a), at

38.
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while filing itself creates a corporation de jure. Even if this is
correct, it is still arguable that courts should posit corporate status
with respect to particular transactions, under the concept of "corporation by estoppel."'5 9 However, section 55-8 may conceivably
imply that if articles of incorporation have not been filed with the
Secretary of State, corporateness, i.e., limited liability, will not be
recognized at all, under any of the old judicial concepts. Thus the
difficult question is whether the "corporation by estoppel" doctrine
survives the statute. At least one court has squarely held that where
a third party dealt with defendant on a corporate basis, the third
party was not estopped to sue the individual since estoppel concepts
had been impliedly abolished by the statute."0 Although such a
result may sometimes be appropriate as a factual matter in a particular situation, certainly the statute should not be construed so
as to destroy the traditional discretionary power of courts to invoke estoppel in order to do justice or implement reasonable expectations of parties."' For "with the flexibility of the estoppel
doctrine, applied sparingly where justice demands it, the intention
of the parties is carried out and security of transactions is maintained."' ' l The public policy of compelling due filing of corporate
documents is not so overwhelming as to call for abolishing all
estoppel concepts with the concomitant result of imposing strict
personal liability on the parties who may have innocently acted on
a supposed corporate basis. Thus, the old problems are not yet
completely laid, as one might suppose at first glance; and indeed
they may take a more difficult form.
A more acute difficulty concerns the possibility that a corporation will be duly organized so that its corporate existence commences under the statute,6 2 and with its initial capital paid in, it will
"' Id. at 36-37.
"°Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964), where D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-921c (1961) corresponds to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8 (1965),
but D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-950 (1961), making personally liable "all persons
who assume to act as a corporation without authority," has no North Carolina
counterpart. Hence, the case is possibly distinguishable. See 43 N.C.L.
REv. 206 (1964).

" In Cranson v. International Business Machs., Inc., 200 A.2d 33 (Md.
1964), the court of appeals, without reference at all to the relevant Maryland
statute, MD. CODE ANN., art. 23, § 131(b) (1957), corresponding approximately to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8 (1965), permitted a defendant individual
officer
of aN.C.L.
defectively
organized corporation to plead estoppel.
"' 43
REv. 206, 210 (1964).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 55-8 (1965).
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begin business."3 But the initial capital may be minimal:64 Mr.
Robinson's form for the articles of incorporation states the minimum
capital as one dollar. 5 The only statutory prohibition on doing
business without capital is a liability to pay up such part of the
minimum capital as has not been actually received by the corporation. 6 On the face of the statute, then, a corporation may be
organized with virtually no capital; it does business; and its directors or others are liable-but only for one dollar or less. Apart from
this, the individuals cannot be sued, since the corporation has been
conclusively formed with limited liability. But the corporation has
no funds to speak of. This may invite a judicial recrudescence and
extension of a common law doctrine that the undercapitalized corporation subjects the corporate insiders to personal liability,6 7 although, in the past, decisions on this theory have been limited to
cases of the grossest and most excessive undercapitalization,6 8 and
thus have rarely furnished a satisfactory remedy. Although Mr.
Robinson suggests one dollar as the stated capitalization in the
articles of incorporation and no doubts assumes that the "real"
capital will come in later, it would seem safer to state a somewhat
larger initial capital.
There is no clear solution, either in statute or case law, to this
problem. Unlike statutes in other states, North Carolina requires
no minimum capital (usually 500 to 1,000 dollars)," simply because (1) the amount which it is practical and politic to require
by statute is too little to matter and (2) it is possible, through distributions, to remove even this minimum from the corporation, if
so desired. On the other hand, a minimum capital of 500 or 1,000
dollars may force persons to think twice before incorporating, and
thus perhaps deter promiscuous or purely fly-by-night enterprises.
A more stringent safeguard is not only to impose personal liability
on directors up to the amount of the minimum capital when they

"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-9 (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7 (5) (1965) specifies no minimum amount.
5).
'= ROBINSON at 639 (Form 3,
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-32 (g) (1965).
" See RoBINsoN § 67 (a).

" Weisser v. Mussam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942) (merchandizing corporation capitalized at $1.00); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v.
W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920) ($10,000 capitalization).
0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4) (1953) ($1,000 capital); S.C.
CODE § 12-14.6(a) (2) (Supp. 1964) ($1,000 capital of which at least $500
must be in cash).
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prematurely do business, 70 but to make them generally liable for
all corporate debts until the stated capital has been received.7 '
Thus, we find curious consequences in the new corporation laws
in general and in North Carolina in particular. In seeking to fix
precisely the date when the corporation comes into existence and
eliminate the need for the de facto corporation doctrine, the statute
may sometimes work injustice by an implied negation of estoppel
concepts when needed. In seeking to make the incorporation process
more flexible and to eliminate formalities, the statute may encourage
inadequate capitalization and expose, more than under the older
and more rigid statutes, corporate officers and others to personal
liability under the ill-defined common law liability in this area.
Thus, the newer statutes create a type of new problem in place of
the old confusions dealt with judicially by de facto corporation
concepts. On questions such as this, the attorney will do well to
follow what has always been good practice: insure prompt and
immediate filing on documents, urge a respectably adequate capitalization, and do everything possible to prevent clients from pursuing
72
corporate business until funds have been paid in.
"N.C.

GEN. STAT.

'S.C.

CODE §

"North

§ 55-32(g) (1965).
12-14.6(b) (Supp. 1964).

Carolina has followed the Model Act and most jurisdictions

in permitting a corporate name, proposed or actual, to be reserved for a
brief time period until the corporation can be organized or secure authority
to do business in North Carolina or effect a name change. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-12(d) (1965). This prevents the not unknown blackmail by which an
unscrupulous person corners the name and tries to force the legitimate enterprise to buy back its proposed name at a high price. North Carolina,
unlike most jurisdictions, does not provide for long-term protection of a
corporate name. Under the Model Act and in other states, a foreign corporation may "register" its name for a period of up to ten years, thereby
securing a definite right (possibly subject to trade-mark and unfair competition rules) to the same. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 9-10
(1960). Although a corporation may not plan any immediate expansion into
other states, it will normally want to save its name for use in various states
if it should decide to expand. In most of the newer statutes, it may do so
for a ten-year period without showing any present intent to go into the
host state. This opportunity is unavailable in North Carolina since the
long-term name reservation is available only to a "person or corporation
acquiring the good will of" another corporation, either domestic or authorized
foreign. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12(e) (1965). This seems a needlessly
restrictive approach and an inconvenience to out-of-state corporations wishing
to save their name for a substantial time period pending a decision whether
to come into that state. North Carolina should permit this as a matter of
convenience and comity to corporations from many states that extend this
privilege to North Carolina corporations.
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C. Election and Removal of Directors
Along with their right to institute derivative suits, the shareholders' power to elect and remove directors is the most potent form
of control which the "owners" of the corporation can exert over
those who are vested with statutory authority to manage the corporate affairs. 73 Without these two rights, the corporation would
become in law what it often is in fact: a managerial autocracy
responsible only to itself and, as a consequence, often irresponsible.
The North Carolina statute, by its silence, leaves shareholder derivative suits entirely to common law rules which are often conflicting
or uncertain.74 As to election and removal of directors, and related
matters, the North Carolina statute is reasonably complete; several
provisions are particularly good, but several contain serious ambiguities or omissions which could readily be corrected.
1.-As to the number of directors, North Carolina retains a
rather archaic requirement of at least three directors whatever the
number of shareholders. 5 This should not be demanded of corporations with fewer than three shareholders, unless the latter
desire it. For instance, two shareholders might conceivably wish a
third director to break deadlocks, but this merely means that they
either are willing to let one shareholder exercise majority control
of the board of directors if the third director is "his" man, or that
they wish to have a permanent arbitrator if the third director is to
be "neutral." Since many corporations with but two shareholders
may prefer to take the greatly enhanced risk of deadlock resulting
from even-numbered boards, the statutorily required third director
is apt to be just a dummy. 78 Alternatively, the shareholders will
designate a four-director board (probably wives plus themselves)
to keep a balance of power intact. The requirement of three directors is absurd in the case of a one-man corporation, for surely
N.C. GEx. STAT. § 55-24(a) (1965) ("Subject to the provisions of
the charter, the by-laws or agreements between the shareholders otherwise
lawful," corporate affairs "shall be managed by a board of directors").
" For discussion, see text accompanying notes 148-62 infra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-25(a) (1965).
" There is nothing inherently wrong with dummies in corporations, at
least so long as they don't have control of the business (which, unfortunately,
they sometimes do). But unless there is some good reason for it, statutes
should do away with persons whose role will necessarily be fictional; this
is as true of multiple incorporators (perhaps, indeed, of all incorporators)
as it is of multiple directors in the situation discussed in the text.
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the holder of all shares will not want decisions by an independent
7
board of directors where he will be in minority.
The obvious solution is that of Illinois and Delaware: permitting
the corporation to have fewer than three directors, but not less than
the number of shareholders, viz., two directors for a two shareholder corporation, and the sole shareholder as his own director
in the case of a one-man corporation. Thus, in Delaware all shares
must be owned "beneficially and of record" by fewer than three
shareholders if the corporation is to have fewer than three directors ;78 but Illinois deletes the requirement of "beneficial ownership." 79 For instance, if all shares are owned by two voting trusts
representing two families, but each trust has two or more beneficiaries, both in Delaware and a fortiori in North Carolina three
directors would be necessary, but Illinois would uphold just two
directors in that situation. Besides being more flexible, as this
example indicates, the Illinois version is preferable because it makes
it readily possible to determine, from the corporate records, whether
the statutory condition validating one or two-man boards exists.
If one must also look beyond corporate records to beneficial ownership-often concealed and otherwise often difficult to determinea degree of uncertainty is added and the reliability of corporate
action taken by a one or two man board is impaired. It is suggested,
therefore, that the North Carolina statute delete any blanket requirement of three directors and permit fewer than three but not
less than the number of shareholders of record.oa
" A second director of a one-man corporation may be useful to assume
the director's functions on the death of the "real" director who owns all of
the shares, so that, between the time of death and the date when the shareholder's executor can choose a new director, there will not be a hiatus in
corporate management. Thus, the Wyoming statute specifically provides
that on the death of a sole shareholder who is also the corporation's sole
director, his executor or administrator may call a special meeting to elect
a successor director-presumably himself. WYo. STAT. § 17-36.35 (Supp.
1963). See the discussion in Rudolph, Further Thoughts on The One and
Two-Director Statutes, 20 Bus. LAW. 781, 783-85 (1965). But even if there
is a director-coadjutor, so to speak, it is unlikely that he will be willing to
take any important action, unless the estate of the deceased director consents.
Since it is questionable whether any statutory procedure will adequately
solve the problems of dislocation on the death of a sole controlling shareholder, the matter is really one to be solved within the corporation "by
contract."
" DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1952) (Supp. 1964).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. § 157.34 (Supp. 1964); NED. Rav. STAT. § 21-2036
(Cum. Supp. 1963).
,,a Compare Wyo. STAT. § 17-36.46(k) (Cum. Supp. 1963) which, after
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2.-There are several unsettled points concerning election of
directors. First, the statute rather clumsily provides for election by
ballot, if demanded, unless the charter or by-laws otherwise provide.8" Election by ballot is sometimes a cumbersome procedure in
the corporate context, especially for a corporation which necessarily
relies heavily on proxies. In order to remove the requirement of
balloting, the charter or by-laws must provide for it, and then no
shareholder may demand it. This provision by itself shows that
there is no strong public policy relevant to the matter. Hence, it is
suggested that a negative approach should be taken: election by
ballot is mandatory only if the charter or by-laws so provide and
some shareholder calls for it.
A point which is needlessly uncertain in North Carolina (and in
most states) is whether a plurality is sufficient to elect directors in
the face of the usual statutory declaration that a majority of shares
voted at a meeting will carry action."' Mr. Robinson believes that a
plurality is sufficient in North Carolina and gives sound reasons for
his view. 2 Since the point should not remain at large in the statute,
North Carolina would do well to adopt the explicit language authorizing election of directors "by a plurality of the votes cast at a
meeting of shareholders" (as in New York) 8 3 or that the candidate
or candidates receiving the largest number of votes are deemed
elected. The prospects of forcing run-off elections in corporations
seems unattractive, and the uncertainty is unnecessary, when it is
so easily corrected. 4
3.-Of special value is the North Carolina version of the statute,
now increasingly enacted, permitting any shareholder or any director
of a corporation to bring a statutory action to determine any controversy concerning election or appointment of a director or officer., 5
This is superior to the Delaware prototype 6 which gives standing
authorizing one or two directors if all shares are owned by one or two
shareholders respectively, requires the charter to specify the number of
directors to be elected whenever the shares come into the hands of more
than one or two persons, as the case may be.
"oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-25(e) (1965). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222
(1952) is essentially the same.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-66(e) (1965).
ROBINSON § 32(d).
83 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 614(a).
81
8

"A plurality requirement would, of course, remain subject to a charter
clause requiring a greater-than plurality vote to elect.
GEN. STAT. § 55-71 (1965).
"" N.C.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225 (1952). Perhaps the corporation itself
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only to a shareholder, but not to the director himself to clarify his
status. Moreover, the relief available from the North Carolina
courts is adequate, since unlike the former New York provision,"7
the court is not limited to confirming the contested election or
ordering a new one, but it may also rule that the defeated candidates won under the judicial power to "declare the result of the
election." ' This adopts for North Carolina the substance of the
Delaware decisions 9 that the court may determine which shares were
entitled to vote or not, and then determine the result of the election
if the contested shares had been allowed to vote.10
4.-North Carolina's provision on removal of directors is full
of uncertainties. It authorizes a majority of the voting shareholders
to remove any or all of the directors, with or without cause, "unless
the charter or the bylaws otherwise provide."91 Read literally, this
provision would seemingly validate a clause in the charter barring
removal of directors even for cause, although it is hoped that courts
would find a way to preserve the common law right of shareholders
to take such protective action.92 Moreover, this clause permits a
by-law provision to accomplish whatever the statute will allow, and
should have standing to seek this type of relief. Under the Delaware statute,
it does not now have such standing. In re Chelsea Exchange Corp., 18
Del. Ch. 287, 297, 159 Atl. 432 (1932) (cross petition by corporation dismissed). The corporation certainly has an interest in securing a conclusive
determination of a disputed election, and at present its interests will now be
indirectly represented by a shareholder who brings suit to review the election. Presumably, the corporation will always be named as a party defendant, although statutes do not specifically so require.
" N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAws § 24. See also Application of Katz, 2 Misc.
2d 325, 143 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Supp. Ct.), aft'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 657, 147
N.Y.S.2d 10 (1955).

N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 619 now permits the

court to confirm the election, order a new one, "or take such other action as
justice may require"-a significant variation from the language of the older
statute.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-71(h)(1) (1965).
" Mercer v. Rockwell Oil Co., 31 Del. Ch. 213, 68 A.2d 721 (Ch. 1949);
Rice & Hutchins, Inc. v. Triplex Show Co., 16 Del. Ch. 298, 147 Atl. 317
(Ch. 1929), aff'd, 17 Del. Ch. 356, 152 Ati. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1930); In re
Gulla, 13 Del. Ch. 23, 115 Atl. 317 (1921).
"oROBINSON § 39 has a good discussion.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-27(f) (1965) (first sentence). However, it is
not inconsistent with the statutory scheme to hold that shareholders could
surrender their power to remove directors. Certainly, § 55-27(f) is consistent with such a result; the remaining sentences of that subsection simply
spell out certain situations where a directory may not be removed rather
than in any way purport to preserve power to remove. And N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-27(g) (1965) permits removal pursuant to court order on application
of five per cent of the shareholders.
9' See Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
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the statute does not even specify whether it must be a by-law
adopted by the shareholders or may be one adopted by the directors.
It would be monstrous to suppose that directors could immunize
themselves from removal simply by adopting a by-law. Assuming
that they could make such a by-law, the shareholders' continuing
power to amend or repeal by-laws,9 3 including those made by directors, could presumably overcome the directors' restrictive by-law
and re-establish the shareholders' right to remove. But it would be
clumsy, expensive, and frustrating for shareholders to have to
exercise a valuable right to remove for cause against such artificial
barriers and troubles.
The situation would be even worse if the clause forbidding removal were inserted into the charter. It would be a standing temptation to the insiders who create a corporation automatically to insert such a clause into the charter at the outset, counting on the
difficulty of amending the charter against the directors' wishes to
keep the clause intact. But it would be doubtful policy to permit
the shareholders' common law power of motion to be waived for
all time by a charter clause whether inserted at the beginning or
later. " And assuming that shareholders might be permitted to
surrender their removal power, the question would arise whether
this means that (a) the directors would then have the power to
remove other directors for cause,9 5 or (b) only the court could
remove directors. Even if policy reasons favor shareholders having
the power to make such a self-denying ordinance as surrendering
their power to remove directors-a proposition I strongly deny-it
should be made unmistakeably clear and not left to the present
uncertainties and conflicting implications.
It could be argued that shareholders would still be protected

" N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 55-16(a) (1965).

",The Delaware courts have noted, but not determined, the question
whether shareholders may "deprive themselves" of their common law right
to remove directors. Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 573, 134
A.2d 852, 858 (Ch.), af'd, 37 Del. Ch. 8, 135 A.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1957).

" See N.C.

GEN.

STAT.

§ 55-27(b) (1965)

(directors may declare

vacant a post where the incumbent director has been adjudicated insane,
convicted of felony, and adjudged bankrupt). Sometimes a court order is

necessary.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 33-317(b) (4) (1962).

New York autho-

rizes directors to remove directors for cause if so provided in the certificate
of incorporation or a by-law adopted by the directors, but not if cumulative
voting exists. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 706(a), 706(c) (1). It is, to
understate the matter, a dangerous power for directors to remove directors.
Bruch v. National Guarantee Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 186-90, 116
Atl. 738 (Ch. 1922).
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even if they had no power to remove directors with or without
cause, since they could either seek a court order or await the next
election. The difficulty with the first alternative is that court orders
to remove directors are available only on limited and special conditions, including a requirement that five per cent of the shareholders
file the petition." Waiting for elections may also be an ineffective
substitute for removal, at least if the corporation has a staggered
director system and the challenged director does not come up for
97
re-election at the next meeting.
Whatever may be the case as to removal without cause, removal
of directors for cause should be preserved by the statute and protected against charter and by-law clauses negating or frustrating
this right. Removal for cause is not a mere subterfuge by which
a removal without cause is effected by dressing it up with some reputation-staining "cause." Decisions in other states clearly hold that
the director to be removed must have minimul due process, i.e.,
notice of the charges, presumably with some specificity, and an
opportunity to rebut those charges even if it requires management
to afford him the chance to use its proxy solicitation machinery at
corporate expense."8 Hence, directors should always be removable
for cause; and if it is desired to protect the director from trumpedup "cause," the statute might well speak of removal for "justifiable"
or "proven"' or "demonstrated" cause.
The same considerations, it is suggested, should apply to removing directors for cause even though elected by cumulative voting.
In effect, North Carolina absolutely bars removal of such a director
if the negative votes are enough to re-elect him if cast for that
purpose. Thus, a director chosen by cumulative voting is removable
only by a court order99 or in conjunction with a shareholder decision
to sweep out the entire board.10 0 The Delaware Court of Chancery
has held that election by cumulative voting should not immunize a
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-27(g) (1965).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-26 (1965). Moreover, it has been held
that staggered directors may not be removed without cause, since they have
tenure for their terms of office. Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic
Steel Products, Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 93, 159 A.2d 288 (Ch. 1960).
"See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 573, 134 A.2d 852,
858 (Ch.), aff'd, 37 Del. Ch. 8, 135 A.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also
Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-27(g) (1965).
100

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 55-27(f) (1965) (second sentence).
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director from removal with cause. 10 1 Although there is more incentive for majority shareholders to find "cause" against a director
strongly representing a dissident minority, this is not of itself
enough to justify North Carolina's unconditional protection of the
director chosen by cumulative voting, although he should surely be
protected against removal "without cause. "102
Substantively, then, it would be appropriate to provide that
(1) shareholders may always remove directors for cause, whether
or not chosen by cumulative voting; (2) removal without cause
should not exist unless the articles of incorporation provide for it
excepting the director chosen by cumulative voting who should be
protected from removal without cause; and (3) where a class elects
its own directors, it alone should have removal powers, as the
statute presently provides.'03 To settle an issue not clear under most
statutes, it should be provided that directors may not remove directors, even for cause, since this power is too likely to be abused
by directors as a means of attacking a minority or dissenting
director.
D. Non-Resident Directors
Certainly one of the most vexing problems in derivative suits
and other actions is obtaining personal jurisdiction over non-resident directors of domestic corporations. There is no uniform pattern among the states. The majority simply make no provision at
all, so that personal service of process cannot be procured over a
non-resident director. Delaware employs the unique method of
sequestering shares of stock owned by a non-resident director of a
Delaware corporation and giving him the choice of forfeiting his
stock interest or coming into Delaware and submitting to the court's
The solution
jurisdiction and defending an in personam action.'
employed by North Carolina,'0 5 in common with Connecticut,' 0 6
.01
Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 573, 134 A.2d 852, 858
(Ch.), aff'd, 37 Del. Ch. 8, 135 A.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1957); N.Y. Bus. Cozp.

§ 706(c) (1).

LAW
10

In the Matter of Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S.2d
106 (Sup. Ct. 1952).

N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 55-27(f) (1965).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 159, 202

(1952), § 324 (Supp. 1964); tit.
10, § 365 (1952), § 366 (Supp. 1964). The subject is fully discussed in
Folk, The Delaware Corporation Law: A Study of the Statute with Recommended Revisions 264-279 (1964) (Mimeographed copy on deposit at
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
the ...
Law
Library,
N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-33 (1965).
10.CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-322 (1962).
10.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

South Carolina, °7 and several other states, is to provide that a
non-resident who becomes a director, or a resident director who
leaves North Carolina, has by the fact of becoming or continuing
as a director submitted himself to the state courts' jurisdiction in
actions relating to corporate affairs during his term as director. Mr.
Robinson briefly discusses the statute' and points up a few difficulties which should be corrected.
First, Mr. Robinson raises the possibility that the statute might
not be held constitutional since, unlike the South Carolina statute
which has been upheld, the North Carolina law does not require
the corporation to keep a current list of non-resident directors'
names and addresses with the Secretary of State who must effect
the out-of-state service of process.' 00 I doubt whether this fact
alone would swing the balance against constitutionality. After all,
non-resident motorist statutes, which have been sustained, do not,
and by their very nature cannot, insure that the Secretary of State
will have a list of addresses of non-resident motorists temporarily
in the state. True it is that police investigation will likely turn up
the address to which process is to be directed, but the address of
the non-resident director can also be found and furnished to the
Secretary of State. We must assume, in order to save the constitutionality of the statute, that the Secretary of State has an implied
obligation to direct the process to the last known address. Connecticut, for instance, has adopted the substance of the North Carolina statute without the South Carolina requirement that corporations maintain lists of non-resident director addresses with the
Secretary of State. If no address happens to be available with the
Connecticut Secretary of State, then process is to be sent to the
last address known to the party seeking to have service made.110
Even though the North Carolina statute is probably constitutional, it is inartfully drawn in this and other respects and should
be clarified. As the foregoing discussion suggests, this should be
done, preferably by requiring corporations to file addresses of nonresident directors with the Secretary of State, so that the address
...S.C. CODE § 12-13.7 (Supp. 1964). The former statute was S.C. Sess.
Laws 1947, No. 277, §§ 1 to 9, and it was this version of the statute which
was held constitutional in Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, Inc.,
122 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C. 1954).
..ROBINSON § 91.
209Id. at 247.
..0 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-322(d) (1962).
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is readily available in public records, and thus eliminating most
problems of securing the address. In all events, since at least one
federal court has explicitly adjudicated the validity of a statute in
which compulsory filing of the addresses was an important element,
it would be well not to tempt fate by some deviation which is
neither necessary nor useful.
Alternatively, as in Connecticut, the corporation's registered
agent could be made an agent for receiving process for any nonresident director with specific duties to transmit process."' There
is no apparent advantage to this procedure, especially since the
North Carolina statute has already created the fundamentals of
a good means for reaching the non-resident director.'-

2

E. Executive Committee
The North Carolina statute now permits directors to create an
executive committee only if the charter or by-laws so provide. There
is, as a practical matter, no reason for requiring both advance
charter or by-law approval, and a directors' resolution."s Rather,
the statute should directly empower directors to create an executive
committee as and when needed, subject, of course, to the existing
statutory requirements that the committee consist of directors, that
its powers be recited, and that the board as such cannot abdicate any
of its fiduciary responsibility and attendant liabilities. It is to be
assumed that the fact that the statute specifically authorizes creation
of an executive committee in no way impairs the board's power to
establish other types of committees, e.g., finance committee, compensation committee, etc., with more specific duties and powers.
Ibid.
do not share Mr. Robinson's concern with the arguable uncertainty
as to the manner of process service under the non-resident director statute.
See RoBINSON § 91, at 247. That statute first calls for "mailing or otherwise
delivering" copies of the process to the Secretary of State, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-33(d) (1965), and then purports to require the Secretary of State
to follow the procedure under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-146 (1965), which in'1'

112I

volves service by the sheriff. Hence, he concludes that "the only sure way

to effect service pursuant to these provisions is to have the sheriff make a
return of due diligence and then personally serve the Secretary of State,

as in the case of service on a foreign corporation." ROBINSON § 91, at 247.
I think the obviously correct reading is that the plaintiff mails or delivers

the process to the Secretary of State, who then follows the procedure spelled

out in detail in § 55-146. The provision for mailing, etc. the process should
control over the more general requirement for service by the sheriff.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-31 (1965). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)
(Supp. 1964) does not require a charter or by-law provision but directly
empowers the creation of committees as needed.
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Many statutes now specifically avoid any question here by indicating that any types of committees may be established by the
directors. 1 4
Several statutes have also dealt with the possibility that one or
more members of a relatively small committee empowered to take
certain types of action on its own may be disqualified or absent.
Of course, the matter could be referred to the full board, or perhaps
the board could appoint committee members in place of those not
acting. Expedients adopted by the board, such as alternate committee members or ad hoc replacements, would presumably be
honored by courts; but it is now specifically provided by several
statutes that the directors may, in establishing the executive committee, designate alternate members who automatically sit in place
of a qualified or absent member," 5 or that the board may simply
act to appoint an ad hoc replacement." 6 Although matters of detail,
such a provision is a convenience to any large corporation whose
committees, especially the executive committee, are significant features of its management. The action of such bodies should not be
subject to technical uncertainties.11
F. Directors' and Officers' Duties
One of the strongest and best features of the North Carolina
statute is its declaration that directors and officers occupy a "fiduciary relation" not only to the corporation but to the shareholders
as well."" This provision is unusual, although not unique, in ex.1.OHio REv. STAT. ANN. § 1701.63(B) (1964); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.36 (1957).
" 'N.Y. Bus. CORP.

...
DEL. CODE

LAW § 712 (b).
ANN. tit. 8 § 141(c)

(1952).
minor, but practical, question sometimes arising in corporate
practice in other states, to this writer's knowledge, is whether, when shareholders or directors act by written consent in lieu of a meeting, all signatures
must appear on the same document. Obviously, if all the parties whose consents are needed are readily available, it makes no difference, since the
document can be readily circulated. But if the parties are scattered, as
might be the case with directors acting by consent, it may be time consuming
to have to circulate the same paper among a number of people perhaps by
mail. Some statutes may be so read, including N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-63(c),
-29(a) (1) (1965), which speak of a "consent" or "in such consent" in the
singular in referring to informal action by shareholders and directors
respectively. There is no reason to preclude the affected parties from signing
separate documents so long as they are the same, no fraud is involved,
and the signed consents are duly filed, as, of course, they will be in order to
preserve the evidence of the action taken.
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1965).
1"A
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plicitly treating the relationship as that of a fiduciary"' and in making the duty, so defined, run to the shareholders. Such a provision
obviously strengthens the hand of shareholders in the common
situation where insiders act from their strategic position and uncommunicated knowledge to buy "outside" interests at prices favorable to those in the know, 1 20 or where insiders otherwise use their
vantage point to force minority interests out of the corporation.''
Beyond dealing with these particular wrongs-many of which
would today be actionable under existing case law and especially
rule 10b-5--explicit recognition of a direct fiduciary relationship
furnishes a firm cornerstone for generally enforcing high ethical
standards in many different and varied situations. I suggest that
it is possible that under this standard several recent issues would
likely be decided in favor of the shareholders.
1.-It is possible that a court, applying this test, would hold
that a sale of controlling shares by a dominant shareholder at a
premium not shared by the minority interests would breach a fiduciary duty running to the shareholders. The theoretical basis of
the decision in Perlman v.Feldmann.2 permitting a minority shareholder's participation in a premium paid for a controlling' shareholder's interest, has never been satisfactorily explained. Certainly
it may be read as assuming and applying a fiduciary duty, at least
in this limited situation, running directly to the minority share
interests,123 although the weight of the decision has been drastically
11. A minor risk of specifically declaring a director or officer to be a
"fiduciary" is that a court might be tempted to overlook the various types
of duty resting on different classes of fiduciaries. For instance, a director
is and should never be a "fiduciary" in the strict trustee sense of accountability for loss from an error of judgment, or debarment from making deals
with his corporation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1965). A director is
a "fiduciary" in the sense of owning an undivided loyalty to his corporation
and its shareholders, and of not pushing his personal interests at the expense
of the corporation.
1..See ROBINSON § 95.
12

For an illuminating study of this area, see

O'NEAL

& DERWIN, Ex-

PULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASsOcIATES: "SQUEEzE-OuTs"
SMALL ENTERPRISES (1960).

IN

122 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), on remand,
1957). by Feldman included a premium for
(D. price
Conn.received
154.22
F.SoSupp.
as the
far 436
control, "he is accountable to the minority stockholders who sue here....
And plaintiffs . . .are entitled to a recovery in their own right, instead of
in right of the corporation (as in the usual derivative actions) . ...
judgment should go to these plaintiffs and those whom they represent for
any premium value so shown to the extent of their respective stock interests."
219 F.2d at 178. Dissenting judge Swan thought the relief granted to
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reduced by the nearly unanimous refusal of respected courts to
follow it and compel sharing of a premium. 124 Even though courts
seem definitely unwilling to adopt a theory that sale of controlling
shares at a premium is a sale of a corporate asset, arguably when
shareholders are the direct and intended beneficiaries of a statutory
duty of directors, sale of shares at a special consideration to the
sellers lacks that "good faith" owing to the non-selling shareholders.
Hence, courts could well find that the "fiduciary relation . . . to

[the] shareholders" requires the directors affirmatively to promote a
comparable benefit for the non-selling shareholders and to use their
position to induce prospective purchasers to extend a standard
"take-over bid."
This result is relatively easy to reach under North Carolina's
section 55-35 so long as the selling shareholders are also directors
or officers, for then they fall squarely within the terms of the statute.
If the controlling shareholder is not an officer or director (probably
infrequent), it is still possible that an analogous duty would rest
on the holders as such to use their powers for the benefit of all of
the shareholders. This is slightly reinforced by certain unique
clauses of the North Carolina statute specifically curbing the powers
of controlling shareholders as such. 1 25 Unless we assume that this
affirmative statement of specific limitations upon the power of controlling shareholders as such implies uncurbed power in unenumerated activities, we can fairly argue that the statute's concern with
fiduciary duty running to shareholders as well as to the corporation
applies to controlling shareholders as well as to directors and officers.
I think it is appropriate to regard section 55-35's statement of the
fiduciary duty as establishing a seminal principle for expanding
fiduciary duties to shareholders.
be "completely inconsistent" with the corporate asset theory. Id. at 180.

"' Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1962);

Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962); Manacher v.
Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741, 751 (Ch. 1960).

...
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-19(b) (statutory provisions on indemnification

apply to "any dominant shareholder engaged to perform services for the
corporation"), 55-22 (limitations on loans to dominant shareholders), 55-2(6)
(definition of "dominant shareholder" in terms of "legal power . . . to
elect a majority of the directors" of a corporation "by virtue of his share
holdings") (1965). RoBiNsoN § 68, at 200 nn.87-88, points out the deletion
from the statute as enacted of a clause specifically imposing fiduciary duties
on dominant shareholders, but apparently considers this omission inconclusive in view of prior North Carolina decisions exacting such responsibility from controlling share interests.
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2.-The opposite situation is involved in some recent cases concerning directors' decisions to use corporate funds to purchase a
large block of shares to prevent a shift of control to "outside" interests whom the directors believe, rationally or not, pose a threat
to the corporation-e.g., by liquidating it for capital gains, changing
the traditional methods of doing business, or simply throwing out
incumbent management. A trio of recent Delaware cases 26 hold
that "disinterested" directors may use corporate funds for this
purpose if they "satisf[y] the burden of proof of showing reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
exist[s] by the presence of the [outsider's] stock ownership," even
though their decision turns out to be "an honest mistake of judgment." '27 In Cheff v. Mathes,2 " the latest (if not last) word,
anticipation of a "reasonable threat to the continued existence of
[the corporation], or at least existence in its present form," justified
spending 2,170,000 dollars to buy out the stock interest.'2 9 This,
then, is an implicit determination that a good faith acquisition of
shares, designed to block a control shift and voted by a "disinterested" board of directors, does not breach fiduciary duty, but is a
conclusive exercise of directors' "business judgment" of the directors.
The rule thus evolved rather obviously gives the directors almost uncurbed authority to use corporate funds for stock purchases,
and "good faith" is, under these cases, satisfied by the flimsiest of
"findings" amounting to little more that a vague conclusion that the
stock purchase serves the "best interests" of the corporation. Surely,
it will always be possible to dress up an already accomplished stock
purchase with the trappings of a good faith decision, necessarily
made under the intense "pressures" of the moment, to avert a
supposed threat to the corporation's "continued existence" or "at
least existence in its present form." Such an approach is profoundly
anti-dynamic since it justifies using corporate funds merely to
..Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), reversing 190 A.2d 524
(Del. Ch. 1963) (directors held not liable for share repurchases); Bennett

v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962) (directors held liable for share repurchases with corporate funds where no reasonable investigation of the
need for spending corporate funds was shown); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del.
Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960) (directors did not breach duty in spending
corporate funds to buy out shareholder).
..Cheff v. Mathes, supra note 126, at 555.
128 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
120Id. at 556.
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maintain the status quo, although the change might best serve the
corporation.
It would be surprising if North Carolina's explicit statutory
standard' would contenance such generous deference to the directors' nearly unfettered discretion. I would suggest that, even though
the stock purchase was "in good faith," the required showing of
"diligence and care" would demand clear and specific findings that
the corporation was genuinely threatened by some immediate and
unavoidable action, such as the prospect of a takeover by a known
crook or liquidator, and that no alternatives remained but to buy out
the share interest in order adequately to protect the shareholders'
investment. This is necessary, for director action in this area is
too fraught with the possibilities of concealed self-interest. Purchasing a large share block may simply cloak a directors' scheme to
preserve their management control, since any corporate attorney
can dress up the expenditure of funds in terms of "business" and
"corporate" reasons, and thus comply with the distinction between
a forbidden purchase of shares for the directors' "personal" purposes and a permissible acquisition for "business" reasons."'
The concept of directors' duty running directly to shareholders
would reinforce this result. The shareholders have an evident interest in the directors' decision to make a large outlay of corporate
funds for a stock purchase rather than for some more productive
use. When used merely to keep incumbent management in office,
it is clearly contrary to the stockholders' interests, particularly if
the purpose and effect is to enable the corporation to maintain some
antiquated or stagnating business procedures or relationships or to
keep up some undesirable business methods. That the shareholders
have a direct interest in such expenditures is indicated by a statutory provision closely controlling the corporate funds available
for share repurchases. Particularly relevant is the provision that
shares purchased out of surplus "from any shareholder of any class"
requires antecedent board authority obtained no later than a year
earlier from a majority of the shares of the class to be purchased
after full disclosure of the "specific purpose of the proposed purchase.' 31 2 Even if this somewhat rigid statutory requirement could
..
0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1965).
See Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 55, 158 A.2d 136, 141 (Ch. 1960).
§ 55-52(c) (3) (1965). A somewhat more liberal
standard, permitting directors to act without shareholder approval, governs
reacquisition of redeemable shares. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(b) (6) (1965).
13,

1 2N.C. GEN. STAT.
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be satisfied, it is difficult to believe that North Carolina directors
could thereafter act with the freedom of their Delaware counterparts and still comply with the explicit fiduciary duty to the corporation and "to its shareholders."
3.-Another situation in which the North Carolina version of
directors' duties could make a difference is illustrated by an important New York Court of Appeals decision dealing with a subtle
fiduciary problem concerning parent and subsidiary corporations.
In Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 3 3 the publicly-owned parent
corporation held eighty per cent of the shares of a profitable subsidiary whose total tax for the years 1957-1960, if separately reported and paid, would have been 3,825,717 dollars. Since it filed
a consolidated return with its then unprofitable parent, this entire
amount was saved. However, under an agreement made by the
parent corporation and the subsidiary (all of whose directors were
nominated by the parent), over ninety-eight per cent of this tax
saving was allocated to the parent; 53,751 dollars of the total tax
saving, or less than twenty-five per cent, was available to the twenty
per cent minority shareholders. Reversing the appellate division,
which found the allocation to be unfair and a breach of the parent's
fiduciary duty to the subsidiary's minority shareholders, the court
of appeals sustained the allocation of the tax saving.
The point to be noted here is not whether the decision was right
or wrong."" There is a good basis for contending that within an
integrated system of corporations, as here, the usual rules of fiduciary duty, especially when applied in sophisticated and difficult
areas such as this, are not workable and that the result should be
controlled by the reasonable expectations of all parties involved
in such a relationship, including the expectation that profits of
individual corporate units will chiefly inure to the system as a whole.
The point is that, given a statute such as North Carolina's, the
decision could well go the other way, since the statute specifically
singles out shareholders as beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty." 5
...
15 N.Y.2d 150, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965), reversing, 19 App. Div. 2d

383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1st Dept. 1963), reversing, 232 N.Y.S.2d 702
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
1 See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964), discussing the case at the appellate
division level.

...
The New York statute requires directors and officers to "discharge the
duties of their respective positions" in good faith and with due "dilligence,

care and skill," but does not, unlike North Carolina, state to whom the
duties run. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 717.
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Under such a standard, the directors of the subsidiary, all nominees
(and in the Case decision, compensated officers) of the parent,
arguably did not act in "good faith" towards the subsidiary's minority shareholders and this breached their "fiduciary relation to
[the subsidiary's] shareholders." In general, the North Carolina
standard should eventually have a significant impact upon parentsubsidiary relations and probably to the benefit of the minority
18
shareholders in a subsidiary.
G. Interested Directorand Similar Transactions
North Carolina was one of the first states to adopt the California archtypal provision 37 sanctioning certain deals between a
corporation and its directors and officers, and incidentally clearing
up the confusion of the common law. 3 8 No one doubts the need to
validate such practices, both for close corporations and for systems
of subsidiary and affiliated corporations, under proper controls protecting the interests of shareholders. Mr. Robinson's discussion of
the North Carolina provision is detailed and competent, 8 0 but it
exhibits serious uncertainties in the statute which can be readily
removed. Literally the statute seems to say that an interested director transaction may stand if any one of three disjunctive conditions are met: (1) disinterested directors approve, (2) disinterested
shareholders approve, or (3) the interested party establishes that
the transaction was "just and reasonable." It is apparent that these
are intended as alternative saving devices so that if one cannot
satisfy (1), he may be able to save his transaction under (2) or
(3); or if he cannot prevail under (1) or (2), he must meet
test (3).
This leads to a point of disagreement with Mr. Robinson-not
as to how the statute will likely be construed, but as to how it should
be construed. He is of the opinion that the test of fairness stated
...
If, as argued later, North Carolina were to abandon its present requirement that only a wholly-owned subsidiary can amalgamate with a
parent corporation through "short-form" merger (see text accompanying
notes 354-63 infra), clear recognition of a fiduciary duty running from
majority shareholder (parent) to minority interests in the subsidiary would
eliminate some of the fear of permitting a parent corporation to absorb a
ninety or ninety-five per cent owned subsidiary without following the normal
statutory merger procedures.
...
CAL. CORP. CODE § 820.
"" 8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1965).
...ROiBNSON § 92.
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in (3) (whether the transaction is "just and reasonable") must be
read into the two preceding, supposedly independent tests.' 40 As a
matter of statutory construction, this seems incorrect. Tests (1)
and (2) are quite specific in laying down the conditions to be fulfilled: their essence is proof that a majority of "disinterested" persons endorsed the transaction. "Disinterested" directors or shareholders usually may act within wide ambits: their "business judgment" is ordinarily conclusive, apart from "fraud"; and if anything
is clear, disinterested directors may make wrong, mistaken, even
stupid decisions, but so long as their decisions are not tainted with
disloyalty or reflect negligence or lack of care, they are not to be
challenged. "Fairness" is not a relevant test in such a context.
Hence, I would view tests (1) and (2) as protecting the corporation under established canons of "disinterested" directors exercising
their judgment, and would not read into these two statutory tests
anything more than the statute states.
True, as Mr. Robinson points out, test (1) specifically incorporates a "good faith" requirement, which he seems to equate,
at least at this juncture, with the "just and reasonable" test. This
may be no more than a prediction of judicial inability to discriminate between related but still distinct concepts. The "good faith"
language really adds nothing at all to test (1), since "good faith,"
whether or not specifically stated, is always a component of fiduciary
duty under section 55-35. Finally, "good faith" logically refers to
how directors act; "fairness" to the intrinsic character and effect
of the transaction. Hence, these are different considerations which
should not be confused.'14 As for the absence of any statement of
1140 Id. § 92, at 251-52. Apparently he feels that if this is not done,
it would violate the doctrine that "overreaching or otherwise unfair corporate transaction with directors cannot be ratified by less than all of the
shareholders." This is clearly not the case. As the text immediately following indicates, directors or shareholders would scarcely act "in good
faith" if they knowingly approved an "overreaching or otherwise unfair
corporate transaction."
""The probable source of the confusion is a badly analyzed California
decision, Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d
405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952), construing CAL. CORP. CODE § 820. True it is that
this case matches the "just and reasonable" test with the California statutory
requirement that directors and shareholders must act "in good faith." In
that case, however, the degree of overreaching was so great and the effort
to divert corporate funds so obvious that there was no compliance with the
"good faith" requirement. Hence, the court's equation of "good faith" with
"fairness" was not necessary to its decision requiring full restitution of
profits (a result with which no one would disagree).
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"good faith" in test (2) (approval by disinterested shareholders),
this points, not in the direction of incorporating the "just and reasonable" standard into the statute, but rather towards its absence. This
is especially true since test (2) overrules the common law view that
shareholders may vote even on matters in which they have a pecuniary interest.'
In sum, tests (1) and (2) should be viewed as
relying upon the integrity and sound judgment of directors and
shareholders who have no axes to grind.
The statute does not help to identify the transactions in which
"a director has an adverse interest." First, it is to be noted that it
applies only to a director but not to a non-director officer. Presumably, in that situation we must fall back on the common law,
whatever that may be.'4 3 Secondly, does the language include a
transaction between Corporation A and a corporation or partnership
in which a director of Corporation A has a financial interest?
Although the statute does not contain the usual words "direct or
indirect" (which it might have added after the phrase "transaction
in which a director has an adverse interest"), it is assumed that
courts would not and should not tolerate an evasive maneuver by
directors' interposing some other entity. Third is the related
question of whether the statute applies to transactions within families of corporations, e.g., between parent and subsidiary or among
affiliates, or generally whenever boards of directors are interlocked
through common membership. Such instances are somewhat removed from the statutory test of a director's "adverse interest"
in the transaction. Hence, it is uncertain whether the statutory rules
would apply, or whether the transaction will be assessed under the
common law. No great difference results except that the most authoritative decisions in cases involving common boards of directors
indicate that the party challenging the contract or transaction must
bear the burden of proof, i.e., it is presumed not unfair.'44 If the
North Carolina statute applies here, the burden of proof would
rest, as subsection (b) (3) declares, upon the "adversely interested
party." Several states have articulated a statutory test for transactions between corporations with common directors, distinct from
...
North-West Transp. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C. 1887).
""See RoBINsoN § 92, at 248 n.92.

See Cheirob v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944); Everett

v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942). See also E~ven v. Peoria
& E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (L. Hand, J.).
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the standard for sustaining contracts between a director and his
corporation. Connecticut, for instance, sustains such a contract if
"not manifestly unfair,"'14 5 and South Carolina looks to a "fair and
equitable" standard with the party challenging the transaction carrying the burden of proof. 4 ' On the statute's scope of coverage,
some clarification would be very much in order and in accord with
statutes in other states. 47
H. Shareholder Derivative Suits
Today, virtually the only effective device for enforcing fiduciary
duties of directors and officers is the derivative suit enabling a
shareholder to proceed as a sort of guardian ad litem for the corporate interests which the directors refuse to assert.' 48 Removing
directors, though it should be preserved as an unfettered shareholder right, is an awkward method;49 and as for elections, shareholders will usually re-elect management if the corporation is
profitable even though management's conduct is less than ethical
(perhaps because of it, if the profits vary directly with relaxed ethical
standards). Clearly, then, the derivative suit, with its faults, plays
an indispensable role. So far as North Carolina is concerned,
derivative litigation has not been particularly frequent, and many
important legal issues are in doubt, since the local decisions are
spotty and the statute does not deal at all with these suits. In my
judgment, however, the statute wisely avoided exacting the inhibitions on derivative actions,' and should not do so until it is quite
..

CONN. GEN STAT. § 33-323(b)

(1961).

(Supp. 1964).
"' See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 713; S.C. CODE § 12-18.16(b) (Supp.
19 6
.Mr. Robinson's discussion of the derivative suit is very good so far
1,"

4

S.C. CODE § 12-18.16(c)

as it goes. See ROBINSON §§ 105-09. However, as noted in text accompanying
note 19 supra, he puts to one side some of the most significant issues in this
area on the ground that they "have not yet received the attention of the North
Supreme Court." Id. § 109, at 302.
Carolina
.4.
See text accompanying notes 91-103 supra.
.0At least ten states require the plaintiff shareholder to post bond to
pay the corporation's expenses unless plaintiff owns three to five per cent
of the shares or the shares have some minimum market value, ranging
from $25,000 to $50,000. See e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §
43A (1960); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627. California provides for posting
security for expenses, regardless of size of holdings, if the court finds no
reasonable probability of benefit to the corporation or its security holders.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 834. Two states have followed the Model Act in authorizing a court to order plaintiff to reimburse all parties defendant for all
expenses on a "finding that the action has been brought without reasonable
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clear that restrictions are needed here, as apparently they have been
in other states. However, through a statutory resolution of two
important and unsettling problems, the derivative action would even
better serve its real purpose-the redress of intra-corporate wrongdoing.
1.-The status of a demand on shareholders is unsettled in North
Carolina and in a state of flux elsewhere. It is often said to be a
precondition to maintaining a derivative action, unless it would
be useless because the controlling shareholders are the wrongdoers. 15 1
A respected federal court of appeals recently excused a demand on
shareholders where the number of shareholders was so large as to
make demand impractical although not truly impossible.'5 2 Several
years ago Delaware excused a demand on shareholders when the
complaint alleged "fraud" ;153 this holding, which perhaps placed a
premium on pleading allegations, was recently expanded by a
chancery court rule which entirely deletes any requirement of a
demand on shareholders.' 5 4 In principle, the demand on shareholders should be dropped entirely, as it was in Delaware and in
some other states by statute. 55 Precisely what is the purpose of
the demand, and what is the result of making it? Presumably, it
is a demand for a shareholder resolution calling on the directors to
bring suit. But would such a resolution, if adopted, bind the directors whose prior refusal to sue was probably the reason why the
prospective plaintiff had to go to the shareholders? After all,
bringing suits is an aspect of corporate affairs committed to directors, rather than a matter for shareholder action. It is extremely
impractical to explain, especially through the proxy system, the
reasons why shareholders should override the directors' refusal to
sue; the shareholders are scarcely competent to make such a judgcause," although no security-for-expenses was required to be posted. ABAALI MODEL CORP. LAW §§ 43A (1960); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-30-32(2)
(Perm. Supp. 1960); N.D. REv. CODE § 10-19-48 (1960).
...
ROBINSON § 107, at 296-97.
...
Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), 43 N.C.L. REV. 442

(1965).
...
Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 754-59, 760-62 (1960).

.' DEL. CE. RuLE 23(b), as amended April 27, 1961. This amendment
does not appear in the 1964 Supplement to DEL. CODE ANN. See Letter
From The Hon. Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, to John Gallagher, member,
Delaware Code Revision Commission, June 24, 1965 (copy on file with
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW).
r E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(a) (2); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405(1) (b) (1957).

§ 2307.311
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ment; and they are unlikely to go against the directors, whatever the
merits and however well explained. Again, if the shareholders
refuse to accede to the demand by passing a resolution favoring
suit, would this bar the complaining shareholder from suing derivatively; and if so, is this not an undesirable result? In general,
seriously enforcing a requirement of a demand on shareholders is
the most effective possible means of blocking derivative suit. Since
courts probably will not rigidly enforce a condition so potentially
crippling, the law remains needlessly confused, and plaintiffs will be
undertain as to whether they must ask the shareholders to force a
suit. Thus, clearly abolishing the old requirement of a demand on
shareholders would both clarify the law and establish a sound legal
rule.
2.-The North Carolina statute would also do well to forbid
settlement of a derivative action unless a court approves the settlement terms. Mr. Robinson notes that a derivative suit settlement
"may be subject to court approval, particularly if it would operate
as res judicata to bar any further action on the claim asserted."' 56
He also notes a corollary rule, developed in New York before the
new statute required court-approved settlements, 5 7 that a private
settlement sum paid to the plaintiff shareholder will inure to the
corporation. 58 Mr. Robinson indicates that North Carolina has not,
either by express holding or by implication, indorsed either rule. 59
Beyond question, court approval of dismissed actions is the fairest
and most effective device for promoting the policy favoring private
enforcement of fiduciary duties and at the same time averting the
evils of blackmail or "strike" suits. Although North Carolina has
apparently not been plagued with such actions, this certainly can
develop and bring with it, as a "cure," demands for stringent limitations on shareholder suits, usually for a security-for-expenses statute
requiring plaintiff shareholder to post bond to reimburse the corporation's expenses.'
The reason for a specific statute (or rule of court) requiring
court approval to dismiss a derivative suit is not only to avert
"strike" suits, but also to insure, so far as any legal procedure can,
that the corporation and its shareholders obtain any recovery equit...
ROBINSON § 109, at 300.
""N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(d).
...
Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).

..ROBINSON

§

109, at 300.

...
See note 150 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

ably owing to them, and that a private deal does not abort a meritorious cause of action.161 If a settlement does seem appropriate,
the prospect of court approval exerts some pressure on the parties
to bargain for a settlement sum reasonably related to the asserted
wrong. The required court approval will likely encourage shareholders to assert meritorious claims against the power and economic resources of management which will surely be employed,
in one way or another, to defeat the action. Such a mandatory
provision for court approved settlement maintains the public interest in the integrity of the legal process and in elevating fiduciary
duties through effective sanctions. Beyond requiring court-approved
settlement, a few states have gone further to state by statute that
any recovery is held in trust for the corporation. 162
L Indemnification of Directors and Officers
North Carolina has adopted a generally sound position on the
delicate question of indemnifying directors and officers for litigation
expenses by way of statutory provisions which are apparently preemptive.
It discriminates between the diverse problems growing
out of suits by or in the right of the corporation and suits brought
by "outsiders," i.e., all suits other than primary corporate or derivative shareholder actions; and it also sets forth the tests for idemnifying directors depending upon their success or failure in defending
an "outside" suit. Thus, the statute substantially protects shareholders from what is essentially a waste of corporate assets when
unworthy directors and officers are richly and often secretly reimbursed. It rejects the extreme liberality of the Delaware.. (and
...
There is, of course, an inherent limitation. The protection of courtapproved settlement cannot be invoked unless suit is instituted. Hence, it
would still be possible to settle a threatened, although not actually instituted, suit through private pay-offs without the courts ever coming into the
picture. Of course, this does not bar anyone (including the person threatening suit) from subsequently suing, and the price of keeping the pay-off
quiet may come high for the corporation, particularly since the directors
who settled the prospective suit have probably breached their duty in making
a disbursement of funds for this purpose. Hence the need for recognizing a

rather broad principle, based on Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71
N.E.2d 443 (1947), that any funds received by a shareholder, whether in
compromise of a suit or a threatened suit, are held by him as constructive
trustee for the corporation.
"'2Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405(3)

626(e).
N.C.
Din..
168
1"

GEN. STAT. §§ 55-19
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §

(1957); N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAW §

to -21 (1965).
122(10) (1953).

19651

N. C. CORPORATION LAW

Model Act)165 provisions, and at the same time avoids the complexities of the New York law.16 My only general criticism is that
indemnification is so sensitive a matter, so susceptible to abuse, and
so closely related to the issues before the court in the main case,
that all indemnification of officers and directors should be judicially
determined. This is, perhaps, a counsel of perfection, since, even
in the face of such a provision, secret indemnity arrangements
could be made, although the directors who did so would probably
be liable for breach of duty.
In matters of detail, the North Carolina statute needs clarifying
amendments.
1.-The statutory language is probably too narrow in its uncertain coverage of proceedings where indemnification would be proper.
For instance, it is not clear whether a director may be indemnified
for his expenses in an administrative investigation not resulting
in any adjudication. Since section 55-20 is in part keyed to a director's "defense" of an action, arguably it does not cover an administrative investigation where "defense" has little or no meaning
in this context. Possibly, this would be an indemnifiable expense outside the terms of the statute, assuming that the courts do not read
the statute as completely pre-emptive of all "common law" indemnity
principles.' Again, it is uncertain whether the statute covers reasonable expenses connected with an arbitration proceeding. Suppose, for
instance, that a corporate officer or dominant shareholder has guaranteed performance or jointly agreed with the corporation to perform a contract whose terms contemplate arbitration of disputes
under the contract. If he incurs costs in a proceeding to adjust a
contract dispute he should fairly be indemnified by the corporation,
but has he put in a "defense" within the meaning of the statute?
Finally, in some cases where a director or officer is a plaintiff or
asserts a counterclaim sued, he may deserve indemnification. But
the statute speaks only of indemnifying those who are "sued" or
"prosecuted" or assert a "defense"-language which impliedly bars
indemnity of one who wields a sword rather than a shield.
4(0) (1960).
common law indemnity rights.
preserve
any
Some statutes specifically
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
721 ("Corporate personnel other than directors and officers"). Usually
these extra-statutory rights arise under the common law of agency. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 438-40 (1958).
"°ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. §
100 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-26.
107
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2.-In several respects, the statute is not sufficiently inclusive
of personnel deserving indemnity. Thus, it leaves uncertain whether
indemnity inures to the personal representative of a deceased director
or officer who would be entitled to it himself as of right or by valid
intra-corporate action.'6 8
Two other classes of corporate personnel are not expressly covered. Whether they may lawfully be indemnified again depends on
how far the statute is exclusive in its coverage. First, the North
Carolina statute refers only to directors and officers, including
certain "dominant shareholders."'6 9 The difficulty is that one is
or is not an "officer" depending on his "office" being mentioned
in the statute or the by-laws. For instance, is the chief sales executive of a large corporation entitled to indemnity, although he is not
a director or an "officer" nor mentioned in the by-laws? Would
the statute permit indemnification of the general manager of a division of the corporation on winning a price-fixing suit? A number
of recent statutes mention "employees" so as to avoid just this sort
of question."0
Secondly, the statute may not include executive personnel of a
subsidiary or an affiliate. But, surely, no public policy should preclude a parent corporation from assuming responsibilities to the
system as a whole and indemnifying personnel of a subsidiary as
it would its own executives. Indeed, since the subsidiary's personnel are usually closely controlled by the parent, that corporation
should carry the risk. Many statutes now specifically empower a
corporation to indemnify a person serving "at its request" as director of another corporation, especially if the indemnifying enter1
prise owns shares or is a creditor of the other corporation. '
3.-The North Carolina law wisely makes indemnity exclusively
a matter for court decision when a director or officer is sued by the
corporation or in a derivative suit, and it recognizes indemnity both
2
when the suit is adjudicated or settled.Y
..
8 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 722(a), 723(a) ("A corporation
may indemnify any person . . .his testator or intestate .... "). See also
CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 33-320(b), (d) (1961).
1 9N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19(b) (1965). Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. §
33320(a) (1961).
" CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-320 (1961);
Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.407 (1957).
1
.E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-320(d) (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14.3-14
(Supp. 1964); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a).
""2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-21 (1965).
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If the action goes to judgment, the director or officer must be
"successful in whole or in part" and the court must find that his
conduct "fairly and equitably merits" indemnity. This is a sound
standard as a general proposition. However, it may be too restrictive in certain limited situations even though the court finds
a violation of duty. The ease of stating the director's duty obscures the difficulty of applying the standard to specific situations,
particularly in some borderline course of conduct which is held for
the first time in a particular jurisdiction to be a breach of duty. For
instance, it is a delicate question how far directors may, consistently
with their fiduciary duty, use the funds of their corporation for
buying its own shares to avoid a shift of corporate control. 3 One
need only state the question to see that directors may well act
honestly, in good faith, and in the reasonable belief that they are
serving the corporate interest but that a court may subsequently find
such action to be improper and a breach of duty. As expressed by
one authority, "in litigation involving corporate policies, where the
chief issue is one of law, without any allegation of bad faith on the
part of the directors, the corporation should bear the expense even
if the directors are held to have breached their duty."' 174 English
practice is particularly instructive. Section 448(1) of the Companies
Act provides that although an officer of the corporation has been
found liable for "negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of
trust," the court may nevertheless relieve him in whole or in part
from personal liability "on such terms as the court may think fit,"
on a finding that the individual "acted honestly and reasonably, and
that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case... he ought
fairly to be excused" from bearing personal liability. 75 It is then
provided that if the court order relieve any such person from personal liability, he "shall be indemnified out of the assets of the
Thus, the English statute allows its courts to impose
company."'"
on the corporation the expenses of a director who breached his duty
but personally acted "honestly and reasonably." With the growing
complexity of business and the ever deeper involvement with government regulation, it seems appropriate that some expenses of a
""See text accompanying notes 126-32 supra.
... WASHINGTON

& BISHOP,

INDEMNIFYING THE CoRPoRATE EXECUTIVE

82 (1963).
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 448(1).
. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 136. (Emphasis added.)
','
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director who is found in technical breach of duty should be borne
by the corporation as a risk of the enterprise. This is especially
fair when the individual is "unsuccessful" because the court determines a new point of fiduciary duty or some new application of
the fiduciary concept not reasonably foreseeable as a rule of law at
the time the individual acted. Often the cost is large, and, perhaps more disturbing to the individual director, the possible loss is
incalculable and uninsurable. I would suggest, therefore, that it
would be sound and sober policy to allow courts to decide whether
the expenses are properly to be carried by the corporation or by the
individual. Particularly when a statute, such as North Carolina's,
empowers the court to exercise full control over indemnification in
derivative actions, this should be left to the sound discretion of the
judge who should not be barred from "doing equity" by the somewhat rigid rules of the present statute, especially the requirement that
177
the director must be "successful" to obtain indemnification.
J. Shares and Shareholders: Voting and Meetings
The North Carolina statute contains well drawn and comprehensive provisions concerning shareholder meetings and voting
rights. Based in part on the Model Act, the North Carolina provisions are superior both in detailed coverage and draftsmanship to
their Model Act counterparts. However, in this area more recent
statutes have made advances in relevant substantive provisions,
and some of these should now be carefully considered in North
Carolina. Before turning to these specific points, we note that Mr.
Robinson gives an excellent exposition of the existing North Carolina provisions and useful advice on compliance. 78 He too notes
some of the deficiencies in the existing statute and usually indicates
the appropriate approach for attorneys to take with respect to these
ambiguities or lacunae in the statutory language.
1. "Proper Subject" under SEC Proxy Rules and the North
Carolina Statute.-One significant feature of the North Carolina
"" The South Carolina statute, after stating a general test for indemni-

fication of directors and officers, authorizes indemnification if "notwithstanding the ... limitations [stated in the general test], the court finds that the
person sued fairly and equitably merits indemnification." S.C. CODE §
12-18.18(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1964). The court's discretion under this statute
would permit a court to reach substantially the same result as under the
English
Companies Act.
1
. ROBINSON §§ 40-51.
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statute is not developed in the Robinson treatise, although potentially it has great importance, either for protection or annoyance depending upon one's point of view. Apparently unique among American statutes, section 55-61 (d) provides in pertinent part that "any
matter relating to the affairs of a corporation is a proper subject
for action at an annual meeting of shareholders .... -179 Mr.
Robinson notes and paraphrases this language,' 1 but does not
comment on its implications. Actually, its implications lie in the
field of federal rather than specifically North Carolina law, and
this indicates the lurking danger of too far segregating federal and
state corporation law. Under the SEC's proxy rules, a shareholder
has, with various limitations and subject to regulations, a right to
demand a vote on any "proper subject" for shareholder action, and
more specifically a right to have his "proper subject" proposal inserted into management's proxy statement."8 ' In effect, the SEC
rules give the shareholder a restricted right to solicit proxies in favor
of his proposal at management's expense, although this right is
drastically curtailed by confining his supporting statement to 100
words"' 2-- a limitation which does not sovern management's immediately following reply."8 3 The dice are then loaded since the
proxy may declare how management will vote if no choice is
specified.' 8 4 Up to the date of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964,85 this right, such as it is, was available only to shareholders
of "listed" corporations. It has, indeed, been widely used; it is not
at all uncommon to find proxy statements with one or more shareholder proposals, although a large percentage of these proposals
emanate from several "professional shareholders." With the extension of the proxy rules to many unlisted corporations whose
55-61(d)
125 n.2. (1965).
The precise
181 SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1964).
language of SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8, is that a
shareholder proposal need not be included if it "is, under the laws of the
holders ...
domicile, not a proper subject for action by security (1964).
issuer's
12 SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)
180The shareholder supporting statements are ordinarily pathetically
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §
180 ROBINSON § 40, at

unpersuasive and would often be so even with a greater chance to fly upon
the wings of unhampered rhetoric. Management statements are rarely very
long and usually wind up with the boilerplate statement that the shareholder
proposal is not in the "best interests of the corporation," the usual formula
position on any matter.
any management
for justifyingProxy
Rule 14a-4(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.4a-4(b) (1964).
1' SEC
180 78 Stat. 565.
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shares are actively traded over-the-counter, the shareholder proposal
80
right will become more important.
The North Carolina statute directly feeds into the proxy rules
and the "proper subject" concept. The SEC rules now look to state
law to determine whether a proposal is a "proper subject" under
the law of the state of incorporation, although the SEC has been
rather liberal in recognizing "proper subjects." Indeed, it has
broadened its interpretation of state law by allowing shareholders to
put into management statements "advisory" proposals which, even
if passed, would not bind the directors but are merely an exposition
of stockholder sentiment.1 7 If any generalization is possible, it is
the somewhat tautological statement that "proper subject" under
the SEC interpretation embraces matters in which shareholders have
a special interest as shareholders. It is not necessarily an economic
interest, for "proper subject" does not cover matters peculiarly within management responsibility, however much their determination
might affect the value of shares and however much the "advisory"
proposal cuts into this.'
The North Carolina provision is unique
since it makes "any matter relating to the affairs of a corporation"
into a "proper subject" for shareholder consideration. Literally,
this obliterates the distinction usually observed by the SEC and
would allow shareholders to present resolutions on matters such as
corporate financial policy, labor relations, dividends, sales policy,
advertising, and so on through various "affairs" usually deemed
exclusively a management prerogative. This, then, is what the SEC
may find when it looks into the North Carolina statute to learn
what issues proposed by shareholders are "proper subjects" under
law for shareholder action or consideration. Whether the SEC will
"8'Generally the importance of the SEC proxy rules is vastly magnified
by the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964), holding that shareholders of a corporation have standing
to attack company proxy solicitation materials allegedly not conforming to
the SEC proxy rules, and that on finding a violation the federal courts have
plenary jurisdiction to take necessary action, prospective or retrospective,
to undo the ill effects of the improper proxy solicitation. Indeed, said the
Court, "we believe that the overriding federal law applicable here would,
where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress despite the
provision of state corporation law . . . ." Id. at 434.
...
See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 908-11 (1961).
188 SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8(c) (5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (5)
(1964),
now provides that management need not include a shareholder proposal if
it "consists of a recommendation or request that the management take action
with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business
operations of the issuer."
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so interpret the North Carolina rule or will still apply, despite the
literal language of the statute, some distinction between shareholder
and management matters, 18 9 is unknown.
It is equally impossible to predict how the North Carolina Supreme Court will read this clause in a case not coming under the
SEC proxy rules. Again, literally the statue allows shareholders to
demand action on any "matter relating to the affairs of a corporation." Although under the North Carolina statute shareholders have
no right to ride management proxy solicitation, 9 ' it is arguable that
they may lawfully present any proposal at a shareholder meeting
and demand "action" thereon. If, then, this is a statutory right, it
would presumably override any effort by management to block
presentation of the issue at the meeting, whether this took the form
of a chairman's refusal to recognize a shareholder or put the matter
to a vote, or a claim that the corporate by-laws limited the meeting
to consideration of matters on the agenda.' 91 This is reinforced by
the second clause of section 55-61 (d), excusing any statement in
the notice of meeting concerning "the matter," viz., a "matter
relating to the affairs of a corporation .

. . ."

The other argument

would be that section 55-61 (d) does not grant a state-law right to
the shareholders, but only broadens the permissible scope of topics
which may be considered at the meeting without causing management to lose control of the meeting agenda. Under this approach,
section 55-61 (d) at the most only broadens shareholder rights to
the extent that the SEC will do so through its reading of the
proxy statement.
This issue is discussed in some detail because it is not treated
in the Robinson book, and because it raises (and by implication
decides) some important questions of allocation of corporate
powers between management and shareholders. Even under the
...
In other words, although the North Carolina statute makes "any
matter relating to the affairs of a corporation" a "proper subject" for
shareholder action, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-61(d) (1965), the SEC may

still apply its own rule of self-restraint under rule 14a-8(c) (5). See note
188 supra.

...
Compare Carter v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 227 Ore. 401, 362 P.2d 766
(1961), in which the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a move by share-

holders of a corporation, concededly not subject to the SEC proxy rules,
to adopt by judicial decision a requirement that the corporation's proxy
solicitation materials include a statement by the petitioning shareholders
opposing the corporation's proposed dam project.

.1Cf. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert.

denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
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most expansive reading the statute presumably does not bind the
directors to observe a vote by the shareholders on some "matter
relating to the affairs of [the] corporation" where this matter is
traditionally a management prerogative. But to the shareholder's
attorney, it does somewhat change the balance of power in favor of
the shareholder interests. To the management attorney, it may
prove to be a serious nuisance at times. To some businessmen, it
may be a factor favoring incorporation in another state.
2. Superstatutory Quorum and Voting Requirements.-Mr.
Robinson points up the confusion in the North Carolina statute
concerning the right to prescribe, and specifically the document
in which to prescribe, a greater-than-majority quorum or vote requirement for shareholder meetings."0 2 Unlike many newer statutes,
North Carolina leaves to negative implication (as Mr. Robinson
stresses) 19 the right to prescribe a superstatutory quorum or vote
provision-a statutory procedure which is subject to a crippling
construction by courts which may refuse to sanction a unanimous
vote requirement. 9 4 It is certainly desirable, considering the importance of high quorum and vote requirements, for the statute
affirmatively to authorize any greater quorum or vote and also to
specify the document in which it must appear. I concur in Mr.
Robinson's advice that the provision should appear in the charter,
even though some statutory sections might sanction its appearance
in the by-laws.' 95 Indeed, I would follow the trend in other states
of stipulating that all superstatutory quorum and vote requirements,
both for shareholders and director action, must appear in the
charter. 6 First, it is clearer, simpler, and more certain if these
deviations from the "corporate norm" must appear in one place
only. Secondly, these provisions usually reflect a basic decision on
the balance of power among the shareholders. They should not be
lightly entered into or removed, and mandatory insertion in the
charter gives the decision a greater solemnity than mere inclusion in
the by-laws (even in shareholder-approved by-laws) which are
adopted and amended more readily. Finally, and more important,
permissible inclusion of these clauses in the by-laws does not serve

...
54. nn.20-21.
. RoBiNsoN
Id. § 54, at§ 148
...
Id. § 54, at 147 n.16.6.
193 Id. § 54, at 149.
...
E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 709.
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the interests of third parties who should only be required to satisfy
themselves that there are no unusual quorum or vote provisions in
the charter but should not have the further burden under the present
North Carolina rule of searching the by-laws.
A problem only recently given adequate statutory treatment is
the protection of a superstatutory quorum or vote requirement,
prescribed either by charter or by-laws, from being removed by a
vote less than that which is required. 197 Thus, a carefully wrought
bargain among shareholders, with say a four-fifths shareholder vote
requirement as its key provision, could be disrupted by an amendment by three of five shareholders removing the original fourfifths requirement. Even if the charter (or by-laws) forbade
amendment except by a four-fifths vote, it would be possible to
remove that clause, and then proceed to remove the general highvote requirement. Courts could go either way on this issue. On
the one hand, they could say that, particularly for close corporations,
the statutory permission for a high-vote requirement would be
frustrated if it could be removed by a lesser vote; on this reasoning,
the high-vote requirement would be protected even without a further
clause in the charter (or by-laws) forbidding amendment of that
instrument except by the vote to be protected. On the other hand,
courts could say that the right to amend charters or by-laws by a
stated vote is a statutory right and controls a high-vote requirement
in a charter or by-laws. This would be especially appealing if the
high-vote requirement was generating a deadlock. In North Carolina, a high-vote requirement contained in the charter for amending
the charter may be removed only by the same vote. 9 8 In my view,
carving out a limited (and very significant) area for specially protecting high-vote requirements may readily imply (1) that absent
specific statute any high-vote requirement may be amended out at
any time by the normal statutory percentage, so that (2) high-vote
requirements on mergers, sales-of-assets, dissolution, and so on
are not secure from removal by the lesser vote.
Slightly different considerations are involved if the high-vote
requirement appears in the by-laws. Even in the absence of statutory protection, as in the case of a charter amendment, Mr.
Robinson believes that "a sensible construction would probably rebriefly mentions this problem.
""ROBINSON § 25, at§ 75,
N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-100(b) (3) (1965).
...
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quire" the same sort of protection for a by-law provision."' I
find this quite incredible both because of (1) the negative implications of specifically protecting one particular type of high vote
requirement and (2) the fact that a charter clause arguably deserves such protection while a by-law clause is less serious, is more
apt to be inserted without the consideration of a charter clause,
and thus should not be binding. Accordingly, I doubt that a by-law
clause will be so protected, and I further doubt whether it should
be so protected.
This is an issue on which the law should be clarified. It should
provide, as does the Connecticut statute, °° that any charter clause
setting up a superstatutory quorum or vote requirement, both for
directors and shareholders, may be removed only by the vote so
protected. This would make the present language of section 55100(b) (3) superfluous and also avoid its present negative implications. However, I would not extend the proposed statutory protection to by-law clauses even when shareholders adopt them for
reasons already given. To give the suggested additional statutory
protection to by-law clauses merely compounds the original error of
permitting the clauses to appear in the by-laws.
3. Voting of Shares.-Apart from some minor uncertainty as
to whether the statute permits fractional or multiple votes,"' there
are two refined points on which the North Carolina statute should
be changed.
First, the North Carolina statute adopts a needlessly rigid rule
in grudgingly recognizing an exception to its worthy (and generally accepted) prohibition against a corporation voting its own
stock, whether held directly or indirectly. 202 This exception permits
a corporation to vote its own shares held by it in a fiduciary capacity,
but only after obtaining a court order appointing an "independent
' RoBINsoN § 25, at 75.
"0"Any provision in the certificate of incorporation prescribing the vote
required for any purpose and complying with this section, may not itself be
amended by a vote less than the vote therein prescribed." CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 33-329(c) (1961).
'2' The statute should be clarified as to whether fractional and multiple
votes per share are permissible. Mr. Robinson points out the present uncertainty under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-67(a) (1965). RoBINsoN § 32, at 107.
As a general proposition, these should be avoided if only for the sake of
simplicity. However, statutes in the United States are divided. Some
impliedly prohibit anything other than "one share one vote." Others leave
specifically authorize it.
the issue in limbo.STAT.
55-67(b) (1965).
"'N.C. GEN. None§ apparently
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and disinterested trustee" (other than the corporate fiduciary),
showing the "necessity" for his voting the stock, and giving notice
to all beneficiaries. Mr. Robinson suggests some of the technical
difficulties of administering this remarkable provision.Y3 I should
like to comment upon its need and basic validity.
Concededly, a corporation should be stripped of any power to
maintain its own nominees in office by voting its own shares-a
situation making the corporate officers in law as well as so frequently in fact responsible only to the corporation. In my judgment,
this desirable policy is not sufficiently threatened by corporate fiduciaries voting their own shares to warrant disfranchising the shares
so held or, as in North Carolina, invoking a cumbersome procedure
on an ad hoc basis. To begin with, the number of shares so held
would usually be small, although occasionally situations do arise
where vote of a large holding might be decisive. °3a Moreover, when
a clear choice is presented, a corporate fiduciary acting through its
trust officers will hesitate to vote its own shares so as to favor the
corporation at the expense of the beneficiary's best interests; for it
would clearly involve itself in a breach of duty both to the trust
beneficiaries and its own shareholders. Finally, it seems curious
for the statute to single out the voting of fiduciary-owned stock for
such restriction. If there is any cause for concern, it should be, not
the remote contingency of misusing voting power, but the possibility
of the corporate fiduciary's holding its own shares in trust at a
time when an independent trustee would sell the shares. °8 b
Absent demonstrated abuse, I suggest that the statute should
relax its present restrictions on a fiduciary's voting its own shares
and adopt the view of Wisconsin and several other jurisdictions by
generally authorizing a corporate fiduciary to vote its own shares.2 4
...
ROBINSON § 36.

-03a In Graves v. Security Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1963), a
bank's vote of the 23.4% block of its own shares held by it in a fiduciary
capacity was decisive in approving a merger with another bank; the Kentucky Court of Appeals sustained this result, holding that the Kentucky
statutory provision barring corporations from voting their own shares did
not apply to shares held in a fiduciary capacity. It is reported that Cleveland
Trust Co., Ohio's largest commercial bank, holds 33% of its own shares in
fiduciary
accounts. Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1965, p. 2, col. 3.
0
1 b See ScoTT, TRusTs § 170.15 (2d ed. 1956).
' "Shares of (a corporation's) own stock held by it in a fiduciary
capacity may be voted and shall be counted in determining the total of outstanding shares at any given time." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(2) (1957).
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-32 (1964) permits the corporate fiduciary to vote
its own shares only if there is a second, independent fiduciary.
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The risk of damage to corporate and other shareholder interests is
minimal, and the provision does not involve the expense and trouble
of administration entailed by the present North Carolina rule.
In contrast to North Carolina's demonstrated concern to block
promoters' abuses and watered stock,2' 5 the statute2°0 contains an
unusual provision authorizing the holder of shares to cast a full
vote even though the shares are not fully paid. The only exception
is when a purchase price installment is due and unpaid. Calls are,
of course, to be made whenever the directors see fit to do so.27
Those who hold shares not yet fully paid often include promoters
or other controlling shareholders, who are themselves likely to be
or to dominate the directors. Thus, it may well be up to the dominant shareholders to determine when they shall make a call and
thus state a condition which, if not fulfilled, may deprive them of
their voting rights. Needless to say, such a situation is unlikely to
occur.
The statutory provision unduly encourages unscrupulous individuals to issue large blocks of shares to themselves with little or
no consideration and to defer indefinitely the payment of the price.
Of course, creditors may be able to realize on the unpaid subscription or to enforce the liabilities under North Carolina's unique
watered stock statute.2 8 Until then, the insiders may have no
strong incentive to pay in capital. Moreover, it is possible for holders of shares with large unpaid amounts to sell the shares at a
substantial profit measured by the sale price over the amount, if any,
paid in by the original subscribers. 2°0 Although the original holder
continues to be liable,2 10 this liability may be inconvenient to enforce if the subscriber is out of the jurisdiction or is insolvent, etc.
Since dividends are likely to be less of a factor at the promotional
stage than voting and control, the statutory requirement that divi...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53 (1965).
206 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-67(a)
(1965).
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(g) (1965).
20.N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53 (1965).

"0'It is true that so long as shares are unpaid, the statute forbids issue
of a certificate therefor, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-57(a) (1965), and thus
significantly inhibits this practice. However, while making this practice
wrongful, it does not deprive the corporation of the power to issue a
certificate which may pass into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value
and without notice. Under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-202(2) (a)
violation of the corporation law would be no defense against the bona fide
purchaser.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53(f) (1965).
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dends must be proportional to the amounts paid in on shares not
yet fully paid. will be no serious obstacle to manipulations by
unscrupulous persons holding large stock blocks.
4. Bondholder Rights.-The North Carolina statute, as Mr.
Robinson briefly notes,2" lacks any provision authorizing the
articles of incorporation to grant voting rights to creditor securities.
This provision is found in the statutes of the most significant commercial jurisdictions, including California, 13 Connecticut,2 14 Delaware,213 New Jersey, 1 " New York,217 and Pennsylvania. 21 Normally, it is of interest only to large corporations which wish to give
bondholders a contingent voting right, comparable to the routine
power of preferred shareholders to vote on the occurrence of dividend defaults. Of course, some may object to giving bonds so distinctive an equity power as a voting right, but such a rigid and
conceptualistic distinction between equity and creditor interests
in this context overlooks the increasing hybridization of many
creditor securities in order simultaneously to gain tax deductions
for interest and enjoy the benefits of equity securities. However,
bondholder voting rights should not be encouraged in close corporations. One distinctive danger here is creation of an excessive
amount of bond capital in comparison with equity capital ("thin
incorporation"); and an outright grant of voting rights to bonds,
even contingent on interest defaults, could weight the balance, in
a close case, against the corporation's right to deduct the "interest"
on the issue which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is challenging as covert equity. 19
K.

Shareholder Control Devices

One of the most significant warnings offered by Mr. Robinson
concerns the attitude of North Carolina courts towards voting trusts,
irrevocable proxies, and pooling agreements which were regarded
as void under local common law on the broad ground of an illegal
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(f) (1965).
"' ROBINSON § 121, at 334.
.. CAL. CORP. CODE § 306.
"' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-324(f) (1961).
...
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1952).
2"0 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:10-10.1.
"",
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 518(c).
"'2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-317 (1958).
.10
For a discussion of "thin incorporation," see ROBINSON § 117.
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ownership.22

severance of voting rights and beneficial
The wellgrounded fear is that the courts may narrowly construe the statutory
authorization for voting trusts and pooling agreements and thereby
compel an overly strict compliance with the statute in order to avoid
falling into the outer darkness of void arrangements. Such a result
came about in several Delaware decisions whose restrictive holdings
rested in part on Delaware's common law background of judicial
hostility to arrangements separating vote and beneficial enjoyment
of stock. Hence, while the statutory sections dealing with voting
trusts and agreements certainly change the old policy against them, it
is doubtful whether they have, as Mr. Robinson says, "completely
overturn[ed]" it;221 and if the Delaware experience is any key,
it is likely to result in a restrictive approach.
1. Pooling Agreements.-The North Carolina statute recognizes certain shareholder vote-pooling agreements lasting no longer
than ten years,22 2 thereby overruling early case-law invalidating
such agreements for unlawful segregation of voting power and beneficial enjoyment. 2 1 This laudable object may well be defeated since
the statute only protects an "otherwise lawful" voting arrangement.
Such a phrase could at the least invite a court to strike down an
agreement going in any way beyond the precise terms of the statute,
223
particularly in view of the former invalidity of these arrangements. a
For example, since the statute explicitly recognizes voting agreements to elect directors, a voting arrangement is arguably invalid if
it covers votes on any other matters, e.g., fundamental corporate
changes such as charter amendments, mergers, sales of assets, dissolution, or, under a very strict construction, a vote on removing,
as against electing, directors. 4 Since North Carolina's common
20j Id. § 55, at 150-51.
Id. § 38, at 121 n.30.
§ 55-73(a) (1965).
22' These cases are cited in ROBINSON § 55, at 150 n.30. See especially
Bridgers
v. Staton, 150 N.C. 216, 63 S.E. 892 (1909).
22
aWyo. STAT. § 17-36.31 (Cum. Supp. 1963) deals effectively with
several problems. First, it sanctions agreements to elect directors or to
vote "on other matters requiring shareholder action under the provisions
of . . . [the statute] or the articles of incorporation." It then authorizes
a court specifically to enforce the voting agreement against a recalcitrant
shareholder, or to set aside an election or other corporate action resulting
from a vote in violation of the agreement, or to grant other appropriate
relief.
22.Perhaps some voting agreements, which do not precisely comply with
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(a) (1965), will be sustained under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-73(b) (1965), which authorizes agreements among all share121

2'2N.C. GEN. STAT.
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law was clearly hostile to shareholder pooling agreements, and since
the statute singles out one kind of agreement for approval, there
is a strong implication that any other type of agreement is invalid
because its objective is unlawful, i.e., one not specified by the
statute. Such an agreement may also not be "otherwise valid."
Of course, the courts may well conclude, as Mr. Robinson evidently hopes, that section 55-73 (a), despite faulty draftsmanship,
articulates a legislative policy once and for all overturning the rule
against separating vote and beneficial use, and that all types of voting
agreements are to be sustained. On this approach, which I too
hope will be adopted, the phrase "otherwise valid" would serve as
a safety valve to strike down an agreement which is really against
public policy. For instance, assuming the validity and enforcement
of a general agreement to pool votes on all issues coming before the
shareholders, the court could find the agreement is not "otherwise
valid" if in purpose and effect it works to oppress or coerce an
unorganized minority of shareholders, or is used to promote selfish
personal interests of the agreeing shareholders.
Because of the limited scope of the vote-pooling statute, it is
possible to void any arrangement which couples the pooling agreement with some enforcement procedure if the shareholders are
unable to agree and some refuse to abide by the contract. For
instance, the agreement may automatically confer on the shareholders complying with the agreement an irrevocable proxy to vote
the shares of those who refuse to go along.2 25 Thus, if A, B, and
C each own fifty shares, and B and C wish to support the "management" board candidate while A insists on voting for the "opposition"
candidates, the voting agreement might automatically give B and C
an irrevocable proxy to vote A's shares where the agreement calls
holders of a close corporation relating to "any phase of the affairs of the

corporation" even if such agreements might otherwise be invalid for treating
the corporation like a partnership. At present, we do not know just how
far these two statutory provisions overlap. One difficulty is that since §
55-73(b) goes on to specify the subject matter of such agreements, viz.,
"the management of [the corporation's] business or division of its profits or
otherwise," this might be taken to exclude voting agreements which would
then be judged under § 55-73(a). Since the North Carolina statute is intended to give broad benefits to close corporations, I suggest that such a
construction is needlessly rigid and should not be adopted. So long as the

voting agreement embraces all of the shareholders, it should be upheld under
§ 55-73(b) even if it cannot meet the § 55-73(a) standards.
25 Compare Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac.
582 (1897).
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for all 150 shares to be voted as the majority shall determine.
As a variant, the agreement may give an impartial person, e.g., an
arbitrator, such a proxy to vote the shares as the majority determine,
or as he shall determine, depending on the terms of the agreement."2
Such arrangements would be seriously in doubt under the North
Carolina statute in view of the common law background. First,
the agreement may not be "otherwise valid" because it couples
227
additional procedures not specifically recognized by the statute.
Secondly, it is doubtful that irrevocable proxies have been sufficiently validated by statute to make them reliable devices to enforce
a voting agreement.2 8 In fact, the courts might simply say that
enforcement is up to the courts, not to the parties, through an
action for damages against the recalcitrant party-a rather sterile
after-the-fact remedy. Thirdly, a voting agreement coupled with
any sort of enforcement procedures, and particularly an irrevocable
proxy, may look so much like a voting trust that the courts will
hold that it is in fact a voting trust-but one which is invalid for
non-compliance with the statutory formalities. 22 Finally, the use
of the arbitrator (or other independent person to enforce the arrangement) may be useless in North Carolina, since arbitration
agreements are not specifically enforceable. 0° Indeed, even if the
agreement gave an arbitrator an irrevocable proxy to vote the shares,
he might not have a sufficient legal "interest" to support an irrevocable proxy either under statute or under common law agency
231
principles.
2. Irrevocable Proxies.-The North Carolina statute leaves
altogether too much to uncertain and contestable implication concerning irrevocable proxies. It recognizes the validity of proxies
"coupled with an interest" for up to ten years 2 2 and speaks of
..6For a decision refusing to grant specific enforcement to such an
arrangement, see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), reversing 29 Del.

Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946) (granting specific performance).
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(a) (1965).

...
See text accompanying notes 232-37 infra.
..The leading decision so holding is Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch.

371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957).

8' See McDonough Constr. Co. v. Hanner, 232 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N.C.
1964); Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 234 N.C. 385, 386-87, 67 S.E.2d 267,

269 1(1951).
..See Johnson v. Spartanburg County Fair Ass'n, 210 S.C. 56, 72-73,
41 S.E.2d
599, 606-07 (1947).
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-68(b) (1965).
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"a valid proxy which is by law irrevocable and which states on its
face that it is irrevocable."2 3 Because of the uncertain state of the
common law on irrevocable proxies, and especially because of a local
dictum that proxies may not be irrevocable, 34 the statute should
certainly be clarified. Although, as Mr. Robinson says,2" 5 "positive
intimation" from the statute doubtlessly alters any general rule that
all proxies are revocable, the wording of the statute merely means
that the court is thrown back, not on the superseded North Carolina common law view, but on the general common law. But the
general common law, that agencies are irrevocable only if "coupled
with an interest," an inheritance from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's
famous though wrong-headed decision in Hunt v. Rousmanier's
Adm'rs3 is far too shaky a foundation to support an important
arrangement requiring an irrevocable proxy. In sum, the North
Carolina statute, in dealing with irrevocable proxies, exchanges a
prohibition for an uncertainty, and the latter may be worse than
the former.
Since the matter can be so readily clarified, as it has been in New
York 37 and other states, the North Carolina statute should now specifically recognize that certain types of proxies are by law irrevocable,
and, in effect, spell out the "interest" needed to sustain irrevocability.
Such a statute should certainly include an irrevocable proxy annexed
to a voting agreement. It is also desirable to make this latter point
clear to avoid any implication that a voting agreement with irrevocable proxy is merely a defective and hence invalid voting trust.
2 38 on voting
3. Voting Trusts.-The North Carolina statute
trusts pursues a questionable policy of nearly unique concern for
the beneficiaries of voting trusts, and, indeed, goes so far that it
greatly reduces the utility of this important control device. By the
terms of the statute, and not subject to any modification in the
agreement, beneficiaries may instruct the trustees as to voting on
certain fundamental changes in the corporation, as well as on
9
The assumption is that a voting
amendments of the by-laws.23

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-68(c) (1965).
2'Harvey v. Linville Improvement Co., 118 N.C. 693, 24 S.E. 489
in ROBINSON § 38, at 121 n.29.
cited and criticized
(1896),ROBINSON
§ 38 at 121.
225
(1823).
174
Wheat.)
(8
U.S.
2021
..N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 609(f)-(g). See also CONN. GEN. STAT.
(1961); S.C. CODE § 12-16.14(f)-(h) (Supp. 1964).
§ 33-337
2
. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-72 (1965).
23

223

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-72 (c) (1965).
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trust's purpose of insuring management stability is satisfied if the
trustees can choose the management, and hence no other powers are
needed.239 This is too limited an approach to the question. Stability
of the corporation will often demand that the trustees be able to
vote for (or against) various proposals which are submitted as
well as to vote to elect management, without polling the certificate
holders. The real purpose of creating a voting trust is to vest in the
trustees the power to act as a unit for the best interests of the
certificate holders. If shareholders doubt whether trustees can be
trusted with their voting rights, they should not surrender their
shares; and if the trustees do indeed misuse their voting power,
they can be challenged for breach of fiduciary duty. 4 ' On the other
hand, as Mr. Robinson points out,

41

the statute is unclear on a

question of certificate holders' rights to dissent to certain fundamental changes and receive the fair cash value of their interests. It
is suggested that the best solution is to allow the trustees to vote
without instructions from certificate holders but to give dissenting
certificate holders a definite right to receive payment for their interests. 42 Other rights given by the statute to certificate holdersincluding rights to inspect corporate books 24 3 and to sue derivatively 2"4 4 -are desirable means of protecting the interest both of the
certificate holders and of other shareholders.
One question left needlessly uncertain in the North Carolina
statute, and apparently not discussed by the Robinson treatise, is
the effect of a provision in the voting trust agreement that permits
it to run longer than ten years. Experience in other states teaches
the wisdom of statutory provision specifically providing that if the
voting trust does exceed the statutory ten-year period, it is not void
22 9

a See Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation
Statutes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 363, 385 (1958).
40 Brown v. McLanahan, 148 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1945); Lippard v.
Parrish, 22 Del. Ch. 25, 191 Atl. 829 (Ch. 1937).
ROBINSON § 55, at 153 & n.44.
24 S.C. CODE § 12-16.16(g) (Supp. 1964) so provides, unless varied by
the 2voting trust agreement.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(a) (1965).
2" It is uncertain whether the merely equitable owner has a right to sue
derivatively in North Carolina. ROBINSON § 108, at 298 nn.54-55. It would
be desirable to clarify this matter by specific statutory provision permitting
equitable owners to sue. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 626(a) (action may
be brought "by a holder ... of voting trust certificates of the corporation or
of a beneficial interest in such shares or certificates").
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in toto, as at least one decision has held,2 4 but is eneffective only
for the time period beyond ten years.
L. Shareholder's Pre-emptive Right
The North Carolina statute wisely makes the shareholder's preemptive right voluntary by permitting it to be expanded or denied
as the articles provide.2 4 At the same time, it incorporates an explicit doctrine of equitable limitation 247 so that a charter denial of
pre-emptive rights does not preclude a shareholder from charging a
breach of fiduciary duty by directors in the issue of shares, e.g., an
offer of shares to others at an unfairly low price to reduce the
complaining shareholder's relative voting power in the corporation.
This merely recognizes the origin of pre-emptive rights in the more
general doctrines of fiduciary duty.
There are several matters of detail which should be clarified by
statute. First, as Mr. Robinson points out,2 48 there is no provision

in the law for enforcing pre-emptive rights. This can be remedied
by specifically stating, as in other states, that whenever pre-emptive
rights are recognized by the charter (whether because it is silent
in not denying statutory rights or because it expands the statutory
right) the corporation must give notice of the terms and conditions
of the offer, the number of shares available to the shareholder, and
249
allow at least a stated number of days for the shareholder to act.

The latter is especially important so as to avoid dispute over whether
a shareholder had a "reasonable" time to raise money to take up his
quota of shares under a pre-emptive rights offer.
It would be useful if the statute also specified that shares subject
to a pre-emptive right but not taken up by the shareholders holding
the right are automatically released from the pre-emptive right
and may be freely sold by the corporation. The nearest thing to this
"' Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 37-42, 191

At. 823, 825-27 (Ch. 1937) (voting trust invalidated because its duration
could exceed the ten year limitation permitted by DEL. CODE ANN. § 218(a)

(1952)). In Holmes v. Sharretts, 228 Md. 358, 366-70, 180 A.2d 302, 30507 (1962), the Maryland Court of Appeals limited a voting trust to the
statutory ten-year period despite language in the instrument indicating a
possibly longer duration. The latter rule is adopted by statute in South
Carolina. S.C. CODE § 12-16.16(f) (Supp. 1964).
2,0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-56 (1965).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-56(e) (1965), discussed in RoBINSON § 129.
218 Id. § 128, at 349.
'E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 622(g) (fifteen days); S.C. CODE
§ 12-16.21(g) (Supp. 1964) (thirty days).
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at present is a denial of pre-emptive rights to shares released therefrom by a two-thirds shareholder vote.250 If the articles of incorporation gives a North Carolina corporation's shareholders a
pre-emptive right, counsel for underwriters of any remaining shares
would do well to require a firm opinion that these shares are released from the pre-emptive right. Since no North Carolina cases
seem to have dealt with any pre-emptive right questions, let alone
this one, the opinion would have to be counsel's best estimate on
the basis of the general law that pre-emptive rights are lost if not
exercised.2 5' The corporation should, however, have the benefit of
a statutory provision making this point unmistakably clear.252
The North Carolina statute exempts from pre-emptive rights
"shares issued or to be issued to obtain all or a portion of the capital
required to initiate the enterprise . *"253 Hence, if the required
capital has been paid in, the pre-emptive rights will attach to newly
issued shares, subject to the terms of the statute or charter. As Mr.
Robinson points out,25 4 the statutory exemption from pre-emptive

rights for initial capital does not mean that all shares authorized
initially in the charter are part of the "capital required to initiate
the enterprise." Thus, the existence vel non of a pre-emptive right
is subject to a rather vague and uncertain test: whether the court
concludes that the necessary capital has been received. In lieu of
this needless uncertainty, the statute should provide, as does New
York, 25 5 that a pre-emptive right does not attach to shares originally
authorized in the charter and sold within two years from the charter's filing date. The time period can, of course, be lengthened or
reduced; but the principal is clear: the shares sold within this limited
time are conclusively presumed part of the initial capital.2"'
5 5
250 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5 - 6(c)(3)
(1965).
2" ROBINSON § 128, at 346.
"' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-343(d) (2) (1961); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
622(h);
S.C. CODE § 12-16.21(d)(9) (Supp. 1964).
"5 N.C. GEN. STAr. § 55-56(c)(1) (1965).
...
ROBINSON § 128, at 347-48.
255 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 622(e)(5); S.C. CODE § 12-16.21(d) (4)
(Supp. 1964).
...
The North Carolina statute wisely does not attempt to deal with the
question of whether one class of shares is entitled to a pre-emptive right
in another class. Rather it gives pre-emptive rights only to shares of the
same class. Of course, the issue of new shares of a class A common may
seriously dilute the interest of the class B common shareholders, and the
latter will have no pre-emptive right. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 622 is the
most serious and ambitious effort to handle this problem, but it is a tour
de force. It recognizes "equity shares" (those with "unlimited dividend
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M. Corporate Records and Stockholder Inspection Rights
1. Minuetes and Records of Corporations.-TheNorth Carolina
statute, like its counterparts in most other states, requires corporations to keep books and records of account, as well as "minutes of
the proceedings of its shareholders, its board of directors, and
executive committee, if any."25' No sanction as such is imposed
despite the seemingly mandatory character of the statutory language,
although any shareholder may seek mandamus to enforce compliance. Neither mandamus nor a penalty are satisfactory means to
compel adherence to procedures which are both a safeguard to
shareholders and some assurance of regularity in the conduct of
corporate affairs. What is needed is some continuing incentive to
invite compliance, rather than penalty for non-compliance. Several
states, led by Connecticut, 258 have hit upon the most attractive inducement, apart from avoiding tax troubles, to keep satisfactory
records by making some of these records prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.
The Connecticut statute specifically gives such effect to minutes
of meetings of incorporators, directors, committees, and shareholders; to a written consent, waiver, release or agreement entered
into the records or minutes; and to a statement that no particular
meeting was held or that no specified consent, etc., exists. To be
effective, the documents must be "certified under oath.., to be true
and correct" by the president and secretary. The Connecticut statute
then declares that all meetings referred to in these certified documents are deemed duly called and held; all motions and resolutions
adopted; and all elections of directors and appointments of officers
are considered "valid," unless the contrary is established.
This statutory provision has much to commend it. For North
Carolina, it would not work any apparent change in the decisional
law, 259 but would give it a statutory statement. This would be a
rights," whether or not preferred and whatever class) and "voting shares"

(those with voting rights whatever their class), and then gives "equity
shares" a pre-emptive right in any new issue of "equity shares" and
"voting shares" a pre-emptive right in any new issue of "voting shares,"
all regardless of class or series. The provision is a tour de force because
the statutory terms are not binding on the corporation, since pre-emptive
rights may be wholly abrogated by charter provision in New York as in
North Carolina.

""N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 55-37(a) (2) (1965).

2" CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 33-415 (1961).

See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw

§ 624(g); S.C. CODE § 12-24.9 (Supp. 1964).
' ROBINSON § 49.
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natural complement to the extensive and unique statutory provisions
codifying much law concerning the authority of and procedures
for officers to execute corporate instruments. 0 Since the minutes
of the meetings of directors, etc., often embody the authority upon
which officers and others act, and upon which third parties rely, it
would be helpful to give a definitive statutory expression to their
effect, as Connecticut does in providing "whenever a person has acted
in good faith in reliance upon any such certified original or copy,
it shall be conclusive in his favor." ' 1 Finally, such a provision
affords corporations and their officers and directors the strongest
incentive to maintain full and accurate minutes and records. Even
though absent such a statute the burden probably rests on the person
contesting the records of meetings, the statute quite usefully declares
this principle and thereby adds a degree of certainty to business
transactions. This is particularly true of the fact that third parties
may completely rely upon certified documents and records.
2. Shareholder Inspection Rights.-On a whole, the North
Carolina statute adequately provides for the shareholder inspection
right.2" 2 However, it is surprising to find North Carolina, unlike
many other states, authorizing inspection of right only to a shareholder owning at least five per cent of the shares of any class or
owning his shares though less than five per cent for at least six
months.2"' Curiously enough, any shareholder may maintain a
derivative action without regard to size or length of holdings, but
only a certain class of shareholders may seek the information as of
right on which a derivative action is to be constructed. The sixmonth limitation on inspection of right is a mild deterrent to one
buying a few shares of a corporation merely to get at its books,
but it means only that he must wait six months before using his
shares in this manner. The deterrent is further eased by the fact
that less-than-six month shareholders may aggregate their hold2 N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-36 (1965).
.6CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-416 (1961).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-37, -38 (1965).
26 This is essentially the Model Act provision, ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CoRPI. ACT § 46 (1960), except that North Carolina makes a decided improvement by permitting inspection of right to a shareholder owning five
per cent of any class in lieu of the harsh Model Act provision measuring it
against the total number of shares outstanding. Under the Model Act, if
there were 1,000,000 common and 49,000 preferred, no preferred shareholder
(or any group of them) could ever inspect unless he (or they) had owned
shares for at least six months; in North Carolina, 2,450 preferred shares
could inspect without regard to the length of ownership.
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ings, " and that in all events they may seek a court order opening
the books.2" 5
The North Carolina statute follows the Model Act provisions in
dealing with the shareholder who seeks a "sucker list" of shareholders for sale or for some other improper purpose.26 It does
so by making any past use for such purposes a defense to any
action for damages against the corporate officer refusing to produce
the requested records, and by making the sale, etc., of the list a
criminal offense. For dealing with this sort of abuse, an effective and
self-executing remedy is available. The New York statute267 permits the corporation to require, at its election, an affidavit from a
shareholder that he does not seek the inspection for an improper
purpose and that he has not sold or participated in a sale of a shareholders' list. If he refuses the affidavit, the corporate officer may
rightly refuse inspection. This will throw the matter into the courts
if the shareholder persists, but it is unlikely that a shareholder who
refuses to furnish the requested affidavit can make a very persuasive
case to the court as to his intended purpose. Presumably, this would
prejudice only the occasional shareholder who is honest but too proud
to submit the affidavit. Besides being self-executing through civil
process, this form of relief eliminates the criminal sanction 268 which
is inappropriate in this context and is unlikely to be an effective sanction since (1) it will rarely commend itself as a criminal action to
prosecuting officials, (2) it is poorly drafted, and (3) it will therefore probably become entangled with questions whether the shareholder knowingly and wilfully intended sale or other misuse of the
list.
Particularly undesirable is the sweeping provision making it a
misdemeanor to use "information obtained pursuant to the provisions of ... [the inspection statute] for any purposes other than
those incident to ownership of the shares as to which information
was obtained." 26 9 The aim of this provision is apparently to declare
that a "proper purpose" of inspection 7 0 includes any purpose incident to share ownership. Rather than obliquely reach this result
.-,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(c) (1965).
- 05N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(f) (1965).
0 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 46

"7 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 624(c)-(d).
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(e) (1965).
209 Ibid.
2
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(b) (1965)

(1960, Supp. 1964).

2

authorizes inspection of right
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through a clause in a criminal statute, it would be better simply to declare that a proper purpose includes a purpose reasonably related to
the person's interest as a shareholder."' Such a non-exclusive definition makes it clear that a shareholder is not limited to seeking information relating to some specifically corporate matter, e.g., suspected
breach of fiduciary duty or waste of assets or the like, but may inquire into matters of a more direct concern to the shareholder but
still related to his ownership right, e.g., the value of his stock, the
availability of funds for declaring dividends, etc. At the same time,
it would exclude efforts to get corporate information for such illegitimate personal purposes as aiding a shareholder's competing business
in obtaining trade or other business secrets. The present language
in section 55-38(e) has no doubt the same objective and probably
would have the same scope, but it should be keyed to the "proper
purpose" concept rather than tied in with a nearly useless criminal
sanction.
In giving a qualified shareholder a right to inspect the "books
and records of account, minutes and record of shareholders...,,,2
the statute is ambiguous, for it is uncertain whether "minutes"
means "minutes . . . of shareholders"

(as it does in many other

state statutes) or "minutes" of any corporate group, including directors and executive committee meetings. There is a big difference.
If it means the latter, this is unwise, for these meetings may contain information which should remain confidential. It is clearly
proper for shareholders to have unrestricted access to the official
records of their own meetings, but access to other types of "minutes"
should be by court order on a shareholder's affirmative showing of
"proper purpose." Actually, there is a latent ambiguity in the
phrase "books and records of account"; the phrase may or may not
refer just to financial records and data, or "books" might be read
to include virtually any corporate documents. The uncertainty
by a qualified shareholder for "any proper purpose," and N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-38(f) (1965) requires a shareholder to prove "proper purpose" in seeking a court order for inspection.
...
Perhaps it should be clear that a "proper purpose" would include a
purpose reasonably related to a shareholder's interests, not only as a shareholder, but also as an incumbent or former director or officer of the corporation. Particularly in close corporations a shareholder's role as director
or officer may be paramount, especially if distributions are made chiefly
through salaries rather than by dividends. Of course, at "common law,"
directors and officers do have certain inspection rights growing out of their
See ROBINSON § 96, at 257.
status.
2
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(b) (1965).
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concerning just what documents may be inspected by a shareholder
suggest that in questionable cases the issue probably will (and
should) be determined by a court on a shareholder's application.
Procedurally, the statute is needlessly encumbered with varying
remedies: (1) inspection as of right is enforced by "an action in
the nature of mandamus,

2 73

(2) refusal of inspection as of right

may involve a penalty suit against the refusing official, 74 (3) sale
or other misuse of a shareholder's list or other information is a
misdemeanor,2 7 and (4) inspection not "as of right" involves an
unspecified form of judicial procedure strongly suggesting an
equitable remedy of quite broad scope.2 76 Surely, these procedural
complications should be simplified merely by designating what may
be inspected as of right, and then providing that (1) whenever such
inspection is refused, or (2) whenever documents not inspectible
"as of right" are sought, the shareholder may simply apply to the
court for an inspection order whose scope would lie within the
equitable discretion of the court. 7
N. Preferred and Special Classes of Shares
This portion of the article examines only two of the many possible problems which might be considered in connection with corporate shares. These are the statutory concept of the "preferred and
special class" of stock and the rights of preferred shares under the
North Carolina statute.
1. "Preferred and Special Classes".-As in most states, the
North Carolina statute heavily relies on the cloudy phrase, "preferred or special classes" of shares. Such shares may be made redeemable, given dividend and liquidation preferences, and made convertible2. 8 "Preferred or special classes" may be issued in series with
27
Redemption and
certain variations among series within a classY.
purchase of shares are treated differently as to some details,2"' and
this in turn depends on whether the shares are redeemable, which
they may be if they belong to a "preferred or special class."
What is a "special class" of shares? Obviously, it is something

""3N.C. GEN.
""N.C. GEN.
"'N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 55-38(b)
STAT. § 55-38(d)
STAT. § 55-38(e)
STAT. § 55-38(f)

(1965).

(1965).
(1965).
(1965).
"°N.C. GEN.
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 624(d).
78N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-40(a)(1)-(5) (1965).
-42 (1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-41,(1965).
"oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52
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other than a "preferred" class, and presumably it is something other
than ordinary common shares, although this latter point is unclear.
If so, then a "special class" would typically include shares which
have no dividend preference and no vote, i.e., what is conventionally
called non-voting common. Suppose two classes of common shares
whose only difference is that one class may elect two while the
other may choose three directors. Is either of these a "special"
class, and if so which one? Or suppose that one class of common
has, while the other lacks, an option to dissolve the corporation at
will.2"' Holding such an option would seem to be something "special" setting apart this class of shares, so that it could be made redeemable or convertible, or subdivided into series. This example
suggests a possible generalization as to a "special" class of shares:
does the class possess some distinctive or unusual right or power
which, if exercised, could significantly change the internal corporate
structure? This would be true of the stock with the option to
dissolve, but not of the shares entitled to elect directors by a special
class vote. It would also be consistent with the recognized right to
redeem preferred shares which are "special" in the sense that they
have certain distinctive and unusual rights, particularly under the
North Carolina statute.
Mr. Robinson points to the uncertainty surrounding the question
whether any common stock can be made redeemable, i.e., whether
any common shares are of a "special class" for at least this purpose.2"' The Delaware Supreme Court, in a persuasive opinion,
found that a corporation's common stock was not a "special" class
and so not redeemable, where this was the only class of common. 8'
This is surely a sound result. If common shares may be made redeemable, the ultimate risk bearer of the corporation can be removed, possibly by action of the common shares themselves. As a
limiting case, it is conceivable, however unlikely, that all common
shares might be redeemed, so that the corporation would be left
without common voting shares. Probably also common shares
should not be deemed "special" for purposes of being convertible.
Since the common rests at the base of the corporate pyramid, they
could of necessity convert only into higher ranking securities; and
2 1N.C. GEN. STAT.
282

§ 55-125(a)(3) (1965).

RoBiNsoN § 12, at 334.

Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
282
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such "upstream conversion" the North Carolina statute wisely proscribes, 2 4 as a serious threat to senior equity and creditor interests.
On the other hand, there is no good reason for not permitting a
single class of common shares to be subdivided into series with
many of the variations recognized by statute." 5 For instance, a
close corporation might wish to issue common shares with the same
dividend rate but varying as to the amount repayable on liquidation,
or as to the dividend payable under some lawful profit sharing
agreement. 8 6
Beyond this, it is not necessarily bad for some common shares
to be redeemed. What is essential is that there must, by the terms
of the charter, remain at least one class of common which cannot
be redeemed but which must always be around to bear the risk of
loss. This has been worked out in New York by an explicit statutory provision that no redeemable common shares, other than such
shares of an investment company, shall be issued or redeemed unless the corporation at the time has outstanding a class of common
shares that is not subject to redemption.28 7 This accommodates
both the policy of requiring an ultimate risk-bearer and of giving
corporations some flexibility in varying terms and conditions of its
shares, including its common.
It is suggested that the North Carolina statute would be improved by deleting ambiguous references to "special classes" of
shares. Instead, the statute should recognize for all shares the
variations which it now permits for "special classes," subject, however, to specific restrictions demanded as a matter of sound policy.
This would include barring a single class of common subject to
redemption, or convertible into higher-ranking securities. But it
would allow some types of variations whatever the class label for
the stock, and eliminate a concept of doubtful meaning.
2. Rights of PreferredShares.-A striking-and now an anachronistic-feature of the North Carolina statute is its excessive
concern for preferred shares. It is an anachronism because preferred stock has lost popularity as a means of raising capital 88
even more rapidly than other forms of shares. Indeed, capital now
is often internally generated through corporate savings rather than
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-40(a) (5) (1965).
- N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-41 (1965).
"' See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1965).
287 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 51(c).
288 ROBINSON § 119, at 324-25, suggests some of the reasons.
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raised on the investment markets. Today, with other sources of
funds often available, any North Carolina corporation should long
hesitate to use the preferred stock route in view of the rigorous
conditions exacted in the statute. Apart from internally generated
funds, preferred stock dividends do not have the great tax-deduction
advantage of bond interest, and in North Carolina the major nontax advantages of preferred shares-the fact that omission of
even an earned cumulative dividend is not a default triggering
action against the corporation and that it need have no maturity
date-are heavily outweighed by other special obligations of the
corporation toward its preferred shares and by the extensive statutory rights of such shares in the corporation's financial affairs.
Hence creditor securities, including medium to long-term notes, are
relatively more attractive, particularly when placed privately. This
is not to say that preferred shares are useless. Quite the contrary.
It is to say that the marginal utility of preferred shares is so greatly
reduced by North Carolina law that corporations which really must
issue preferred shares should consider incorporation elsewhere,
unless they are prepared to live for a long time with the North
Carolina law.
All of this is unfortunate, since preferred shares are very useful
devices. They enable corporations to raise money without unduly
diluting the common equity and avoid overburdening the capital
structure with debt. They are exceptionally helpful in working out
a proper capital structure taking account of the varying economic
contributions and voting power of members of a close corporation.
Thus, even without the tax deduction for payouts, as with bonds,
they do have advantages which cannot be duplicated by any other
form of security. Hence, strong disincentives to preferred share
issues, as in North Carolina, are a net loss to many, though not all,
corporations. If anything, preferred share issues should be encouraged in view of the long-run loss of interest in issuing equity
securities.
What, then, has the North Carolina statute done to discourage
preferred share issues? First, it substantially abolishes true noncumulative preferred by giving all such shares an unwaivable "dividend credit" which accrues if the corporation has any year-end
earned surplus,"' thereby in effect enacting the New Jersey "cast
...
N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 55-40(c), -2(5) (1965).
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iron pipe" rule. 29
Secondly, preferred shares may block any
"quasi-reorganization," by which directors use capital surplus to
reduce a deficit in earned surplus.2 91 Thirdly, preferred shares may
receive dividend payments directly out of capital surplus other than
that contributed by shares senior to those receiving the dividend. 92
Any other distribution from capital surplus is a partial liquidation,
requiring approval of a majority of all shares of each class, "whether
or not otherwise entitled to vote," and thus giving preferred shares
a further hand in dividend policy.293 Fourthly, any charter restriction on normal sources for preferred shares is "null and void,"
apart from limitations protecting creditors. 94 Fifth, as an overall
limitation on any dividend payment, "the highest aggregate liquidation preference of shares entitled to such preference over the shares
receiving the dividend" must not "exceed the corporation's net
assets."2 9 Sixth, a like limitation in favor of preferred shares
applies to purchase or redemption of equal or junior shares, 96 which
may also not be purchased or redeemed if any senior shares have
dividend accruals or credits.29T And, again with exceptions, shares
with dividend accruals or credits may not be repurchased unless
there is specific notice either to the potentially affected shareholders
or to the markets.2 9 Finally, and perhaps most severe, are appraisal
rights for preferred shares if certain preferences are readjusted or
on issue of a senior preferred into which junior preferred with
dividend accruals or credits are to be converted. 9 9
Many of these protective features are admirable; some are most
unfortunate. Taken together they impose a heavy burden on corporations which might wish to issue preferred shares. For not only
does the "protection" block predatory designs upon the preferred
shareholders themselves, but under this guise it restricts much other
2o Compare Sanders v. Cuba R.R., 21 N.Y. 78, 120 A.2d 849 (1956),
with Wabash Ry. v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197 (1930). See ROBINSON § 119,
at 326 n.53. Id. § 119, at 327 n.5 4, observes that the North Carolina Supreme Court never had to decide which rule applied to non-cumulative
preferred; the statute now settles the issue.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(i) (1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(a) (3) (1965).
2" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-50(a) (4), -50(e) (1965).
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(b) (1965).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(c) (3) (1965).
..N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(e) (3) (1965).
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(e) (4) (1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(f) (1965).
0
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-101(b), -102, -113 (1965).
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corporate action which might possibly reduce the security of the
preferred. While no one can contest the desirability of "protecting"
preferred shareholders, we can ask whether this "protection" costs
too much in terms of other values. Corporations should, initially,
be able to choose among the traditional types of preferred shares
and to issue wholly non-cumulative preferred. Shareholders should
seek their protection in full disclosure as to what they are getting
and what may happen to their shares which lack dividend accruals
or credits. In such circumstances the market would take into
account the risk which the purchaser bears. In part, then, it is a
question of whether the statute should try to make all preferred
shares a virtually risk-free investment, or, more accurately, shift
the risk entirely to the corporation. The whole point of preferred
shares is that, unlike bonds, some of the risk is borne by the shareholders, as it is by any equity securities. It seems unreasonable for
the statute to force all preferred share issues over towards the
riskless end of the securities spectrum which ranges from first
mortgage bonds (and equipment securities) to common stock (and
warrants). The usual explanation is that common has the chance
of gain as well as the risk of loss, while preferred stands only to lose
but not to gain unless fully protected by statute since, it is assumed,
common-dominated management will not protect preferred. But
preferred shares do have such "rights and preferences" as the charter
gives them; they do have priority on dividend and liquidation payments which the common lacks. The fact that preferred may sometimes have to bear burdens is consistent with the nature of an
equity security. The fact that these burdens may involve scaling
down or eliminating arrearages in times of trouble is not in itself
an "abuse" but a recognition that such shares do not have the
bargaining power of bonds or the voting power of common. But
this is very much a part of their value to the corporation. It is
also a risk to be assumed by the preferred-share purchaser (which
often includes institutions well able "to fend for themselves"), but
the risk is one for which they are compensated at a dividend rate
higher than the prevailing interest rate on creditor securities of the
same corporation. These facts should not lure a statute into protecting preferred shares to the point where they become unattractive
to a corporation through loss of their distinctive characteristics.
What is more, it seems unfortunate for any statute to assume, as
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the North Carolina law does implicitly, that corporations may not
be trusted with the freedom to create and manage various types of
preferred shares where the risk is to be partly borne by the shareholder. Any power of a corporation is susceptible to abuse.
Consistently with their intermediate position between creditor
securities and common stock, I suggest that preferred shares are
sufficiently protected if action adversely affecting them is approved
by a two-thirds class vote, 0° after full disclosure but without appraisal rights. If two of every three shares must endorse some
change, it is reasonable to suppose it acceptable to that class, and
the two-thirds vote is sufficiently high to pressure management to
formulate a plan acceptable to so large a number. This is much to
be preferred to North Carolina's mere majority class vote require3°
ment °1 coupled with appraisal rights for dissenters. 0 It more
effectively balances out the conflicting interests of corporate flexibility in readjusting to current needs, and of protecting preferred
shareholders from overreaching by the numerically preponderant
common shares. While the statute appropriately protects the preferred share cushion by barring or controlling some uses of surplus
paid in by preferred shares, it should not interfere with normal
director discretion in passing dividends, repurchasing shares, and
otherwise using capital surplus, especially in quasi-reorganizations.
Preferred shares should accept the fact that their capital contributions are not designed for them alone but for the welfare of the
entire corporation and its various component interests. If holders
3
want more than this they should buy bonds."'
0.

Financial Provisions

Among its other distinctive characteristics, the North Carolina
statute is notable for going farther than any other American statute,
"'0 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 54 (1960, Supp. 1964).

N.C. GEN.
...
GEN.
"'N.C.

STAT.
STAT.

(3) (1965).
§§§55-100(b)
55-101 (b), -102, -113 (1965).

.oLest this section of the article appear wholly critical, I note several
statutory provisions governing preferred shares which are particularly
valuable and should be adopted elsewhere. Perhaps the best is N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 55-40(b) to -40(d) (1965), setting forth rules of construction of
ambiguous or poorly drafted preferred share contracts and thereby settling
some otherwise uncertain questions. Thus, unless the charter otherwise
provides, dividend accruals or credits are added to the liquidation preference,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-40(b) (1), -40(d) (2) (1965), and shares preferred
as to dividends or on liquidation are respectively barred from participation
in any surplus left over. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-40(b)(2) (1965). Similar
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except for New York, in using sophisticated accounting concepts and
terminology to define legal rules. Much of this is derived from the
Model Act, but in many respects North Carolina significantly
differs from that statute-a feature which has generated sharp
criticism.
In my view, the North Carolina statute is generally sound in its
treatment of corporate accounting and also in many of its restrictions. Thus, I do not consider the blanket criticism leveled at the
statute to be valid, 3 although there are features with which I
strongly disagree. These chiefly include the excessive power given
to preferred stock80 5 and the undue restrictions on directors' traditional discretion with respect to dividends.
On two major matters, the statute is very sound. First, it
quite properly blocks directors from playing fast and loose with
unrealized appreciation. This it does by leaving it out of earned
surplus, 0 6 and thus eliminating it as a direct dividend source.
Even in capital surplus, it does not arise unless there is an asset
revaluation "made in good faith upon demonstrably adequate bases
of revaluation. ' 30 7 This is a counsel of conservatism, and reenforces the accountants' view that assets should be carried at cost
rather than a higher market price. It also eliminates the inevitable
question: if assets are written up, and distributions made out of the
write-up, what is to be done if subsequently their value declines?
Perhaps the question is no longer so pertinent if we assume that
there will always be an increase in values, rather than the past experience of ups and downs in value-perhaps the dominant reason
for sticking to a "cost" basis. On the other hand, the statute does
not inflexibly preclude a revaluation; and this is desirable, since
certainly many assets will have increased in value and will stay
there. An increase in value of prime business property in a metropolitan area is an instance. Restricting write-ups is especially important since capital surplus may be used in a quasi-reorganization
rules of construction appear in such diverse statutes as South Carolina,
S.C. CODE § 12-15.4 (Supp. 1965), and Ghana, COMMISSION or ENQUIRY
INTO

THE

WORKING

AND

ADMINISTRATION

LAW OF GHANA, FINAL REPORT

23

§ 51 (1961).

OF

THE

PRESENT

COMPANY

...
See Garrett, Capital and Surplis under the New CorporationStatutes,
239 (1958).
...See text accompanying notes 288-303 supra.
.0.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(d) (1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(e) (1965).
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to eliminate an earned surplus deficit,80 thereby freeing any future

earnings from being charged against the deficit, and thus permitting
those earnings to be used for dividends on common. The revaluation surplus may also be directly distributed through "partial
liquidation," but this will require action of shareholders." 9
In major respects the North Carolina statute has a sound approach to dividends. The heart of the statute is its limitation of
dividends to "earned surplus, 8 310 the historical balance of profits,
gains, and losses, less distributions and dividends and transfers out
of earned surplus.3 1" This is obviously much more restrictive than
other state statutes which allow dividends out of any surplus at all
(whether earned or one or more of the capital surplus accounts).
Limitation to earned surplus would, by itself, substantially protect
senior shares, since none of their paid-in capital can, under such a
test, be used for common dividends. It does not, of itself, avoid
the possible use of their paid-in surplus to effect a quasi-reorganization, 312 or a partial liquidation.3 13

Surprisingly, the North Carolina statute, after stating the earned
surplus limitation, authorizes "nimble dividends" from current net
profits whether or not stated capital is impaired.31 4 This latter
provision is surely of questionable soundness, and is even omitted
in the Model Act, not known for its restrictive attitude towards
management. The North Carolina revisors apparently felt that the
statute might as well permit it since reducing capital would yield the
same result.318 But there is a world of difference between (a)
directors voting a quick payout of a sudden accretion of profit and
(b) going through a stated capital reduction with a shareholders'
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(i) (1965).
(1965).
00 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(e)
'0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(a)(1) (1965). This is the Model Act
position. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 40(a) (1960, Supp. 1964).
In contrast, a number of states have rejected the Model Act view although
adopting that statute otherwise verbatim. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.41 (a)
(1962). New York takes a half-way position, by permitting dividends out
of any surplus, but requiring disclosure of any source other than earned
CORP. LAW § 510(b), (c).
N.Y. Bus.
surplus.
GEN. STAT. § 55-49(d) (1965).
" N.C.
STAT. § 55-49(h) (1965), which requires a preferred
GEN.
N.C.
...
See
share vote on the "quasi-reorganization."

3"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(e) (1965), which requires shareholder

approval.
" N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 55-50(a) (2) (1965).

Delaware permits "nimble

dividends." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 170(a) (2) (1952).
010 ROBINSON § 154, at 413 n.10, quoting from the comment of the North
Carolina General Statutes Commission.
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vote and published notice and filing with the Secretary of State.
The time and trouble and publicity to carry out the latter procedure
is an incentive to live with the situation and apply net profits to
reduce the stated capital deficit or to build up surplus. More deeply,
the question is, as Mr. Robinson notes in a slightly different context, 16 how far we propose to go in making stated capital a fixed
dollar amount subject to reduction and other manipulation only
with considerable difficulty and publicity, or whether we wish to
drop the traditional accounting concepts of stated capital and surplus
as substantive limits on dividend payments.81 7 Whatever the merits
of this argument, the essence of the North Carolina statute is
contra, and recognition of "nimble dividends" is inconsistent with
the statutory design.
North Carolina does employ a wise limitation on nimble dividends, and, indeed, on any dividends out of sources other than
earned surplus. This is mandatory disclosure of the source. 18 I
would suggest that if disclosure is intended to have some real utility
here, it is not enough to say, "this dividend came out of this year's
net profits although our stated capital account is still under water."
Instead, notice should make clear just what effect the distribution
has upon any relevant account, viz., stated capital, capital surplus,
or earned surplus. Only in this way can the significance of the move
be evaluated, admittedly only by those acquainted with rudiments
of corporate accounting. Moreover, if North Carolina chooses to
rely on disclosure, it should also lengthen the time from one year 10
to at least three for revealing that dividends are being paid from
an earned surplus account whose deficit had been eliminated by a
quasi-reorganization.
In my view, the most serious policy error of the North Carolina
statute is excessive restriction on directors' discretion as to dividend
payments. In part, this is due to the already considered concern
for the position of preferred shareholders. But it goes beyond that
and erects the most formidable controls on dividend payouts to be
found in any American jurisdiction. It takes several forms. First,
any efforts to restrict the availability of the usual dividend sources
is invalidated by an express statutory provision, saving only reId. § 157, at 418 n.35.
See the deeply thoughtful article by George Gibson, Surphls-So
What? 17 Bus. LAw. 476 (1962), persuasively espousing this point of view.
"'8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(g)(1) (1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(g)(2) (1965).
317
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strictions in favor of creditors. s20 Secondly, transfers from earned
to capital surplus require a majority vote of common shares.3 2'
Thirdly, surplus reserves (and presumably restrictions) may not
reduce the amount available for dividends unless they accord with
"sound accounting practice."3' 2 Fourth, shareholders not only retain their traditional rights in equity to compel dividend payments,323
but have a statutory right to force the payment of up to one-third
of the "net profits" of an accounting period, subject to certain
limitations.324
This package of restrictions is cumulatively excessive, and with
the exception of the traditional equitable right to compel dividend
payment, 2 5 each of these limitations is undesirable. The mandatory
dividend payout provision is unquestionably the most objectionable
of all. It makes it very difficult for a corporation to build up large
reserves over a long period of time by withholding dividends. One
can only wonder where many of our greatest "growth" corporations
would be today if dividends could not have been drastically curtailed. Even today, such distinguished corporations as International
Business Machines and Xerox, after many years, find it necessary
to restrict dividend payments. In effect, the North Carolina statute
adopts for all corporations a particular dividend policy which would
be appropriate for a flourishing electric utility or a railroad. It
places the burden on the directors to justify, in response to a shareholder's suit, their decision to withhold or restrict dividends. Apparently there are only two defenses to such a suit: it would involve
excessive payouts in the current fiscal period or the profits are retained to eliminate a deficit.3 2 On its face, the statute does not
permit the directors to justify their policy by showing that funds
are being reinvested in the corporation or held in reserve for such
uses. However, this surely must be a defense: "net profits" subject
to compulsory payout mean those that "can lawfully be paid in
dividends" to the shareholders,32 7 and funds that have been set
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(b) (1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(h) (1965).
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(j) (1965).
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(j) (1965).
..N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(i) (1965). For discussion of a curious
problem arising under the wording of this provision, see ROBINSON § 159,
2I

at 423 n.61.
..
5 N.C. GEN.
'N.C.

""1N.C.

STAT.
GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT.

§ 55-50(j) (1965).
§ 55-50(i) (1965).
§ 55-50(i) (1965).
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aside in reserve in accordance with "sound accounting practice"
would presumably not be "lawfully" available for dividends. 828
Mr. Robinson also points out the uncertainty as to whether the
customary type of dividend restrictions contained in agreements
with corporate creditors will be a defense to a suit to compel dividend
payments.3 29 It is indeed curious, as he points out, that the statute
does not indicate that this is permissible, as it does in the case of
creditor arrangements restricting normal dividend sources.8 8 Not
only should corporations not be subjected to such uncertainty at
so sensitive a point in their financial arrangements, but creditors, too,
should be extremely wary of accepting and relying on dividend restrictions in light of the statutory policy favoring compulsory dividend payouts.
The absurdity of this statutory provision, and indeed the inconvenience of the other dividend protection clauses in the statute,
is even more apparent in light of the purpose, which is to prevent
the directors from adopting too stingy and parsimonious an attitude towards shareholders. Many of these objectives will be
achieved by readily accepted procedures. First, whatever incentive
there is to holding back dividends is largely offset by the federal
tax on unreasonable income accumulations. 83 ' To the extent that
stingy dividend policies are intended to force some shareholders to
sell out at sacrifice prices, the corporate insiders have breached their
fiduciary duty which, in North Carolina, runs to the shareholder as
well as to the corporation. 332 Finally, the traditional equitable right
to force a dividend payment remains available. 3' 3 Although these latter two procedures may not be as efficient in forcing dividend payments as the statutory procedure, they are available for the most serN.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(j) (1965). This argument would be strengthened if N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(a)(1) (1965), authorizing dividends
"out
of the earned surplus of the corporation," made it clear, as in ABA-

ALI MODEL Bus.

CORP.

AcT § 40(a) (1960), that it is only "unreserved

earned surplus" from which dividends may be lawfully paid.
and unrestricted
ROBINSON
o
§ 159, at 424-25.

"30 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(b) (1965).
1954, §§ 531-37.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1965). ROBINSON

.. 1 INT. REV. CODE OF

§ 159, at 425-27, is very
good on this point.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(k) (1965) simplifies procedure in suing to
compel dividend payments by authorizing the suit against either the directors
or the corporation whether or not directors are also parties. Even if the
mandatory dividend payout provision of N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-50(i) (1965)
is eliminated, the other section should be retained to facilitate suits under
the traditional equitable doctrine.

19651

N. C. CORPORATION LAW

ious abuses. Together they avoid the uncertainties of the compulsory
dividend section and the unnecessary inroads which it makes upon
the directors' dividend management. After all, it is rarely good
sense for a statute to go all the way in protecting one particular
interest (such as preferred shares) or promoting one particular
policy (maximizing dividends) at the expense of competing interests
and objectives. That is precisely what North Carolina has done
both for preferred shares and on dividend payouts generally, for it
has sacrificed legitimate interests of corporate management and
internal financing. It is far better to accommodate these potentially
conflicting interests and policies rather than subordinate one or the
other. It is suggested that this would be most effectively done by
entirely eliminating the compulsory dividend payout section; it
would also be desirable to permit greater flexibility in transferring
funds to capital surplus and in making reserves of earned surplus.
P.

Charter Amendments

The North Carolina corporation law follows the conventional
33 4
statutory pattern of broadly authorizing charter amendments,
including certain changes which, according to some cases, infringe
"vested rights" of shareholders. 3 5 As in most states and under the
Model Act, 33' a specially affected class of shares has a class vote.
In North Carolina amendments require only a majority vote of the
shareholders and, where applicable, a majority class vote, subject
to any greater vote requirement fixed by the charter. 8 37 In contrast,
the Model Act and most of its progeny set the shareholder vote at
3 38
two-thirds rather than a mere majority.
These similarities are insignificant when compared to the provision in North Carolina (and a few other states) granting appraisal rights on certain charter amendments. 3 9 In North Carolina,
834 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-99 (1965).
= The most famous exposition and application of the "vested rights"
doctrine is Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct.
1936) (setting aside attempt to eliminate preferred stock dividend accruals
by direct amendment of charter). Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-99(b) (11)
(1965) (authorizing charter amendments "to cancel or otherwise affect the
rights of the holders of the shares of any class with respect to accrued
.... ").
dividend or dividend credits
5
4(c), 55 (1960, 1964 Supp.).
838 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act §§
S N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-100(b) (3), 55-101 (1965).
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 54(c) (1960, 1964 Supp.).
888ABA-ALI
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-101(b), -102, -113(a) (3), -113(b) (1965).
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-373(a) (1961); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
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these rights arise when amendments cancel or impair dividend accruals or credits, reduce a dividend or liquidation preference or a
redemption price, make redeemable shares not previously callable,
or convert cumulative dividends into noncumulative. Since dividend arrearages have been destroyed in some states, notably Delaware,3 40 by the neat maneuver of amending the charter to authorize
a senior preferred into which the subordinated old preferred with
accruals is "voluntarily" converted, the North Carolina statute now
8 41
specifically authorizes such arrangements but with appraisal rights.
Prior North Carolina case law had struck down such amendments
as unduly coercive. 42
Thus, the North Carolina statute very broadly authorizes charter
amendments, including ones that eliminate accrued dividends, so
long as appraisal rights are available to dissenters. Admittedly,
this is an improvement over the "vested rights" doctrine which, if
rigidly applied, would bar any techniques to scale down arrearages
short of unanimous consent.3 43 I suggest, however, that even in
this context appraisal rights are unwarranted. Given the scope and
severity of the appraisal right it has almost the same effect as if
the old doctrine had been explicitly incorporated into the statute.
Even assuming that appraisal rights should be retained for some
situations, charter amendments should not be among them, for
several reasons.
First, appraisal rights on amendments are part and parcel of
the statutes's efforts-already criticized- 3 4 4 to shift preferred shares
far towards the creditor end of the investment spectrum, and to
reduce their risk as far as possible. Secondly, since enforcing apPA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-810 (Supp. 1964) (applicable
1933).1943),
only.,0toBarrett
public utilities
andTramway
to other corporations
v. Demver
Corp., 53 F.organized
Supp. 198before
(D. Del.
aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corp.,
25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1941).

§ 806(b) (6) ;

..N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 55-101 (b) (2), -102 (1965).

...
In Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906
(1939), the court struck down a Shanik-type plan on the ground that it
improperly pressured preferred shareholders to surrender their accrued
dividend "vested rights." See also Clark v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N.C. 1, 12
S.E. 2d 682 (1941). See the sardonic comment in Dodd, Fair and Equitable
Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REV. 780, 818 (1942) ("Gaining North
Carolina and losing Delaware is for preferred shareholders much as gaining Iran and losing Europe is for the enemies of Hitler").
, For a searching critique of the "vested rights" doctrine, see Gibson,
How Fixed are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PR1OB.
282 (1958).
""See text accompanying notes 288-303 supra.
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praisal rights often impairs the cash position of corporations, 45
this result is especially likely (and bad) at a time when the corporation is probably short on cash and is skipping preferred dividends.
Thirdly, scaling down dividend preferences is not so shocking or
immoral as to demand the appraisal remedy. Although a history
of mistreating preferred shares in the past compels some statutory
protection, there are sounder alternatives to appraisal rights in this
situation. In order for corporations to meet changed conditions,
they should be able to promote efforts among the shareholders to
relieve the burden of arrearages or dividend credits and attempt
to revive or extend the business. The existence of dividend accruals
or credits unquestionably (though perhaps illogically) depresses
credit standing and, of course, virtually bars any resort to new equity
capital. Flexibility in dealing with dividend arrearages is at least a
respectable, although not fool-proof, device for getting a corporation
back on its feet and thus ultimately benefiting all interests. Thus, it
is instructive to note that many Delaware recapitalization plans,
assailed as unfair, were overwhelmingly approved by shareholders
of the affected class, voting as a class. 46 It is foolish to suppose
that this is solely the product of despair, or of deception by the
common shares, pressures by management, and so on. Perhaps preferred shareholders, like others, sometimes willingly, if reluctantly,
recognize that in a bad business situation everyone must surrender
some rights or priorities. It is suggested that, until state courts are
summoned by statute to supervise preferred stock recapitalizations
as do federal bankruptcy courts in chapter X reorganizations under a
"fair and equitable" standard, it is preferable to leave a wide area for
intra-corporate arrangements and deals, free of the present restraints
in the North Carolina statute, but subject to certain different con. This may be so great that the corporation will abandon the undertaking. In Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 431 n.5. 143 A.2d 25,
28 n.5 (1958), it was conceded that if appraisal rights on a de facto merger
had to be met, "the resultant drain of cash would prevent Glen Alden from
carrying out the agreement." A proposed merger of Texas Butadiene &
Chemical Corp. and Industrial Rayon Corp. was abandoned when 10.3%
of the latter corporation's shares were voted against the plan. GUTHMANN
& DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 558 n.10 (4th ed. 1962).
Shanik v. White Sewing Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A.2d 821 (Sup.
...
Ct. 1941) (ninety per cent of old preferred with accruals exchanged their
shares for new senior preferred); Federal United Corp. v. Havender 24
Del. Ch. 318, 323, 11 A.2d 331, 334 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (91.8% of "all of the
outstanding stock" affirmed a merger eliminating dividend accruals) ; Porges
v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 130, 32 A.2d 148, 149 (Ch. 1943)
(ninety-six per cent vote for merger of parent into subsidiary).
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trols. In particular, appraisal rights on charter amendments should
be abolished.
There are several alternatives to appraisal rights. First, the
vote for charter amendments, especially those changing existing
preferences and rights, should be higher. At least a two-thirds vote
of the affected class, rather than the present majority,84 7 should be
required to approve such a change. The higher vote would supply
some assurance that the preferred shares were not being overborne
by the more numerous common or unduly prejudiced by management
which usually represents common, or that persons holding both
preferred and larger blocks of common are swinging the vote to
change existing preferred stock rights to their ultimate advantage
as owners of common. In this connection, the statute should specify
that whenever some particular series of shares is specially affected,
it should vote as a series; and its vote as a series should be necessary
to approve a change in that series.8 48
Secondly, the statute should compel a complete and detailed disclosure as to all relevant facts concerning any plan of recapitalization or other change in preferences or rights, so that the affected
shareholders can intelligently decide. Even if some shareholders do
not understand the facts disclosed, many others will, including some
who are in a good position to exert strong influence. The compulsion to make a full disclosure, coupled with a higher class vote, will
probably induce management to fashion a plan giving some fair
consideration to the interests of the affected class of shares, although
just how much more favorable the plan would be is obviously an
indeterminate matter.
Thirdly, as Mr. Robinson points out, equitable limitations on
exercising the amendment power do survive.8 40 We may ask (1)
whether the traditional limitation in terms of "fraud" is sufficient 50
8

".N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-100(b) (3) (1965).
See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 804(b).
"'8ROBINSON § 180.

88

...
Some Delaware cases come close to equating fairness with absence of
actual fraud. In Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 132-33,
32 A.2d 148, 150-51 (Ch. 1943), in turning back an attack on dividend
accruals eliminated via merger between parent and wholly owned subsidiary, the court noted that there was "no misrepresentation, concealment,
or deception" or that the preferred shareholders pressing for the plan
would specially "benefit from the alleged unfair allocation of stock." As
for a claim that the allocation of the new shares between the old preferred
and the common shareholders was so unfair as to amount to fraud, the
court noted that in proving such a charge "the unfairness must be of such
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or (2) whether a statute should articulate a "fairness" test. As Mr.
Robinson notes, an early draft of the North Carolina statute would
have given shareholders standing to seek an injunction against an
allegedly unfair charter amendment with the proponents of the
amendment required to prove it fair and equitable to all affected
interests.35 ' Although Nebraska is apparently the lone American
state so providing, 352 section 72 of England's Companies Act has
long contained such a provision, which has apparently worked
effectively.358 Under that statute, fifteen per cent of the shares of
a class whose rights or preferences have been varied by a majority
vote "may apply to the court to have the variation cancelled." The
standard to be met is whether in view of "all the circumstances of
the case" the court finds that "the variation would unfairly prejudice the shareholders of the class," in which case it will "disallow"
the change, otherwise "confirm" it. To avoid holding up corporate
affairs, the petitioning shareholder must act within twenty-one days
from the approval of the change.
A high class vote with mandatory disclosure would significantly
protect the shareholders. If further safeguards are needed, the
English model should be followed. The threat of court suit would
be the strongest deterrent to working up recapitalization plans inimical to the special interests of a class of shares. Indeed, although
not appearing in the English provisions, such a statute could readily
provide for the corporation to seek approval of an amendment by
a suit akin to a declaratory judgment action.
Whoever has standing to contest the charter amendment, such a
procedure would not work undue delay or interference with corporate affairs. After all, when a shareholder charges "fraud" in
an amendment, even in the most "liberal" jurisdictions, inescapably
there is some unsettling effect since the amendment just might be
overturned. But this possible inconvenience is not, of itself, a
character and must be so clearly demonstrated as to impel the conclusion that
it emanates from acts of bad faith, or a reckless indifference to the rights of
others interested, rather than from an honest error of judgment." Id. at
133, 32 A.2d at 155. This is obviously an extremely difficult burden of proof,
and in fact probably most plans do meet the tests laid down by the Porges
case. Thus, as a practical matter "fairness" stated in terms of absence of
"fraud" is really no protection at all except against the most aggravated
situations which are not likely to occur if sophisticated counsel advises.
s1 RoBINSON § 180, at 465 n.26, 466 n.32.
NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 21-2059 (Supp. 1963).
...
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 72.
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reason except in the most biased minds to bar or restrict such suits;
and in all events it would be superior, both from the standpoint of
the corporation and the affected shareholders, to an appraisal right
for amendments. It nicely balances the shareholder interest in
effective protection against overreaching and the equally weighty
concern of the corporation to adjust financial commitments to meet
new situations.
Q. Mergers, Consolidations, and Asset Sales
1. Mergers and Consolidations.-North Carolina follows the
conventional statutory pattern for mergers and consolidations, 8 4
and here, as elsewhere, these provisions, based largely on the Model
Act, appear to work well. On some matters of detail, the North
Carolina statute lacks some of the flexibility now found in newer
laws.
(a) Merger of a subsidiary corporation into its parent is too
strictly limited for insufficient reason. In North Carolina, the
board of directors may not merge a parent and subsidiary unless the
subsidiary is wholly owned., 55 Thus, if a single share of the sub-

sidiary's stock is held other than by the parent, its merger must
proceed under the general merger provisions requiring approval
by shareholders of both parent and subsidiary. This is a needless
waste of time, effort, and money.
First, one questions the logic of the statute's apparent premise
that minority shareholders of the subsidiary gain anything from
requiring the parent's shareholders to vote on the merger. From
their standpoint, the merger is just an internal adjustment usually
of little concern to the parent's shareholders. 5 ' Indeed, if they are
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-106 to -111 (1965).
"'N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-108.1 (1965).
...
Of course,
there are some situations where merging subsidiary and
parent corporations may be more than a merely formal change from the
parent shareholders' standpoint. One such situation would be a merger into
the parent of a subsidiary engaged in an unusually risky business likely to
generate large or incalculable losses. Here, however, it is most improbable
that the parent's management would choose to end the subsidiary's separate
corporate entity which so effectively isolates the parent's assets from the
subsidiary's loss-producing activity of the subsidiary, particularly since consolidated federal income tax returns allow the system to take the tax benefit
of one unit's losses. However, short-form merger statutes, even including
North Carolina's strict law, would not preclude a parent's directors from
merging the loss subsidiary into the parent if the parent owns all of the
subsidiary's shares. A second situation would be using a merger of parent
and subsidiary as a device to eliminate preferred share dividend accruals
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not benevolently neutral on the matter, they are more likely than
not to have interests adverse to the subsidiary's shareholders.
Secondly, the few shares of the subsidiary held by persons other
than the parent cannot block the merger even if all of them voted
against it.3" Third, for the subsidiary's minority shareholders, an
appraisal right is helpful here since these shareholders obviously
can have no effective voice in the matter. 8 Since North Carolina
gives shareholders copious protection on corporate amalgamations,
the statute could safely drop the present requirement that the merging subsidiary be wholly-owned, and permit a short-form merger if
the subsidiary is ninety or ninety-five per cent owned.
As things now stand, if a North Carolina parent wanted to merge
with its ninety-five per cent owned Delaware subsidiary, it could not
do so. Although the Delaware statute would permit the Delaware
corporation to merge,85 9 the North Carolina statute would prevent
it since the North Carolina corporation which survives the merger
does not own all of the shares of its subsidiary. Similarly, if the
parent were a Delaware enterprise, while the ninety-five per cent
owned subsidiary is a North Carolina enterprise, the Delaware statute would permit the merger, but North Carolina law would block
it."" The effect, then, of the statute is to state an unusually strict
rule under which a short-form merger involving any North Caroas an incident of the merger. Even if a statute permits a merger of parent
into subsidiary, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 253(a) (Supp. 1964), contrary to the
usual provision only for a short-form merger of subsidiary into parent,
e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Coiu. ACT § 68A (1960, 1964 Supp.); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-108.1 (1965), it is extremely doubtful that the short-form
merger statute alone could be used for such a purpose.
...
As a matter of sterile logic, this point implies that a short-form
merger should be permitted whenever the number of "outside" shareholders
of the subsidiary is less than the number whose vote could block an ordinary
merger between the two corporations, i.e., if the parent owns at least sixtyseven per cent of the subsidiary's stock where the merger statute requires
a two-thirds vote of the shareholders to approve the combination. No
statute has been willing to extend the short-form merger authorization so
far, not so much for reasons of logic but probably out of a fear that this
would give the parent corporation's directors too much power over too many
"outside" shareholders of the subsidiary.
...
Even Delaware recognizes appraisal rights for the subsidiary's minority "outside" shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. § 253(e) (Supp. 1964). North
Carolina has no such provision since a short-form merger cannot go forward
if there are any outside shareholders of the subsidiary.
..See DEL. CODE ANN. § 253(a) (Supp. 1964). Actually, this statute
uses a sort of renvoi concept by authorizing such a merger with a nonDelaware corporation "if the laws of such other state or jurisdiction shall
permit such a merger .

...

"

...
The comments in note 359 supra apply here.
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lina corporation is permissible only if the parent wholly owns the
subsidiary. It is difficult to see what is really gained by such strict
requirements which hobble North Carolina corporations merging
with out-of-state subsidiaries incorporated under more generous
laws. When a parent owns ninety per cent or more of the stock of
a subsidiary, a merger is essentially a formal change in the corporate
family. While this is a good reason for giving special protection to
the subsidiary's almost impotent minority shareholders, it is no reason to require either (a) a vote by the parent's shareholders or
(b) a right of appraisal to dissenting shareholders of the parent,
particularly when one can envision circumstances where the parent's
shareholders may legitimately be concerned with the economic consequences of merger with a wholly owned subsidiary but unable to
vote or dissent. 61
It would be more realistic, more accommodating to North Carolina corporations, and more in harmony with the law of other states
to permit short-form mergers if the parent owns ninety per cent or
more of the subsidiary's stock; and also to authorize the surviving
corporation, the parent, to issue its own shares to consummate the
merger, or, alternatively, to issue bonds or cash or like consideration. 362 Of course, if additional shares of the parent must be
authorized to meet a merger obligation, the parent's shareholders
would need to approve the charter amendment. 0 3 They would have
no appraisal rights at that time.
(b) In contrast with more recent statutes, North Carolina restricts consideration on mergers or consolidations to "shares or
other securities or obligations" of the surviving or new corporations.36 This raises a question whether, as a matter of local state
law, cash may figure into a merger or consolidation, either as sole
consideration or, more likely, as partial consideration. If the draftsmen consciously refused to sanction use of cash, perhaps they feared
note 356 supra.
...
See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 68A (1960, 1964 Supp.);
DEL. CODE ANN. § 253(a) (Supp. 1964) ("securities, cash or other consider80.See

ation").
"' N.C.
..
4 N.C.

GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT.

§ 55-99(b)(4) (1965).
§ 55-106(b) (4), -107(b)(3)

(1965). N.Y. Bus.

§ 902 (a)(3) permits the merger plan to specify the basis for
converting the shares of the constituent corporation into the "shares, bonds
or other securities of the surviving or consolidated corporation, or the
cash or other consideration to be paid or delivered in exchange for shares
of each constituent corporation, or a combination thereof."
CORP. LAW
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that it would be used to force out some participants in an enterprise
resulting from a merger or consolidation, including not only shareholders who do not wish to continue in the new enterprise but also
those who would like to do so. However, by authorizing use of
"securities or obligations" of the surviving corporation in a merger,
a class of shareholders may already be forced out as equity owners.36 5
If they no longer have the equity owners' opportunity of unlimited
profit, it matters little whether it is cash or bonds which effects their
ouster. As a policy matter, the statute should broadly authorize any
lawful consideration on merger or consolidation since unusual
combinations of cash, bonds, and shares may be called for by the
particular business situation. Moreover, while use of cash will
vitiate certain otherwise "tax free" reorganizations under the
Internal Revenue Code, if the state statute authorizes use of cash
in a merger or consolidation, the Code, as it now stands, will not
treat it as a taxable event, except to the extent of the cash or other
boot.""0

2. Transfer of Assets.-The problem under sale-of-assets statutes is to determine when action by directors to sell corporate property must be supplemented with shareholder approval. The traditional formulation, preserved in the Model Act"'T and thus carried
forward into many corporation codes, employs two distinctions for
this purpose: whether the sale involved "all or substantially all" of
the corporate assets, and whether the assets were sold in or out of
the "regular course of business" of the enterprise. North Carolina's
distinctive approach, which is justified in broad outline, is to retain
the first test ("all or substantially all the assets") but to eliminate
..On the basis of the state's reserved power to amend corporate charters through amending the statute, several courts have sustained the constitutionality of short-form merger statutes requiring minority shareholders
of a subsidiary to take cash for their former equity interests. Coyne v.
Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561
(1949).
...
A sale of assets is a tax-free reorganization only if the acquisition
is "in exchange solely for all or a part of [the acquiring corporation's]
voting stock," INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (C), although within
strictly defined limits some "boot" may be used without destroying the taxfree character of the transaction. See ITT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (2)
(B). "Boot" restrictions do not expressly apply to a statutory merger or
consolidation, see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (A), but limitations
upon its use may be inherent in the judicial "continuity of interest" doctrine. See SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION 1554-55 (1960).

""ABA-ALI

MODEL

Bus. CoRP. Ac? §§ 71-72 (1964 Supp.).
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the latter test ("regular course of business")." 8 Under this statute
one result is clear-a sale of "all or substantially all" assets requires
shareholder endorsement unless it falls within one of three restricted
80
categories of sales which the directors alone may approve.
However, the North Carolina statute seemingly implies that any
sale of less than all or substantially all of the corporate assets needs
no shareholder approval. Thus, if a corporation, not specifically
organized to liquidate its property, should slowly sell off its assets
over an extended time period, it would be possible eventually to
get rid of "all or substantially all" assets without ever obtaining
shareholder approval. One aspect of this problem is noted by Mr.
Robinson when he questions but does not examine the consequences
of selling the whole of the businesses of a multi-purpose corporationY7 This issue is, as Robinson says, clouded by the statutory
language that directors alone may approve a sale "not made to
terminate or dispose of the business in which the corporation was
organized to engage, but merely as a transaction... whether usual
or unusual, to further the said business."8 7 ' By implication, if the
transaction is made to "terminate or dispose of the business in which
the corporation was organized to engage," it requires shareholder
approval. Thus the statutory reference to "the business" seemingly
looks to the simplest situation of a corporation organized to engage
in a single business. If the corporation carries on several activities,
presumably the court must determine which of these is "the business," i.e., the predominant activity which is being "furthered" by
the sale of the subordinate activity. On this point, the statute marks
no advance over the rejected "regular course of business" criterion,
and in fact the statutory standard is essentially a negative restatement of that test.
A related difficulty, inherent both in the North Carolina statute
and in the "regular course of business" concept, is whether the "business" is to be tested by what the corporation is authorized by its charter to conduct or by what activities the corporation is actually conducting at the time of the transfer. This is illustrated, by the New
York Court of Appeals decision in Eisen v. PostM2 in which a cor" N.C.
...
N.C.

§ 55-112 (1965).
§ 55-112(b) (1965).
' ROBINSON § 199, at 503.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(b) (3) (1965).
8723 N.Y.2d 518, 146 N.E.2d 779, 169 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1957).
GEN. STAT.

GEN. STAT.
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poration, organized to deal in and transfer real estate, also held and
operated a leasehold, a motion picture theater for which it had no
specific charter authority. Under New York's then statutory standard
of "regular course of business,"' 7 the court ruled that the business
of dealing in real estate embraced sale of a realty interest such as a
leasehold, and that shareholder approval was not called for even
though the corporation disposed of "substantially all" of its assets
by selling the lease." 4 Clearly, if the statutory policy is to give
shareholders a voice in disposing of a major part of the corporate
business, it was thwarted by the court's refusal to consider the type
of business actually conducted by the corporation. Instead, by
looking exclusively to charter recitals of the business for which the
corporation was organized, the court elevated form over substance.
Such an approach is particularly unrealistic in view of the current
practice of charters routinely authorizing every conceivable type of
business whether or not the corporation ever intends to engage in
any of these multifarious activities. It ignores the fact that shareholders are far more concerned with what the corporation is in
fact doing and what it will discontinue doing if it sells off assets
than in what the corporation might do at some indeterminate future
date according to boilerplate charter recitals. Indeed, it is logically
implied that if the charter vests any corporation with a "purpose"
of selling and transferring real estate, the directors could always
evade shareholder approval. Otherwise stated, a transfer is in the
''regular course of business" and needs no shareholder approval so
long as the charter authorized the transfer, i.e., so long as the
sale is not ultra vires.
Clearly, the North Carolina statute would not permit the Eisen
v. Post result if transfer of corporate assets would terminate the
sole business for which the corporation is organized and which it
is in fact conducting. The result would be less clear in the rare event
of circumstances identical to those in Eisen v. Post where the
business actually conducted is not clearly authorized by charter.
But this result could very well come about where a multipurpose
N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 20.
8'The decision has now been overruled by N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909
(a), which refers to "the usual or regular course of the business actually conducted by such corporation." This is in line with Judge Fuld's dissent in
Risen v. Post, reported in 146 N.E.2d at 782, as indeed a New York court

recently recognized. Boyer v. Legal Estates, Inc., 255 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup.
Ct. 1965).
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corporation seeks to transfer assets used for one of two businesses,
perhaps its major business. Here the directors are in literal compliance with the statute: They are not making a transfer of assets to
"terminate or dispose of the business in which the corporation was
organized to engage," but at the most are giving up some assets
used for a different business in order that the corporation may devote full attention to the remaining business and thus "further the
said business," to use the statutory language. The court might
refuse to give conclusive effect to the directors' determination as
to which of several activities was "the business" and should do so
if the determination is in bad faith, i.e., if one of two businesses
is discontinued via asset sale supposedly to "further" some smaller
or insignificant other activity in which the corporation may also
be engaged.
My point is that this issue should not remain in doubt. I suggest
that, in the light of recent developments and in furtherance of the
objectives of the present law, North Carolina's sale-of-assets statute
should explicitly deal with transfers of all or one of the businesses
of a multipurpose enterprise. Specifically, the statute should authorize the directors acting alone to approve a transfer of all or substantially all of the corporate assets if the transfer is "not made to
terminate or dispose of one or more of the businesses actually conducted by the corporation, but as a transaction or one or more of
a series of transactions, whether usual or unusual, to further one
or more of such businesses." Not only would this avoid an Eisen
v. Post-type difficulty, but it would articulate the statutory policy
in the context of an assets sale which terminates one but not all
of the corporate undertakings. Within such a framework, the courts
need only determine whether a particular activity is "a business" to
which the statute should apply. This would involve factors such as
the extent to which this activity contributed to revenues, the proportion of total assets committed to it, the overall significance of the
activity in the corporation, and so on. Presumably, when in doubt,
secure stockholder approval-but this same advice would likely
apply under the "regular course of business" criterion.
3. De Facto Mergers.-North Carolina adopts a unique statutory distinction between sales of assets for shares of the purchasing
corporation and for non-stock consideration. For the former a
two-thirds vote of the selling corporation's shareholders is neces-
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with dissenters getting appraisal rights. 376 In such a situasary
tion, as Mr. Robinson points out, the shareholders of the purchasing
77
corporation do not vote and a fortiori have no appraisal rights.1
Although rather loosely referred to as a de facto merger, this is an
inapt description, for the statute simply attaches some but not all
incidents of a true merger to a sale of assets for shares. As decisions
in other states hold or imply, if a transaction is judicially held to
be a de facto merger, the shareholders of both seller and purchaser
are permitted to vote and to enforce dissenters' rights, the court
having set aside the previous corporate action (usually under a saleof-assets statute) .78 Thus, North Carolina does not create a class of
statutory de facto mergers, but selects a rather common form of
corporate amalgamation for special treatment.
Several interesting questions can arise under this statute. First,
suppose that Corporation A sells all of its assets to Corporation B
for B shares, after which A distributes the B shares to its (A's)
shareholders and then dissolves, leaving B as the survivor of this
transaction. The A shareholders vote, and dissenters have appraisal
rights. Thus, A and B have .been as effectively combined as in a
statutory merger, but unless the judicial de facto merger doctrine is
invoked the B shareholders have no voting or dissenters' rights.
This can be carried further. Suppose that A, the seller, is large
in relation to B, the purchaser, and B must issue many shares to
acquire A's assets. A subsequently dissolves and distributes the B
shares to the A shareholders. We can assume that B is now three
or more times its former size, B's indebtedness is larger, there are
many new B shareholders, and B's business is changed. Under the
North Carolina statute, the B shareholders have no voting (or
dissenters') rights. Under the judicial de facto merger doctrine,
they might well have such rights. 7 9
75

"'IWhen assets are sold for other consideration a two-thirds vote is
rights are given.
still required but no appraisal
.N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-112(c) (3), -113(a) (1), -113(b) (1965).
""RoBINsoN § 193, at 491.
1 Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958) (transfer of assets under Pennsylvania's sale-of-assets statute held de facto
merger); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super.
333, 159 A.2d 146 (Ch.), af'd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960)
(exchange of shares set aside and transaction held a de facto merger void for
non-compliance with New Jersey's merger statute formalities). These and
other cases are discussed in detail in Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware:
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. 1261 (1963).
", This was essentially the fact situation in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,
supra note 378.
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These two examples pose the question of whether the sale-ofassets-for-shares provisions are pre-emptive, or whether in North
Carolina some sales of assets, especially when coupled with the
seller's dissolution, may require a vote of both the seller's and the
purchaser's shareholders. More precisely, may the courts apply the
conditions of the merger statutes in certain cases where the sale-ofassets statutes seemingly control, but where this statute would insufficiently protect the purchaser's shareholders? The answer in
North Carolina is unpredictable; sound arguments point either
way.as8 On the one hand, the statute as a whole proclaims a clear
policy favoring shareholder rights on corporate amalgamations by
specifically giving voting and dissenters' rights on sale of assets
stock. Since the statute articulates this policy, courts should also
apply it in related areas not explicitly covered where failure to do
so would sanction the precise evils the statutory policy would avoid.
On the other hand, the very specificity of the statute-and its unique
regulation when assets are sold for shares-should bar courts from
finding voting and dissenters' rights outside the statutory scheme.
Indeed, the legislature intended such rights for shareholders of all
participating corporations only when the transaction took the form of
a merger or consolidation, gave limited rights when assets are sold
for shares, and impliedly denied all such rights to shareholders of
a purchasing corporation. Since a sale of assets for shares requires
a two-thirds vote while a merger needs only a majority vote, 881
the statute arguably looks to the higher vote requirement for shareholder protection.
In my view, the balance of logic slightly favors pre-emption and
should preclude courts from weaving a de facto merger doctrine,
as known elsewhere, into the interstices of the North Carolina
statute. The unusually broad coverage of the statute argues against
judicial innovation in areas that it does not embrace. I would suggest at least one limit to judicial restraint. Sometimes an apparent
sale of assets is, in reality and effect, an upside-down transaction
with the nominal purchaser as the real seller, e.g., a large corporation "sells out" to a smaller entity.3"' According to scattered deSee Note, The Right of Shareholders Dissenting from Corporate
...
Combinations to Demand Cash Payment for their Shares, 72 HARv. L. Rrv.

1132 (1959).

88 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(c) (3) (1965) (sale of assets)
(1965) (merger).
with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-108(b)
8' This was a distinctive feature of the transaction vacated in Farris v.
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cisions in other states, the courts may (1) realign the parties, (2)
hold that shareholders of the real seller (the nominal purchaser)
have voting and dissenters' rights, and (3) treat the entire transaction as a merger with voting and dissenters' rights to the shareholders of all participating corporations.
Assuming that the merger and sale-of-assets statutes are preemptive, there is still an important de facto merger problem not
considered by Mr. Robinson. Suppose that Corporation B acquires
all or most of the shares of Corporation A in exchange for its own
3
(B) shares and thereafter dissolves and takes over A's assets. 3
For all practical purposes, this amounts to a merger of A and B
with B as survivor since the former A shareholders now have B
shares, and B now holds both the A and B assets and conducts the
operations of both A and B. The North Carolina statute obviously
does not cover this situation, and indeed few, if any, states do.
Although the B shareholders may vote to authorize additional
shares to acquire the B shares, they have no appraisal rights; and
the A shareholders would likewise have (and probably need) no
voting or appraisal rights since theirs is a presumably voluntary
decision to accept or reject B's offer to buy up the A shares. In this
situation the risk of a court-evolved de facto merger rule is less
(though not eliminated), since an exchange of shares is a significantly different procedure from a merger or an assets sale, although
the end product may be indistinguishable. Counsel seeking to combine corporations with minimum bother from shareholder demands
should consider this method. It avoids appraisal rights on all sides
and only requires the "purchaser's" shareholders to authorize
additional shares to make the offer, unless shares had been previously authorized in which case the "purchaser's" directors may issue
the shares on accepting tenders from the "seller's" shareholders.
Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958), and in fact the court
appears to make an alternative holding on the basis of the fact that "despite
the designation of the parties and the form employed, Glen Alden [the
nominal purchaser] does not acquire List [the nominal seller], rather List
acquires Glen Alden . . . and . . . the right of dissent would remain with
the shareholders of Glen Alden." Id. at 438, 143 A.2d at 31.
...
Recently, the Delaware courts rejected de facto merger contentions
in sustaining this kind of transaction. Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375
(Del. 1963). A New Jersey court found, a de facto merger in an exchange
of shares plus liquidation of the seller, but the factual circumstances were
quite different. Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super.
333, 159 A.2d 146 (Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960).
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R. Dissenters' Appraisal Rights8 4
Although the North Carolina appraisal right statute885 has
fewer pitfalls than its counterparts in other states, enough difficulties remain. However, North Carolina alleviates some of these
problems, for whenever a substantive change triggers an appraisal
right, the corporation must give specific notice of the right, "including the twenty-day requirement. 3 8 6 If omitted, the transaction
is not invalidated, but an adversely affected shareholder has a limited
right to recover damages. 3 7 On a whole, the North Carolina appraisal right statute is about as satisfactory as can be expected, and Mr.
Robinson's discussion is a very good guide to it.3"8 However, there
are two matters which can and should be clarified.
1.-The statute should now settle the question when a registered
owner may demand appraisal rights for less than all of his shares.
Several principles point to a satisfactory resolution of this issue.
First, a shareholder should not be able to hedge by dissenting as to
some but not all of the shares which he owns both of record and
beneficially. Secondly, a registered owner, e.g., a broker holding
shares in street name for beneficial owners, should be able to split
his vote as record owner and dissent when so instructed by one or
..I should draw attention to my personal bias against appraisal rights;
in my view they generally have no proper rule today in American corporations and the statutory remedy should be eliminated. Folk, De Facto Mergers
in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. Rav. 1261
(1963). I would preserve them only (1) for minority shareholders of a subsidiary dissenting to a short-form merger of a subsidiary into its parent, (2)
for certain mergers involving close corporations whose shares are not
traded and cannot therefore be disposed of by an objecting shareholder, who
is therefore stuck with his shares unless he has an appraisal right, and (3)
for dissolutions where assets are distributed to shareholders collectively as
co-owners. See N.C. GuN. STAT. § 55-118(a) (2) (1965). Beyond these
limited situations, I would suggest that (1) the appraisal remedy is historically a transitional device to permit corporations to merge or sell assets
without complying with the old common law rule compelling unanimous
consent to such operations, and that since this rule would unlikely be applied today, the appraisal remedy loses its raison d'etre; and (2) the objectives of the appraisal remedy can better be accomplished by other devices,
such as higher voting requirements, more adequate disclosure of all relevant
facts, and possibly a greater disposition of courts to assess the fairness of
certain complicated corporate transactions rather than so supinely defer to
the presumed "good faith" and "business judgment" of the directors.
"' N.C.GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1965).
.8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-100(b) (2) (charter amendments), 55-108 (a)
(merger and consolidation), 11-112(c) (2) (sale of assets), and 55-118(a)
(2) (certain dissolutions) (1965).
8 8'N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 55-113(f)
ROBINSON §§ 204-08.

(1965).
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more of the beneficial owners. The New York statute best accomplishes this by providing that a "shareholder may not dissent as to
less than all of the shares, held by him of record, that he owns
beneficially. A nominee or fiduciary may not dissent on behalf of
any beneficial owner as to less than all of the shares of such owner
held of record by such nominee or fiduciary.

'3 8

9

2.-Under the North Carolina statute, only the dissenter may
go to court to determine the fair cash value of his shares; the
corporation apparently has no standing to sue. 39 " Hence many
different shareholder suits could be started and must be consolidated, unless all shareholders tacitly agree to abide the outcome of
a test suit. It would be better to authorize the corporation to
institute an appraisal proceeding, and treat the action as one quasi
in rem as in the Model Act 9 ' and many other statutes. Indeed,
New York requires the corporation to start the action and to serve
392
the petition on all shareholders who have perfected their dissent.
Thus, a single suit, initiated at an early stage of the proceedings,
will finally determine all issues of value and appraisal and will also
be a convenience to individual shareholders who need not take
affirmative action. The result of the decision should bind all shareholders with notice of the proceeding. In contrast, the North
Carolina statute looks to a suit involving the single shareholder
plaintiff and gives no indication as to the extent to which the judgment in one such suit is determinative of other shareholders' rights.
The New York and Model Act procedure would be much more
efficient than that now used in this state.
S. Dissolution
The dissolution provisions of any well-drafted corporation
statute such as North Carolina's rarely create controversy. In his
comprehensive chapters on dissolution and liquidation, 9 3 Mr. Robinson points out a few difficulties facing the careful attorney, but
these are not serious. I would suggest two points where the statute
could be clarified.
"N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(d). See 15 S.C.L.Q. 579 (1963) for a
discussion of two recent decisions wrestling with this problem in the
absence of a statute such as New York's.
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(e) (1965).
..ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 74 (1960).
8"2 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h) (1).
...
RoBINSON §§ 209-30.
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1. Automatic Dissolution.-Like many other statutes, the North
Carolina law permits a corporation to dissolve "automatically by
expiration of any period of duration to which the corporation is
limited by its charter,"'3 94 but if it continues in business a charter
amendment may extend or perpetuate its existence.315 Mr. Robinson's discussion 90 so clearly points up the problems of automatic
dissolution that I am persuaded that statutes should now require
all corporations to be dissolved only by an affirmative act. That act
would normally be the filing of articles of dissolution, preceded by
resolution of directors and shareholders.30 7 As it now stands, automatic dissolution means that the corporation terminates, possibly
without shareholders or creditors being aware of the event or its
significance. There is little, if any, reason for preserving this relic
of a day when corporate existence was usually limited to a fixed
period with legislative (later administrative) action needed to extend
it. Although close corporations may sometimes want limited life,
this can be as well achieved by ordinary dissolution procedures or
by an option to dissolve. So long as close corporations are protected, any reason for automatic dissolution evaporates; and we are
left only with the difficulties it spawns.
This archaic privilege should be eliminated or at least clarified.
New York has apparently dropped it.3 98 Connecticut 9' and South
Carolina40 o permit automatic dissolution, but require advance filing
with the Secretary of State of a "statement of intent to dissolve,"
thereby giving notice of the impending dissolution. Before expiration, the directors may alone amend the articles to make the corporate existence perpetual, and may revive the corporation within
one year of the expiration date. If automatic dissolution is to be
retained, it should be thought out more carefully than it is now; but
it would be better to delete it altogether.
2. Option to Dissolve.-The North Carolina statute was ap-

..'N.C. GEN.
...
N.C. GEN.

STAT.
STAT.

§ 55-114(a) (1) (1965).
§ 55-115(a) (1965).

...
RoBINSON § 217.
...
As authorized by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-118 (1965).
...
See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1001. However, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 402(a) (9) does require the certificate of incorporation to state "the duration of the corporation if other than perpetual," a provision which arguably
preserves a power of automatic dissolution on expiration of the stated
time period.
so Co0N. GEN. STAT. § 33-377 (1961).
,'9
S.C. CODE § 12-22.4 (Supp. 1964).
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parently the first to recognize agreements giving one or more of a
class of shareholders an option to dissolve a corporation by analogy
to a partner's right to dissolve a partnership.40 1 It is an exception
to the usual rule requiring a two-thirds (or in some states, a majority) vote of the shareholders; and it is likely to be used only by
very close enterprises including jointly-owned subsidiaries. The
North Carolina statute conditions enforcement of the option on
a showing that all shareholders are parties to or have actual notice
of the option. Apparently, it may be recited either in the charter
or in a side-agreement. It would be better for the statute to require
4 °2
so that this
the option to appear in the articles of incorporation
inspection
from
unusual type of provision can be readily determined
of public records. Moreover, it should appear on all stock certificates.40 3 In this way, both shareholders and creditors have a good
chance of actually knowing of the existence and content of the
option. When exercised, the corporation should be required promptly
to file articles of dissolution with the Secretary of State, giving
notice that liquidation has begun.4 0° At present, apparently no such
certificate need be filed if the corporation is voluntarily dissolved and
liquidated pursuant to the option.
I would also suggest that a dissolution option should be expressly limited to close corporations, by voiding the option when
40 5
Therethe corporation's shares come to be traded on any market.
after, dissolution would be approved only in the normal manner,
40 6
Even though shareholders
viz., by a two-thirds shareholder vote.
would presumably have "notice" of the option stated in the articles
of incorporation and on a stock certificate, this is inadequate when
shares are traded; the interests of purchasers, even when trading is
incipient and infrequent, should prevail over the desire of some
insiders to retain their dissolution option. The risk should be borne
""The statute authorizes it in the back-handed way of recognizing
jurisdiction of courts to decree involuntary dissolution pursuant to a shareholder's option to dissolve. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (3) (1965).
"02 N.Y. Bus. Core. LAw § 1002(a) so requires.
"'To accord with the provisions of the recently enacted Uniform
Commercial Code, the existence of the option should be "noted conspicuously" on the certificate representing the security. See N.Y. Bus. CoR'.
after New York enacted the Code.
LAw § 1002(c), a provision added 1002(a).
,0, See N.Y. Bus. Corp. LAw §
'As in S.C. CODE § 12-22.14(b) (Supp. 1964). Such a provision is
necessary to protect transferees from buying into a corporation which is
subject to such an unusual option.
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-118(a)(3) (1965).
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by those who have the unusual privilege the option confers. Hence,
termination of the option should be automatic when trading begins.
Finally, under the North Carolina statute, if a dissolution option
appears in the charter, may it be amended out by the normal majority
vote? Presumably so, unless the charter requires a higher vote to
make any amendments; and even then, it might eventually be removed by amending out the high vote requirement. Thus, the
statute should allow removal of a dissolution option only by a
vote of all of the shareholders, whether voting or non-voting,
unless the charter authorizes a lesser vote to remove this particular
option.4 07 But if the corporation is already in existence, a dissolution option should not be subsequently inserted except by unanimous
vote of all shareholders. °s
It is suggested that the dissolution option is a most useful device
for small corporations, that it has no place at all in enterprises whose
shares are traded, that it should appear at all times in the charter,
and that it should not be removable by the ordinary charter amending process.
T. Close Corporations
The North Carolina statute is rightly noted for pioneer close
corporation provisions which stimulated new developments in this
specialized but important field, especially in the Connecticut, Florida,
New York, and South Carolina statutes. Other states follow the
Model Act's somewhat rudimentary clauses, although its generally
satisfactory procedure for judicial dissolution on a shareholder
petition,"

9

similar to North Carolina's,

410

now appears in many

statutes which have not otherwise grappled with close corporation
issues. The most dramatic development is Florida's close corporation statute which is applicable only to enterprises whose shares are
not traded in any securities markets.4 11
...
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002(b) deals with this problem quite specifically and effectively. It requires action on the dissolution option by a
unanimous vote, or by such lesser vote as the charter specifically provides
shall govern any changes or amendments to a dissolution option.
408 See S.C. CODE 12-22.14(d)
(Supp. 1964); cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1002(b)
(1963).
40" ALA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 90 (1960, Supp. 1964).
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1965).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.0100 to .0107 (Supp. 1964). See 77 HARV.
L. REv. 1551 (1964). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1965) employs the same
"test" of a close corporation in broadly authorizing intracorporate arrangements which might otherwise be struck down as appropriate only to partnerships.
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Of the many close corporation provisions in the North Carolina
statute, this article selects for study only the procedures to correct
deadlock, a problem whose prevalence varies directly with the frequency of high voting and quorum requirements. The only North
Carolina remedy is dissolution ordered in the court's discretion on
a shareholder's showing any of four specified forms of damage.
Two of these grounds involve deadlock; either the directors are
unable to act,4 or the shareholders have been unable to elect
successor directors at two consecutive annual meetings.4 13 A third
basis is enforcement of a shareholder's option to dissolve the corporation.41 4 As a final ground, dissolution may be ordered if
"reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of
the complaining shareholder."4 5 If only one form of relief must be
chosen for breaking deadlock, dissolution under court control is the
appropriate remedy. Indeed, it is often unnecessary to order dissolution; its bare possibility may bring disputing directors and shareholders to their senses. If not, dissolution may be the only way out of
an impasse, particularly if the mutual confidence necessary to operating a small corporation, like a partnership, has vanished in a cloud
of bitterness and hatred. And, after all, it is rarely if ever possible
to secure "togetherness by injunction, 4 4 0 and it would be a vain
effort for a court to try it.
But dissolution is not a wholly satisfactory remedy. Since it
does irrevocably end a once viable concern which might have been
revived if the stalemate could have been broken, it entails the permanent loss of going-concern values. It is thus sufficiently drastic that
many courts shrink from it as court-enforced corporate suicide (or
judicial murder) hoping for the impasse to break-something that
can never happen if the enterprise dies by court decree. Hence the
observable judicial reluctance to order dissolution, even when
statutes give courts that power. Their discretion as to exercising
the power tempts them to withhold it. Courts may also feel, however incorrectly, that the fighting shareholders do not in their heart
of hearts wish to destroy the enterprise and will regret it if the act

'118 N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(1) (1965).
(1965).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § §55-125(a)(2)
55-125(a) (3) (1965). See text accompanying
'x'N.C. GEN. STAT.
notes 401-08 supra.
'.N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (4) (1965).
"' This apt phrase is from Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close
Corporation,73 HARv. L. Rnv. 1532, 1535 (1960).
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is done. Thus, New York once seized on a corporation's continuing
though diminishing profit-making potential to refuse dissolution
of a hopelessly deadlocked family concern.4 17 Even North Carolina
deeply cut into the policy of the 1955 act by a 1959 amendment
withdrawing judicial discretion to dissolve a corporation whose
shareholder deadlock results from "special provisions or arrange4 18
ments designed to create veto power among the shareholders.)
Thus the upholding of such intra-corporate arrangements-the
usual cause of shareholders deadlock-takes precedence over breaking impasse and letting the feuding shareholders end their relationship. I suggest that this amendment, beyond its obvious objective,
shows a deeper disquiet about over-reliance on dissolution as a
"way out," and that the time is now ripe for the pioneer close
corporation law to devise supplemental and alternative remedies for
the inescapable deadlock problem. Three such remedies are worth
considering, each of which keeps the corporation alive and functioning but may break the deadlock, and, in some cases, resolve the
underlying cause of which deadlock is but the symptom.
1. ProvisionalDirector.-California's procedure for appointing
a provisional director is the least drastic remedy since it deals essentially with symptoms rather than causes. Under this statute,419
if an evenly divided board of directors is deadlocked, half of the
420
directors or a third of the shareholders may seek a court order
designating an "impartial person" to serve as director so long as the
court keeps him in office or until he is removed by a majority of the
shareholders. The latter provision suggests that if the shareholders
can get together on this question, they have made real progress
towards breaking the deadlock. Of course, they may only want to
oust the intruder from the arena so that they can fight their own
way minus "outside agitators." During the provisional director's
'.In the Matter of Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d

563 (1954). N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1111(b) (3) (1963) sharply modified
this approach by stipulating that "dissolution is not to be denied merely
because it is found that the corporate business has been or could be conducted8 at a profit."
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(2) (1965).
...CAL. CORP. CODE § 819.
,"The judicial procedure for appointing a provisional director is swift
and summary and is often made on the basis of affidavits. See Edlund v.
Los Altos Builders, 106 Cal. App. 2d 350, 235 P.2d 28 (Dist. Ct. ADD. 1951);
Desert Club v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 2d 346, 221 P.2d 766 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1950).
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term of office, he has all the powers of the other directors, including
42 1
the right to notice, to attend meetings, and to vote.

Essentially, this is a method to force arbitration on warring
factions. Often it will work. The deadlock-breaking director, acting
independently and for the best interests of the corporation as seen
by an outsider, i.e., one whose perspective is not warped by the
feuding, may be able to vote on certain matters which are the underlying cause of deadlock; and once they are out of the way, the other
problems may be readily resolved. For instance, the corporation may
need to issue new shares to raise capital, but one faction refuses to
go along since it is financially unable or unwilling to acquire all
of the shares to which it has a pre-emptive right and thus fears loss
of control or disruption of the power balance. The provisional
director may well vote to issue the shares on the ground that the
overall needs of the corporation, e.g., its ability to make a strategic
move into an opening new market only if it has new capital, demands
that the factional interest be subordinated. Perhaps the provisional
director simply because of his presumptively dispassionate approach
can work out some other method which will be acceptable to the
parties and avoid disturbing the balance of power within the corporation. Thus, it is likely that, given a good appointee, the provisional
director may be able to bring the factions together, without having
to use his deadlock-breaking power, simply by pressing new ideas
or alternatives, or by acting as a mediator or conciliator.4 22
2. Compulsory Buyout of Shares.-A more far-reaching remedy
is the compulsory buy-out of shares of a dissenting stockholder.
With some shadowy antecedents in West Virginia 2 ' and California, 424 this remedy was first effectively developed by the English
.".
The California courts have stressed that the provisional director is in

no wise like a receiver, since he "is merely a director and has none of the
plenary powers which are granted to a receiver." His appointment, unlike
that of a receiver, does not reflect upon the financial standing or good name
of the corporation. In the Matter of Jamison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App.
2d 27--, 322 P.2d 246, 250 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
.2Although the statute is not specifically limited to close corporations,
in practice its remedy has only been invoked by very small enterprises,
usually ones with evenly divided shareholdings. See the cases cited in
notes2 420-21 supra.
.

W.VA. CODE § 3093 (1961).
CAL. CORP. CODE § 4658 permits

any holder of fifty per cent or more
of a corporation's outstanding shares to "buy off," with court approval, an
"'

action to appoint a receiver for a corporation or to dissolve it. The leading
decision under the statute is Merlino v. Fresno Macaroni Mfg. Co., 64 Cal.
App. 2d 462, 148 P.2d 884 (Dist. Ct. 1944).
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courts in fashioning relief under section 210 of the Companies Act
of 1948.425 Speaking generally, section 210 enables the court to
exercise the widest powers in granting relief when the court finds
that dissolution is appropriate except that it would prejudice some
group of shareholders; the statute specifically authorizes an order
compelling "the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members of the company or by the company ....
In Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc., Ltd. v. Meyer,4 26 a corporation,
organized to exploit a textile process developed by two individual
inventors, had 7,900 shares, of which 3,450 were held by the individuals and 4,000 by a corporation whose interests were adverse to
those of the individuals. Seeking to capture the entire profits of
the prosperous little company, the majority shareholder followed a
"lethal policy"4 27 of withholding necessary supplies of raw materials

and blocking the company's determined efforts to obtain them from
other suppliers. When the majority shareholder could not thereby
force the individuals to sell out at the sacrifice price it offered, it
tried to liquidate the corporation. When the individuals sought
section 210 relief, the majority shareholder was ordered to buy out
the other interests at a fair price. Lord Justice Deening noted that
"one of the most useful" powers under section 210 is to "order the
oppressor [majority shareholder] to buy [the injured minority
shareholder's] shares at a fair price: and a fair price would be, I
think, the value which the shares would have had at the date of the
petition, if there had been no oppression. Once the oppressor has
bought the shares, the company can survive. It can continue to
operate."42 8 The effect is to give the minority interests money compensation for the injury they sustain. I29While this procedure
enables the majority to force out the minority, it is costly to the
majority interests, since the court will no doubt generously calculate
"fair value" in aggravated circumstances. But the ouster of the
minority is not so horrifying as it seems at first sight, since, presumably, there would be no way to restore the status quo ante and
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.
[1959] A.C. 324 (1958) (Scot.), affirming [1954] Sess. Cas. 381
(Scot.
1st Div.).
7
1 Id. at 340.
"12 Id. at 369.
" In this respect, it bears some resemblance to short-form merger
statutes permitting the parent corporation to force out minority equity
interests by payment of cash or bonds. See text accompanying notes 364-65
428

supra.
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get the parties together again after such conflicts, indeed persecution. Liquidation would end the undeniable going-concern value of
the subsidiary, while the buy-out preserves that value but fairly
treats the ousted interests. Indeed, the minority will often be glad
to get out. Since their previous reluctance to do so is often due to
the sacrifice price previously offered them, court control of the price,
as in the statutory appraisal remedy, eliminates that difficulty. The
touchstone of fair valuation of the minority interests should, of
course, be the earnings potential of the shares which are sold out
under the court order.
The essential features of the English statute and decisions are
captured in a Connecticut statute which is in other respects similar
to North Carolina's section 55-125, permitting shareholders to seek
court-ordered dissolution of a deadlocked corporation. 43' After the
shareholder has instituted his suit, "any other shareholder" may
request the court to determine the fair value of the plaintiff's shares
in a procedure not dissimilar to appraising the fair value of a dissenting shareholder's interest. Thereafter the shareholder may elect
to buy the shares at that figure, the plaintiff must turn over his
shares, and the suit is dismissed.
Obviously, any shareholder will think twice before suing to
compel dissolution, since he may have to sell out his stock interest,
at a large tax cost to him if he has a low basis. Policywise, this
may weaken the position of the minority shareholder who will fear
to seek dissolution. But if the majority interests do not try to
force a potentially costly buy-out, they run the risk that the corporation may be dissolved by court order. On the other hand, the prospect that the majority -will have to buy off the suit at a large cost
may noticeably deter unconscionable conduct, and perhaps initiate
fruitful changes in the intra-corporate relations. Actually, there
may be some danger that a minority shareholder may sue to force
the majority shareholders to buy him off at an exaggerated price
just to be rid of him. Since the Connecticut statute inexplicably
states that the court "shall" determine fair value, the judge is in a
weaker posture to deal with a "strike" shareholder, since, unlike the
English courts, he lacks threshold discretion to decide whether
buy-out is warranted before proceeding with the expensive process
"" CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 33-384 (1961).
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of appraisal.
Clearly the court should be able to dismiss a suit
brought in bad faith or for an improper purpose at an early stage
of the proceedings.
3. "Section 210 Relief."-By far the most comprehensive relief
is found in section 210 of the English Companies Act. Besides the
compulsory buyout of shares just discussed, under the English
statute "the court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters
complained of, make such order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in future," including "any
alteration in or addition to any company's memorandum of articles." 4
In one case, the court kindly but effectively kicked a
domineering, senile majority shareholder upstairs into an honorary
presidency and isolated him from any meaningful contact with corporate affairs, but did not disturb his shareholdings, although his
sons, the petitioners, had asked for such a shift of control.43 3 In
another decision, the court refused any relief to a shareholder who
had been expelled from his corporate office on the technical ground
that the statute remedied only injuries to a shareholder qua shareholder but not in any capacity he might have as a director or officer
34
of the corporation.
Whatever the American reaction to vesting courts with such
sweeping powers, the procedure has been widely hailed in England
and duplicated in the Commonwealth, 43 5 and its extension has been
urged both in the revision of the Companies Act, 43 0 in the Northern
Ireland statute,'" and in the draft statute for Ghana.438 Indeed, it
"'Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-384(b) (1961) with Companies
Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210(2).
"" Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210(2), (3).
".It re H. R. Harmer Ltd., [1959] Weekly L. Rep. 62 (C.A. 1958),
involving the famous London stamp auction firm.
,"'Elder v. Elder & Watson Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49 (Scot. 1st Div.
1951). This is a particularly unfortunate and crippling construction of the
statute, since in close corporations a main source of income for shareholders
is salaries as officers; at least in the United States this is encouraged by
federal tax law under which salaries are deductible but dividends are not.
The English Company Law Amendment Committee ("Jenkins Committee")
has recommended that this decision be overruled. COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT, CMND. No. 1749, at 75 (1962).
...
Comparable statutes are in force in South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia.

...COMPANY

at 73-78 (1962).

LAW

AMENDMENT

ComITTEE,

REPORT, CMND.

No. 1749,

"' DEPARTMENTAL COM-ITTEE ON COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT,
ERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND, REPORT, CMND. No. 393, at 6-7,

(1959).

Gov10-12

"" COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE WORKING AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE COMPANY LAW OF GHANA, FINAL REPORT

160-62 (1961).
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bids fair to develop into general relief for breach of duty within the
corporation and oppression of shareholders. In particular, it is
only a matter of time before Parliament cuts the remedy loose from
its present connection with dissolution. Thus, instead of an alternative, invoked only when dissolution may be ordered but not otherwise, it will apparently become available even when dissolution could
not be granted but the dispute calls for some corrective action.
Only one American jurisdiction has adopted the section 210
idea. The South Carolina statute vests the courts with the same
discretion as the English prototype. 39 The relief may be granted
as an "alternative to a decree of dissolution, or may be granted
whenever the circumstances of the case are such that relief, but not
dissolution, would be appropriate." 4 ' Thus, injury not demanding
the "drastic" remedy of dissolution may be cured by a forced share
purchase, or a change in the by-laws or articles, or by some other
form of relief. Clearly, there is no connection with dissolution so
far as relief is concerned. 44' But the statute is in a sense tied to
dissolution since only those shareholders who have standing to
petition for dissolution, under the South Carolina counterpart442 to
North Carolina's section 55-125, may invoke the alternative relief
modeled on the English statute. This simply eliminates the need to
repeat the list of persons who would have standing to seek relief.
4.-Since deadlocks in close corporations are increasingly frequent, effective remedies other than dissolution are needed. The
most comprehensive remedy is a combination of statutes recognizing
(1) dissolution on petition of any shareholder, (2) judicial power
to appoint a provisional director, and (3) judicial discretion to
award relief under a statute modeled on England's section 210. If
the section 210 relief is thought too broad, the courts in order to
handle deadlocks should at least have the power, besides ordering
dissolution, to appoint a provisional director and to force a buy-out
of shares. Clearly dissolution is alone an insufficient tool for the
judges.
§ 12-22.23 (Supp. 1964).
§ 12-22.23(b) (Supp. 1964).
""This is in contrast to the wording of the English statute which
authorizes the alternative relief only if the circumstances are such as to
require dissolution. Certainly, a South African court has so construed
its comparable statute. Irvin & Johnson Ltd. v. Oelofse Fisheries, Ltd.,
1954 (1) So. Afr. L. Rep. 231. The Jenkins Committee recommends
"" S.C.
440

S.C.

CODE
CODE

eliminating that as a pre-condition to relief. COMPANY
COMMITTEE, REPORT, CMND. No. 1749, at 76 (1962).
"

S.C.

CODE

§ 12-22.15 (Supp. 1964).
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III. CONCLUSION

This article concludes its assessment of the North Carolina
corporation law in the light of post-1955 developments. It is clear
that on a whole the statute remains a sound and enduring piece of
work, excepting some major disagreements on policy. Apart from
this significant factor, the main deficiencies of the statute stem from
its failure to keep up to date with new corporation law developments,
both statutory and decisional, that have occurred since 1955. This
article's main objective is both to critique the statute in the light
of these developments and to draw upon them to suggest ways in
which the statute would more adequately balance the sometimes conflicting interests of those involved in and affected by the corporation.
One conclusion clearly emerges. It is that all states with an abiding interest in their corporation laws, including North Carolina,
should commission some organized group to maintain a continuing
and critical surveillance of the corporation statute. Such a committee
would not only maintain oversight of developments within this
state-decisions of the supreme court and (when known) of lower
courts, problems encountered by corporate law specialists in working
with the statute, and the changing needs of business-but would
also winnow out new statutory and case-law developments in other
states and determine which, if any, would be helpful in North
Carolina. The considered recommendations of a competent and
impartial committee would carry great weight and would render
incalculably valuable service in maintaining the North Carolina
statute in the forefront of corporate laws, a position from which
it has begun to slip.
This could be a legislative committee, or a bar association committee, charged with this specific purpose and not involved in other
duties, or a joint legislative-bar association committee. Several
states, including Pennsylvania and Delaware, have for some time
had bar association committees maintaining a continuous and specialized oversightof their corporation statutes with a specific purpose of
revising, clarifying, and improving these statutes in the light of the
continuing changes in this rapidly growing area of the law. The
approach is recommended for North Carolina.*
* Since this article went to press, the compulsory dividend requirement
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(i) (1965) has been made inapplicable to "any
corporation having total assets of one million dollars ($1,000,000) or more
and whose shareholders number seven hundred and fifty (750) or more,"
N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 726, in an apparent effort to co-ordinate the
state-law exemption with new federal requirements for registering securities of certain corporations traded over-the-counter.

